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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the experience of work and industrial relations at the British Motor 
Corporation’s commercial vehicle assembly plant at Bathgate in West Lothian, from its 
establishment in 1961 until its closure in 1986. The plant opened in Scotland as a result of a 
government regional development policy which sought to create jobs and ameliorate the 
rundown of heavy industry in areas of high unemployment. The thesis considers the role of such 
policy in shaping industrial development since 1945, and, using the oral history testimony of 
former Bathgate workers to examine the impact of economic and social change on Scotland’s 
industrial population, contributes to the regional policy literature by extending the analysis 
beyond questions about its efficacy and considering the experiences of the workers and 
communities directly affected by such initiatives. 
What emerges from this study of regional policy from the perspective of the shopfloor is the 
extent to which the plant’s establishment on a greenfield site, in an area of high unemployment, 
very much on the periphery of the UK motor industry and with little tradition of mass assembly 
production processes, shaped the subsequent evolution of its working conditions, industrial 
relations, and worker attitudes, as well as its position within the Bathgate community. The 
Bathgate experience therefore illuminates a number of key debates in the wider historiography of 
Britain and Scotland since 1945, not only in relation to regional policy itself, but also with regard 
to the motor industry, its industrial relations, and the development, in the post-war context of 
relatively high wages and the increasing stability of work, of a more typically ‘affluent’ working 
class. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One explores some of the issues surrounding the plant’s 
establishment in West Lothian, particularly the regional policy aspects, and the plant’s position 
within and relationship to both the wider BMC – later British Leyland – organisation and the 
British motor industry more generally. Part Two draws extensively on the influential ‘affluent 
worker’ thesis, as well as the literature around the industrial relations of motor manufacturing, in 
developing and exploring questions related to the way in which work was experienced at 
Bathgate, and the extent to which the attitudes and behaviour of its workforce came to reflect 
ii 
 
those which typified the motor worker elsewhere. Throughout, the thesis engages with and adds 
nuance to debates over the role of shopfloor organisation and strike activity in damaging the 
performance of British motor manufacturing, and, by drawing on the oral testimony of former 
Bathgate workers themselves, offers a fresh perspective on the post-war experience of regional 
policy both in a particular, under-researched regional policy plant, and in Scotland and Britain 
more broadly.  
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Introduction 
In his survey of Scotland’s twentieth century, John Foster writes that ‘the two words 
‘Ravenscraig’ and ‘Linwood’ are etched in Scottish industrial history’.1 The Colvilles steel strip 
mill, opened at Ravenscraig, near Motherwell, in 1959, and Linwood’s Rootes car plant, which 
followed in 1963, have been central elements in the historiography of Scotland’s industrial and 
economic development since 1945, representing the attempted ‘reindustrialisation’ of Scotland, 
and in many accounts, symbolic of its failure. Missing from Foster’s analysis, however, and 
marginalised in many others, is the truck and tractor plant established by the British Motor 
Corporation (BMC) at Bathgate, in West Lothian, in 1961. This preceded Linwood and was in 
fact the first motor plant to be built in what were, from 1960, termed the Development Districts, 
as a result of regional policy. This initiative, under Harold Macmillan’s Conservative 
government, sought to create jobs in unemployment ‘black spots’ while easing inflationary 
pressures in the ‘congested’ Midlands and South-East of England. 2  Foster argues that the 
developments at Ravenscraig, Linwood, and Bathgate faced opposition from ‘traditionalist’ 
sections of Scotland’s business elite with interests in the heavy industries, but other economic 
actors, including the Scottish Trades’ Union Congress (STUC) and the Scottish Council for 
Development and Industry (SCDI), viewed them as essential to the diversification and 
modernisation of the Scottish industrial base.
3
 This was due in part to the success of motor 
manufacturing in driving the growth and prosperity seen in the West Midlands especially since 
1945, and the expectation that the availability of steel from Ravenscraig would induce substantial 
secondary development in ancillary industries, encouraging the growth of a sustainable and 
similarly prosperous Scottish motor industry, providing thousands of jobs, and helping to close 
the productivity and employment ‘gap’ between Scotland and the rest of the UK.  
The focus on the motor industry as key to Scotland’s economic development was, however, 
highly problematic. The motor industry is, after all, frequently cited in the historiography as a 
symbol of British industrial decline, and the idea that its industrial relations were marked by the 
                                                          
1
 J. Foster, ‘The Twentieth Century’, in R.A. Houston and W. Knox, The New Penguin History of Scotland (London: 
Penguin, 1991) p.468. 
2
 G. O’Hara, ‘A Journey Without Maps: The Regional Policies of the 1964-70 British Labour Government’, 
Regional Studies, 39:9, 2005, p.1184. 
3
 Foster, ‘The Twentieth Century’, pp.468-470; J. Phillips, The Industrial Politics of Devolution (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2010) pp.18-21. 
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militancy and self-interest of its shop stewards in particular has become a familiar trope in media 
portrayals of Britain during the 1960s and 1970s.
4
 There are problems with this characterisation, 
but the industry was plainly grappling with periodic market, design, and supply chain difficulties, 
of which its labour troubles were, perhaps, symptomatic, and which narrowed the potential 
benefits of the regional policy intervention in Scotland. In addition, much of the literature 
surrounding the regional policy project, both from the perspective of its role in Scotland’s 
economic development, and in terms of its impact on the performance of the UK motor industry, 
has highlighted the difficulties associated with introducing semi-skilled mass assembly 
production processes to an area with little tradition of light engineering. Christopher Harvie, for 
example, is among those who have suggested that Linwood’s poor industrial relations record 
stemmed from the problems of adapting a previously highly skilled workforce to assembly line 
work, while Peter Dunnett, in his study of The Decline of the British Motor Industry implies that 
the ‘fractious’ Scottish labour force was inherently unsuited to motor industry working 
practices.
5
 However, the monotony, loss of skill, and loss of autonomy associated with motor 
assembly work has also been closely linked to the image of the motor worker as the archetypal 
‘economic man’ or ‘affluent worker’, to use the terminology of John Goldthorpe et al.’s 
influential 1969 study of workers at Vauxhall and a number of other employers in the town of 
Luton.
6
 The conflict between the assumption in the literature that Scottish labour could not, or 
would not, adapt to the motor industry assembly line, and the Goldthorpe analysis, in which 
workers overlooked the intrinsic benefits of skilled work in order to pursue the greater financial 
rewards associated with assembly work in the new industries, suggests that motor industry work 
was experienced in a highly distinct manner in Scotland’s regional policy plants.  
Bathgate’s absence from much of the historiography of the post-war Scottish economy also 
signals the peculiar position of commercial vehicle manufacture in the motor industry literature: 
definitions of ‘motor industry’ vary, but much of the literature tends to focus on car production, 
                                                          
4
 See, for example, T. Claydon, ‘Images of Disorder: Car Workers’ Militancy and the Representation of Industrial 
Relations in Britain, 1950-79’, in D. Thoms, L. Holden, and T. Claydon (eds), The Motor Car and Popular 
Culture in the Twentieth Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). 
5
 C. Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes: Scotland since 1914 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1981) p.151; P. Dunnett, The Decline of the British Motor Industry: The Effects of Government Policy, 1945-
1979 (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p.181. 
6
 H. Turner, G. Clack and G. Roberts, Labour Relations in the Motor Industry: A Study of Industrial Unrest and an 
International Comparison (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967) p.331. 
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and offers little detailed analysis of other sectors of the industry and its supply chain.
7
 This thesis 
addresses this gap in the literature, and examines the experience of the BMC – later British 
Leyland (BL) – and its workforce at Bathgate, as it illuminates and offers new ways of thinking 
about three inter-related areas of economic and social development that are central to 
understanding Scotland and Britain’s post-1945 history: industrial change and the role of 
regional policy; the motor industry and its industrial relations; and the development, in the 
context of post-war full employment, of a more typically ‘affluent’ working class.  
 
Full employment, economic growth, and regional policy 
Clive Lee discusses regional policy and the growth of state intervention in the economy in terms 
of the post-war consensus and UK government commitments to full employment, and 
emphasises the extent to which the developments at Ravenscraig, Linwood, and Bathgate, 
apparently driven by the short-term need to create jobs and alleviate unemployment in depressed 
areas, have attracted criticism.
8
 George Peden argues in this vein that the focus on providing jobs 
proved damaging to the overall Scottish economy in the long-term, as it directed regional policy 
to ‘development areas that were defined by high rates of unemployment’, and gave very little 
consideration to either existing industry or the development of the Scottish economy as a whole.
9
 
By contrast, Jim Tomlinson concludes that, from the 1950s, when full employment was reached 
in many parts of England at least, job creation was replaced by the preservation or creation of 
economic growth as the main objective of government.
10
 Tomlinson argues that a growing 
awareness of Britain’s declining importance as a global power was accompanied by an increased 
focus on domestic economic improvement rather than the strategic implications of economic 
policy. This could initially be achieved through the promotion of full employment, but greater 
                                                          
7
 In some analyses, ‘motor industry’ is taken to refer to car manufacturing only, with some studies of industrial 
relations in particular excluding explicitly commercial vehicle manufacturing on the grounds that it was 
generally more specialised and less automated than car production. In other cases, the scope of the study is 
unclear. Bathgate was, however, designed predominantly to produce small trucks, and used mass assembly 
processes which were not common in older commercial vehicle plants, and more representative of car 
manufacturing.   
8
 C. H. Lee, ‘Unbalanced Growth: Prosperity and Deprivation’, in T. M. Devine, C. H. Lee, and G. C. Peden (eds), 
The Transformation of Scotland: The Economy Since 1700 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005) 
pp.220-221. 
9
 Peden, ‘The Managed Economy’, in Devine et al, The Transformation of Scotland, p.246. 
10
 J. Tomlinson, The Politics of Decline (Harlow: Longman, 2001), p.79. 
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economic growth would be necessary to increase consumption and secure the ‘doubling of living 
standards in twenty-five years’ promised, in a 1954 speech, by the Conservative Chancellor, 
R.A. Butler.
11
 For Tomlinson, 1960 marked the year in which growth, previously more a ‘happy 
aspiration’ than a policy priority, emerged as a central issue, shifting the parameters of policy 
debate and encouraging greater state intervention in the economy.
12
 This resulted in part from a 
‘statistical revolution’, which allowed countries to compare their relative economic performance, 
but was also informed by the need to ensure that high levels of employment could be maintained 
and living standards could continue to rise even with full employment achieved.
13
 As Tomlinson 
writes, ‘growth could deliver more of everything’, and was therefore popular with politicians and 
academics on both the Left and the Right.  
It was under the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan that the new rhetoric of 
‘planning’ emerged, which was to dominate policy throughout the 1960s and 1970s, recognising 
the shift required in macro-economic policy if continued expansion was to be realised.
14
 Foster 
writes that regional policy was at the heart of this new focus on planned growth, and both he and 
Tomlinson highlight the importance of the creation in 1961 of the National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC), set up to establish targets for growth and to analyse any possible 
impediments and, as Tomlinson writes, perhaps most important as a symbol of what he calls this 
‘great reappraisal’ in British economic policy.15 While Tomlinson describes the impact of the 
NEDC as mainly symbolic, it is central to Foster’s analysis of the development of regional policy 
and its effects on Scottish industry. For Foster, regional policy was driven not by the need to 
create jobs and prosperity in the depressed Development Districts, but by concerns over the 
potentially damaging effects on growth of the concentration of industry in the Midlands and 
South-East of England. Certainly in the West Midlands, where motor manufacturing and its 
supply chain supported a strong regional economy, unemployment scarcely rose above one per 
cent throughout the 1950s, and concerns were, by the end of that decade, emerging over both its 
limited capacity for further growth, and the potentially inflationary consequences of overheating. 
In order to secure continued growth, therefore, it would be necessary to disperse new industrial 
                                                          
11
 Ibid, pp.3, 10. 
12
 J. Tomlinson, Government and the Enterprise since 1900: The Changing Problem of Efficiency (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994) pp.246-247. 
13
 Tomlinson, The Politics of Decline, p.13; Tomlinson, Government and the Enterprise, p.247. 
14
 Ibid, p.248; Foster, ‘The Twentieth Century’, p.468. 
15
 Tomlinson, Government and the Enterprise, p.248; Foster, ‘The Twentieth Century’, p.468. 
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development away from the congested areas, and into those with higher levels of unemployment 
such as Scotland, Northern Ireland, Tyneside, and South Wales, where surplus labour could be 
used to both release these pressures in the south, and reduce operating costs for manufacturing 
firms.
16
 Indeed, the NEDC published a series of reports which highlighted the ‘growth potential’ 
of reserves of unemployed labour in both depressed regions and ‘declining industries’, and the 
report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Scottish Economy, known as the Toothill Report and 
published in 1961, similarly recommended that Scotland’s heavy industries be rundown in order 
to create such a pool of labour which could be used to attract investment in the ‘new’ consumer 
goods industries.
17
 
Toothill is significant as it marks a shift in regional policy thinking in Scotland which reflected 
the wider pervasiveness of growth as a key economic objective, and the concern that Scotland’s 
relatively high rate of unemployment – which at 3.1 per cent was low by historic standards but 
still twice the rate in England – demonstrated that the Scottish economy was lagging behind the 
rest of the UK.
18
 The report described unemployment as a symptom of low growth which could 
be reversed through the renewal and modernisation of the industrial base, and considered heavy 
industry an obstacle, characterised by poor industrial relations, weak management, and outdated 
methods.
19
 Both Foster and Jim Phillips have highlighted the divisions which emerged between 
the ‘modernisers’, represented by Toothill, who stressed the importance of cultivating younger 
forms of manufacturing, and those ‘traditionalists’, with interests in Scotland’s older, heavy 
industrial sectors.
20
 In these terms, Foster presents the establishment of Ravenscraig in 1958 as a 
victory for the modernisers, although it is important to note that both Ravenscraig, conceived in 
the early 1950s, and Bathgate, under discussion in 1959, opened before Toothill reported and 
were unaffected by its recommendations.
21
 Toothill was in fact critical of the ‘defensive 
thinking’ which lay behind these previous regional policy initiatives that had sought to create 
jobs in unemployment black spots, and in particular the 1960 Local Employment Act.
22
 This 
                                                          
16
 Foster, ‘The Twentieth Century’, p.468. 
17
 Ibid, p.468; Committee of Inquiry appointed by the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) under the 
Chairmanship of J. N. Toothill, Report on the Scottish Economy (Edinburgh, 1961) pp.19-20. 
18
 J. Phillips, The Industrial Politics, p.20; Toothill, Scottish Economy, pp.17-19. 
19
 Foster, ‘The Twentieth Century’, p.470. 
20
 Ibid, pp.468-471; Phillips, The Industrial Politics, pp.19-20. 
21
 D. Stewart, ‘Fighting for Survival: The 1980s Campaign to Save Ravenscraig Steelworks’, Journal of Scottish 
Historical Studies, 25:1, 2005, p.40. 
22
 Phillips, The Industrial Politics, p.21; Toothill, Scottish Economy, p.154. 
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introduced the designation of Development Districts, smaller than the previous Development 
Areas, on the basis of unemployment rates of over 4.5 per cent, and, in Peter Scott’s analysis, 
transformed regional policy ‘entirely into one of short-term unemployment alleviation’.23 For 
Scott, Toothill represented a catalyst which refocused regional policy on longer-term economic 
growth rather than the short-term imperative to create jobs which had informed Conservative 
policy in the late 1950s, and had led to the dispersal of motor manufacturing to Scotland, 
Merseyside, and South Wales. In this analysis, the earlier decision to direct motor industry 
expansion out of the Midlands was political, designed to show the government’s commitment to 
reducing regional unemployment and justifiable on social policy grounds, which had the effect of 
incurring increased costs and reducing the efficiency of British motor manufacturing.
24
 
This is largely in line with Gavin McCrone’s 1969 study of regional policy, in which he writes 
that 1960 marked a ‘natural dividing line’ in the way in which the ‘regional problem’ was 
approached. Anticipating Tomlinson’s conclusion that it was in 1960 that growth supplanted full 
employment as the UK government’s central economic policy priority, McCrone argued that 
regional planning was increasingly treated as a problem of growth, and was afforded greater 
precedence than it had been in the years immediately following the war, when the commitment 
to ‘high and stable’ employment levels had first been articulated as a government objective in the 
1944 White Paper on Employment Policy.
25
 However, while this white paper accepted that ‘the 
maintenance of a high and stable level of employment’ was a primary aim and responsibility of 
government, it also acknowledged that, in the cases of some depressed industrial areas, there was 
no real hope of economic revival and so the resettlement of some workers in more favourable 
locations would be necessary.
26
 McCrone argues that this made better economic sense than the 
targeting of unemployment black spots which emerged during the following decade, and in this 
context the 1960 Act is regarded as something of an anomaly, which continued the 
‘preoccupation with the social aspects’ of the regional problem seen during the 1950s, rather 
                                                          
23
 P. Scott, ‘The Worst of Both Worlds: British Regional Policy, 1951-64’, Business History, 38:4, 1996, p.56. 
24
 Ibid, pp.54-55; P. Scott, ‘Regional Development and Policy’, in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds), The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume III: Structural Change and Growth, 1939-2000 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp.351-352. 
25
 G. McCrone, Regional Policy in Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969) p.120. 
26
 Ibid, pp.106-107; Employment Policy (London: HMSO, 1944), pp.3, 13-14. 
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than reflecting the greater emphasis on economic factors which was to mark the 1960s 
approach.
27
  
The Bathgate and Ravenscraig developments perhaps bridged these two approaches. The BMC, 
during a period of increasing difficulty in the heavy industries, was steered to West Lothian by 
the Board of Trade primarily because of the area’s high level of unemployment, but its 
development was not discussed solely in terms of job creation. While Scott describes Toothill as 
a ‘catalyst’ which changed the focus of regional policy in Scotland in particular, David Stewart 
characterises it instead as the encapsulation of a consensus which had emerged in Scotland 
during the 1950s, shaped by the potential of Ravenscraig to attract light industries as well as 
supporting existing Scottish heavy engineering firms.
28
 Irene Maver, in her analysis of the 
economic development of the Glasgow conurbation, has similarly discussed attempts during the 
1950s to ‘create a distinctive regional identity, based on the potential of steel and motor 
vehicles’.29 In this context, Bathgate, Ravenscraig, and, later, Linwood – described by Maver as 
‘Scotland’s Detroit’ – were seen as providing a basis, or anchor, which would attract further 
motor industry investment and breed ancillary manufacturing, enabling the economic 
redevelopment of Central Scotland more widely. There is, perhaps, some tension between 
Tomlinson’s assertion that economic growth replaced full employment as the key concern of 
government during the 1950s, and Scott’s characterisation of pre-Toothill regional policy as 
informed above all by the need to create jobs in unemployment black spots, but, as this suggests, 
these positions are not necessarily incompatible. The BMC’s establishment at Bathgate was 
primarily a response to that area’s high unemployment, but it was shaped by both the need to 
secure continued growth in the full-employment Midlands, and an early awareness of the 
potential role of motor manufacturing in driving the growth and modernisation of the Scottish 
economy. Furthermore, in Tomlinson’s analysis, the imperative placed on growth had emerged 
from the need to ensure continued improvements in living standards even in areas of full 
employment: conditions which had yet to be achieved in Central Scotland.   
 
                                                          
27
 Ibid, pp.120-121. 
28
 Stewart, ‘Fighting for Survival’, pp.43-44. 
29
 I. Maver, Glasgow (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000) p.213. 
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The motor industry and its industrial relations 
The establishment of the motor plants at Bathgate and Linwood was seen as essential to the 
modernisation of Scottish industry, and yet motor manufacturing and its industrial relations 
during the 1960s and 1970s have been central tenets of both contemporary discussions of the 
alleged failure of British industry, and the historiography of Britain’s economic decline since 
1945. The experience of the BMC and its workforce at Bathgate highlights many of the 
complexities of the industry, and especially its commercial vehicle sector, which exhibited in 
exaggerated form some of the key features of the industry as a whole. This is particularly true of 
its deep-rooted supply chain weaknesses, which were exacerbated by the length of the supply 
line from component makers in the Midlands to assembly in Scotland, and had considerable 
influence on the way in which work, pay, and industrial relations developed at the plant. Workers 
in the motor industry, and especially those living and working in the tight labour markets of the 
Midlands and South East, were noted for their relative affluence, and indeed it was the success of 
the industry in providing jobs and driving the growth experienced in the West Midlands 
especially which both contributed to inflationary concerns there, and demonstrated the 
importance of attracting motor manufacturers to Scotland. Paradoxically, however, the affluent 
motor worker, representative of the drive for growth and the increase in personal consumption, 
came to be associated with the poor industrial relations and low productivity central especially to 
analyses which highlighted the role of restrictive trade union practices in damaging the 
competitiveness of British industry.
30
 Motor manufacturing was, after 1945, the UK’s third most 
strike-prone industrial sector, accounting for five per cent of all stoppages and 13 per cent of 
working days lost, and the industry became a symbol of the country’s allegedly poor industrial 
relations.
31
 This was especially the case at BL, from 1975 a state-owned ‘national champion’ 
which, Tim Claydon writes, ‘had for some time been seen as exemplifying in acute form wider 
problems in British industrial relations’.32 Derek ‘Red Robbo’ Robinson, Communist convenor 
of shop stewards at the company’s Austin car plant at Longbridge in Birmingham, developed a 
‘formidable reputation’ in the press, and the public reaction to his sacking in 1979 is seen by 
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Claydon as an illustration of ‘how central a position in political and economic discourse 
industrial relations had come to occupy by the late 1970s’.33 Claydon links this to what he terms 
a ‘meta-narrative of disorder’, which he argues dominated public perceptions of industrial 
relations and, in so doing, contributed significantly to a ‘sense of crisis in British political and 
economic life’.34 Steve Jefferys, in a study of shopfloor organisation at Longbridge, describes the 
long-term development of a particularly confrontational style of labour relations at the plant, 
which began with the rigidly anti-union stance of Herbert Austin in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, and the belief that ‘the Austin couldn’t be organised’, and culminated in the 
sacking of Robinson in 1979. For Jefferys, a key factor in the creation of problems at the plant 
was ‘chronic management failure’ during the 1960s, when sectional and unofficial disputes were 
increasing, but management made no attempts to assess this situation or construct a different 
framework of labour relations, allowing informal shopfloor organisation to grow in strength.
35
  
It was this feature of industrial relations in the motor industry which caused much of the 
contemporary press and political concern, and which has since remained central to historical 
debate. Among the most notable contemporary studies is Turner, Clack, and Roberts’ Labour 
Relations in the Motor Industry, which, published in 1967, had considerable influence on the 
work of the Donovan Commission, or Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations. The report of this commission, established in response to concerns over the impact 
of unofficial strike action in British manufacturing, drew on Turner et al.’s characterisation of 
the ‘parallel unionism’ which had developed in British car plants, and was marked by the 
strength, independence, and relative moderation of motor industry shop stewards.
36
 Turner et al. 
rejected explicitly the ‘agitator’ theory of strike causation, according to which strike activity in 
the British motor industry was propagated by supposedly militant shop stewards, but considered 
the emergence of this informal system of industrial relations within the industry – alongside its 
instability of both earnings and employment, and the importance attributed to ‘fair wages’ – in 
their discussion of its relative strike-proneness.
37
 In more recent literature, however, there has 
                                                          
33
 Ibid, p.229. 
34
 Ibid, p.230. 
35S. Jefferys, ‘The Changing Face of Conflict: Shopfloor Organization at Longbridge, 1939-1980’, in M. Terry and 
P. K. Edwards, Shopfloor Politics and Job Controls: The Post-War Engineering Industry (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1989) p.73.  
36
 Turner et al., Labour Relations in the Motor Industry, p.329. 
37
 Ibid, pp.339-344. 
10 
 
been a stronger emphasis on the disruptive nature of labour organisation in the industry. Jonathan 
Zeitlin, for instance, has argued that ‘structural features of British trade unionism and collective 
bargaining have played an important role in the progressive decline of the British economy’.38 
Zeitlin’s argument is that the ‘peculiarity of the English’ which led to this decline was ‘not the 
prevalence of shop steward organisation, job control, and restrictive practices…but rather their 
diffusion throughout the industrial structure, including technically advanced mass production and 
process industries’.39 This is an idea which has subsequently been criticised by Dave Lyddon 
who takes a more ‘bottom up’ approach to trade union organisation. While Zeitlin argues that 
trade unionism trickled down to semi- and unskilled workers from craftsmen keen to preserve 
their own status, Lyddon emphasises the nature of official trade unionism as ‘the institutional 
expression of what has been called “the spontaneous association of workers on the shop floor”’, 
and the willingness of trade unions, notably the Amalgamated Engineering Union, to support the 
constitutional office of shop steward, albeit arguably as a means of ‘decapitating’ the leadership 
of the shop steward movement itself.
40
 Lyddon, unlike Zeitlin, does not see organised labour as 
an important factor in Britain’s post-war economic difficulties, and argues that far from being the 
‘British disease’ as it is sometimes referred to, ‘attempts by workers to exercise control over 
work is a structural feature of all capitalist societies, not the result of a prior tradition of craft 
control.’41  
While there is a debate about the character of motor industry trade unionism and its role in 
Britain’s allegedly poor post-war economic performance, there is less disagreement about the 
position of the motor industry itself, and indeed much of the historiography of motor 
manufacturing since 1945 is marked by a sense of near-permanent crisis and disorder. Books 
such as Jonathan Wood's Wheels of Misfortune: The Rise and Fall of the British Motor Industry, 
Roy Church’s The Rise and Decline of the British Motor Industry, Peter Dunnett’s The Decline 
of the British Motor Industry, and Timothy Whisler’s The British Motor Industry, 1945-1994: A 
Case Study in Industrial Decline offer various perspectives on what is an accepted position: that, 
during the 1960s and 1970s in particular, the British motor industry experienced ‘one of the most 
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spectacular industrial declines’, as its share of the world market in cars fell by half, and BL in 
particular came to represent ‘a byword for industrial anarchy’. 42  However, most of these 
accounts have included the industry’s industrial relations alongside their analyses of numerous 
other factors in its decline. Whisler, for example, has emphasised the ‘rigidity and insularity’ 
which existed on the part of both labour and management, as well as weaknesses in product 
engineering and design, while Wood and Church are among those who have similarly criticised 
the weak, short-sighted management of British car firms and their subsequent inability to adapt 
to changing market conditions.
43
 Studies of BL in particular have highlighted that company’s 
creation as the culmination of a series of takeovers and mergers across the industry, which left it 
with an extremely complex corporate structure and an inefficient and unwieldy range of 
products.
44
 This is the focus of recent work by Jon Murden, who examines the problems caused 
by the lack of pay parity across the industry and its increasingly complex firms. In Murden’s 
analysis, the labour difficulties caused by this issue were exacerbated by the dispersal of motor 
manufacturing to the Development Districts, where car makers could take advantage of 
depressed local labour market conditions and pay considerably lower wages than pertained in the 
Midlands.
45
  
 
Branch plant syndrome: the historiography of regional policy in 
Scotland 
Other analyses have suggested that the dispersal of motor manufacturing to the Development 
Districts exacerbated the industry’s structural peculiarities by introducing further complexity to 
the supply chain and contributing to the problem of over-capacity.
46
 Indeed, supply chain 
difficulties resulting from the relative isolation of Bathgate and Linwood have emerged as a 
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central tenet of the historiography of regional policy in Scotland. This is frequently characterised 
by a ‘branch plant’ narrative stressing the extent to which the post-war Scottish economy became 
reliant on factories established by English or foreign-owned firms as a result of government 
incentives, and offering only low status assembly work.
47
 Indeed, the idea of a branch plant 
economy is central to much of the literature relating to regional policy and inward investment in 
Britain more generally, and the Scottish experience can be seen as part of a much broader trend 
which developed as Britain, and its peripheral regions in particular, came increasingly to depend 
on plants established by multinationals (MNEs). As Peter Scott has shown, multinational 
investment in the ‘new’ industries did assist in the restructuring of the British economy towards 
higher growth sectors, but branch plants established in peripheral regions especially lacked 
‘embeddedness’ in the local economy and were thus acutely vulnerable to closure.48 As Scott’s 
analysis suggests, branch plants have often brought benefits in terms of employment, but this has 
generally not been reflected in more ‘dynamic, developmental impacts’, as headquarters and 
research and development (R&D) functions have largely remained outside the assisted areas.
49
 In 
the Scottish context, the branch plant economy and the growth of the consumer goods industries 
more generally has been linked to the deskilling of the workforce, with William Knox, for 
example, describing the plants established by American electronics firms in particular as ‘little 
better than low level assembly production units’.50 Recent work by Pavlos Dimitratos, Ioanna 
Liouka, Duncan Ross, and Stephen Young, however, has re-examined the impact of MNE 
investment in Scotland, and distinguishes between the MNE branch plant, or ‘production 
subsidiary’, the ‘developmental subsidiary’, and the ‘entrepreneurial subsidiary’, the latter 
exemplified by the IBM electronics factory established at Greenock in 1951. While the first of 
these is characterised by low levels of autonomy and reliance on imported supplies, the 
entrepreneurial subsidiary has made a far more dynamic contribution to the Scottish economy, 
developing greater autonomy in terms of entrepreneurship and R&D, and becoming far more 
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embedded than branch plant analyses allow.
51
 The IBM example highlights the possibility of 
dynamic growth, functioning initially as an assembly-based branch plant, but taking on new 
responsibilities as it expanded during the 1970s and survived into the twenty-first century. This 
is distinct from Bathgate where developments were informed not so much by the physical 
positioning of the plant in Scotland and its remoteness from suppliers and markets, but by 
features of the motor industry more generally, exaggerated but not created by the plant’s 
geographical distance from the Midlands. 
While Bathgate has been of marginal importance to most accounts of regional policy in Scotland, 
the car factory at Linwood has attracted more attention. It is arguable that this is in part due to its 
reputation for poor industrial relations, and certainly much of the literature relates to the 
difficulties associated with establishing an assembly plant in an area with a strong craft tradition 
which, in Peter Dunnett’s words, introduced ‘an unsuitable fractious labour force’ into the motor 
industry.
52
 Implicit in such analyses are the linked assumptions that Scotland’s predominant 
industrial culture was fundamentally different to that of the Midlands and South of England, that 
the Scottish workforce was unsuited to motor industry production, and, that Scotland’s motor 
plants were therefore doomed inevitably to fail. As Jim Phillips has shown, this rests on tenuous 
thinking about the nature of Linwood workers’ previous employment, 53  and other recent 
accounts have suggested some limits to this interpretation of regional policy in Scotland. Clive 
Lee, for example, describes Linwood as ‘typically expensive and relatively short-lived’, but 
shows that, during the period in which the government remained committed to creating jobs in 
areas of relatively high unemployment, around 39,000 new jobs were created and Scottish GDP 
made significant progress in catching up with the rest of the UK.
54
 Richard Finlay has similarly 
addressed the paradox represented by Scotland’s increasing prosperity, with growing 
consumption, and improving standards of living during a period ‘normally characterised by 
economic failure’, while Phillips has suggested that, when social as well as economic criteria are 
considered, the extent of Linwood’s ‘failure’ has been exaggerated. Linwood was open for 
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roughly two decades, and in that time provided work for thousands of people, which went some 
way to ameliorating the difficulties associated with the longer-term rundown of Scotland’s old 
industrial sectors of coal mining and shipbuilding.
55
  
 
Scotland’s affluent workers? 
Alison Gilmour’s work on Linwood has examined its industrial relations and demonstrated the 
strength of its shopfloor organisation, and Niall MacKenzie has explored the efficacy of 
government initiatives in the Highlands, but the historiography more generally contains very 
little analysis of the broader economic and social dimensions of regional policy in Scotland.
56
 
Furthermore, the branch plant narrative has, perhaps, obscured the impact that plants such as 
Bathgate had on the lives of their workers and the wider communities they affected, not only in 
terms of the jobs they provided, but also in stimulating the creation of additional housing, 
improved transport infrastructure, and new leisure, retail, and educational facilities. Certainly in 
the Bathgate example the plant brought considerable change to the local community, as many of 
those it employed were ‘incoming workers’ who moved to West Lothian under an overspill 
agreement with Glasgow Corporation and were attracted by the promise of new housing as much 
as by work at the BMC plant. This has significant implications for the understanding of the way 
in which work was experienced on the shopfloor, as there are clear parallels between the 
Bathgate experience and the Affluent Worker studies, afforded ‘orthodoxy’ or ‘foundation status’  
by academics and political commentators alike.
57
 The findings of these studies, carried out in 
1962 by John Goldthorpe and colleagues and based on interviews with workers in four factories 
– including a Vauxhall car plant –  in the prosperous and expanding town of Luton, were perhaps 
most notable for their rejection of the notion of working-class ‘embourgeoisement’: the idea, 
central to contemporary studies such as Ferdinand Zweig’s The Worker in an Affluent Society, 
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that the stability and rising incomes associated with the post-war period of full employment had 
created ‘a new type of bourgeois worker’, whose interest in consumption, leisure, and family life 
was indicative of a ‘move towards new middle-class values and middle-class existence’.58 For 
Zweig, this was particularly the case for factory workers in the ‘progressive’ new industries, 
where continued growth and expansion meant that pay was above average and employment 
relatively secure, allowing the worker to aspire to higher wages and continued improvements in 
living standards. 
The affluent workers of Luton’s new industries similarly sought higher standards of domestic 
living for themselves and their families, and the importance of pursuing increased personal 
consumption was reflected in their instrumental approach to both work and trade union activity. 
In the Goldthorpe studies, however, class consciousness remained central, and the aspirations of 
Luton’s affluent workers ‘defined by the social realities of their position as manual wage 
workers’.59  Indeed, Goldthorpe et al. suggest that the embourgeouisement thesis reflected a 
middle-class bias amongst its proponents, which ‘prevented them from even conceiving of the 
possibility that working-class aspirations might be focused on something other than their own 
cultural and social standards’.60 In their analysis, social class is a structural, rather than a cultural, 
concept, which retains its relevance even in the context of rising wages and increasing 
prosperity: ‘increases in earnings, improvements in working conditions, more enlightened and 
liberal employment policies do not in themselves alter the class situation of the industrial 
worker… He remains a man who gains his livelihood through placing his labour at the disposal 
of an employer in return for wages.’61 Mike Savage, however, has argued recently that the 
conception of class used by Goldthorpe and his colleagues was flawed, and that their focus on 
money models of society did not recognise the nuances in the relationship between the three key 
concepts of money, power, and status.
62
 For Savage, what emerges from the studies is that the 
key to understanding the affluent worker’s view of class is the idea of ‘ordinariness’, and what it 
means to be an ordinary individual, or ‘average worker’, as opposed to a member of an ‘upper 
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class’ marked by its wealth and power, as well as its class status.63 ‘Ordinary individuals’, in this 
context, are defined chiefly in terms of ‘having to make their own living’: a feature which both 
distinguished ‘ordinary factory blokes, factory workers, the council house sort of tenant’ from 
the elite upper class, and underlined the individualism associated with the ‘action frame of 
reference’ attributed by Goldthorpe et al. to the instrumentalist affluent worker.64 Indeed, Savage 
notes that for many of Goldthorpe’s respondents there was little differentiation between working 
and middle class, as in each case the ‘ordinary individual’ still had to make their own way in life. 
In this re-analysis of the Goldthorpe study, individualist and class identities do not compete; 
rather, social class represents ‘the stage on which the individual necessarily acts’, and collective 
action can therefore be interpreted as a means by which ‘ordinary factory workers’ can seek to 
gain individual improvements.
65
  
Margaret Grieco’s critique of the Affluent Worker studies centres on Goldthorpe et al.’s 
interpretation of the link between this instrumentalism and migration. Grieco argues that 
Goldthorpe et al. based their claim that Luton’s affluent workers traded job satisfaction for 
increased income on the flawed assumption that, in a period of national full employment, these 
conditions informed the decisions of all workers, and that those who chose to take up unpleasant 
work must therefore be doing so in order to pursue higher earnings and other extrinsic rewards.
66
 
Furthermore, in taking worker migration as evidence in itself of instrumentality, Goldthorpe et 
al. overlooked both the role of ‘economic coercion’, and the regional nature of employment 
opportunity.
67
 This has significant implications, as Vauxhall had in fact recruited many of its 
Luton workers from peripheral areas of high unemployment, notably the fishing areas of the East 
coast where labour was traditionally non-unionised, and so many had little knowledge of motor 
industry work and were conditioned in their choice of work by a lack of information.
68
 
Furthermore, even where workers had no personal experience of unemployment, those from 
areas of relatively high rates of unemployment had been exposed to and shaped by ‘an 
atmosphere of employment insecurity’.69 In this context, then, the decision to migrate to Luton in 
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order to take up work at Vauxhall cannot be seen solely in terms of instrumentalism, particularly 
as Vauxhall recruited actively in areas of high unemployment. In her more recent re-examination 
of Luton’s affluent workers, Fiona Devine has similarly found that, of those who migrated to the 
town for work, the majority did so not in an instrumentalist search for highly-paid work, but in 
search of work and affordable housing per se.
70
 Indeed, many had been forced to move because 
of unemployment or poor housing conditions in their regions or countries of origin. This reflects 
the experiences of many of Bathgate’s incoming workers who chose to move out of Glasgow 
because of a lack of employment opportunities, and the slum conditions which existed in many 
inner-city areas. Bathgate offered new and spacious housing, as well as relatively clean and safe 
factory work, but there are limits to the idea that Scotland’s motor workers came to represent 
Scotland’s affluent workers. The difficulties associated with branch plant manufacturing, as well 
as the weak position of the BL organisation by the late 1970s, undermined the plant and 
destabilised its workforce, while its position as a regional policy plant established under duress 
in an area of high unemployment had considerable implications for the terms on which labour 
was engaged. These issues, which have emerged from the oral history testimonies of former 
Bathgate workers, illuminate the ways in which regional policy was experienced on the 
shopfloor, and will be developed and explored in the following chapters. 
 
Methods and structure 
Paul Thompson has written that oral history enabled labour historians to study not only those 
trades or plants which, by their exceptionality, attracted contemporary press and government 
attention, but also, for the first time, ‘the normal experience of work and its impact on the family 
and the community’.71 Much of the oral history testimony used here was collected as part of 
Workers’ Educational Association (WEA) project entitled ‘Bathgate Once More’, which sought 
in 2011 to commemorate the plant and record the experiences of its workers on the fiftieth 
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anniversary of its establishment, and the twenty-fifth anniversary of its closure.
72
 I had originally 
envisaged conducting my own interviews with around ten to fifteen former Bathgate workers 
but, as it became clear that it would be confusing and potentially counter-productive to have two 
oral history projects running concurrently in the town on a similar theme, I decided instead to 
work alongside the WEA, whose staff were very accommodating in allowing me to participate in 
a number of their own interviews, and providing me with recordings of others. I contributed in 
turn essays on the economic and political history of the factory to the project’s main published 
outcome.
73
 The interviewees were volunteers who responded to an advert in the local newspaper 
and attended a number of open days held in a Bathgate community centre. These publicised the 
WEA’s work, with displays of photographs and archival material relating to the plant. A 
disproportionate number of those who volunteered to be interviewed for the project were skilled 
workers and former shop stewards, which raises issues of representativeness, particularly in the 
context of a plant which is significant in part because of the potential difficulties associated with 
introducing assembly line work to an area with little tradition of light engineering. This is 
perhaps due to the WEA’s own profile, as well as the prominent involvement in the ‘Bathgate 
Once More’ project of Jim Swan, former convenor of shop stewards at the factory and currently 
a well-known councillor in the area. The relative shortage of testimony from assembly workers 
and workers with little interest in the trade union movement within the plant does not, however, 
represent an insurmountable problem, and is in itself indicative of the different ways in which 
work could be experienced. For example, the apparent lack of interest shown by assembly line 
workers could be taken as symptomatic of a broader indifference to or disengagement from their 
work at the plant, while the conversely enthusiastic response of more skilled workers to the 
project reflects their more positive experience of motor industry work. 
Indeed, the response to the Bathgate Once More project was far greater than the WEA had 
expected. It was initially anticipated that the organisation would interview around fifteen former 
workers during the first few months of 2011. In the event, around sixty interviews were 
eventually conducted over the course of a year. This has provided a great resource and generated 
more material than a single researcher could achieve over the course of a PhD, and outweighs a 
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number of slight disadvantages, especially where substantial business, government, and trade 
union archive materials were utilised alongside the testimony. The interviews were conducted by 
a number of trained volunteers and WEA staff, each of whom used the same schedule of detailed 
questions. This has been very valuable for the purposes of the Bathgate Once More project, as it 
has meant that, irrespective of the interviewer, the testimonies collected have been broadly 
comparable, and have covered all of the areas which the project has aimed to address. In order to 
avoid any potential problems caused by this strict adherence to a relatively narrow interview 
schedule, I planned to carry out a number of follow-up interviews which would allow me to 
explore in more detail those issues most pertinent to my own research and not necessarily 
addressed directly in the original interview. However, these follow-up interviews proved 
problematic in their own terms. Owing to their awareness of the nature of my research, those 
volunteers willing to be interviewed for the second time in a relatively short period represented a 
small and self-selecting sample, with a particular interest in the industrial relations of the plant. 
Furthermore, I found that their previous, and notably recent, experience of interview by the 
WEA impacted upon the interviews themselves as, although I was keen to keep these interviews 
as unstructured as possible, the conversation frequently returned to topics and themes which had 
been covered in detail during the first interview. I therefore decided to concentrate the bulk of 
my research effort on archival material, which has been used alongside the testimony collected 
by the WEA and in my own follow-up interviews.  
Much of the available archive material relates to the plant’s establishment, and to the ‘teething 
problems’ which it experienced during its first five years especially. This is particularly the case 
with regards to Scottish Development Department papers relating to the motor industry in 
Scotland, Ministry of Labour reports on the company’s industrial relations in its regional policy 
plants and, most notably, the evidence presented to a Motor Industry Joint Labour Council 
inquiry into the plant’s industrial relations conducted in 1966, held as part of the Jack Scamp 
collection at the University of Warwick’s Modern Records Centre (MRC). Newspaper reports, 
primarily from The Times and The Financial Times, provide analysis of the plant’s establishment 
and closure, as well as a number of ‘flashpoint’ incidents which attracted media attention, while 
television news reports held at the Media Archive for Central England (MACE – then at the 
University of Leicester; now at the University of Lincoln) give some insight into the way in 
which the BMC and, later, BL, were perceived in their Midlands heartland. The annual reports of 
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the General Council of the STUC, and the papers of West Lothian Trades’ Council, both held at 
Glasgow Caledonian University, provide some institutional continuity, while the company’s 
corporate records, at the Motor Industry Heritage Trust (MIHT), contain valuable insight into the 
plant’s position within the organisation. The minutes of the company-wide British Motor 
Corporation Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee (BMCJSSC), also held at the MRC, give some 
indication about industrial relations throughout the company and the impact of regional policy on 
workers in the Midlands.  
The thesis is structured in two parts. The first considers the broader context surrounding the 
establishment of BMC Bathgate, in terms of both Scotland’s post-1945 economic and social 
development and the role of regional policy in shaping its experience of industrial change, and in 
relation to the motor industry more widely. The second part examines the ways in which work 
and industrial relations were experienced on the shopfloor, and draws extensively on the WEA 
oral history testimonies. In the absence of any shop steward or trade union material from 
Bathgate itself, these provide a valuable resource which illuminates the variety of ways in which 
the presence of the plant and the opportunities which it afforded to its workforce shaped life in 
West Lothian between 1961 and 1986. It will be seen that the motor plant at Bathgate raised 
living standards in the area by providing new housing as well as training and opportunities in 
relatively clean and safe industrial jobs for two generations of workers, including women, who 
gained access to well-paid engineering work, as well as office positions. There were problems, 
however. While some of the difficulties experienced at the plant – such as strikes, stoppages, and 
disruptions to the supply chain – reflected the structural weaknesses inherent in the British motor 
industry more generally, they were connected to and exacerbated by both cultural and physical 
distance. The plant remained reliant on supplies of components sourced overwhelmingly from 
the Midlands, leaving it vulnerable to supply problems and suggesting low levels of ‘spillover’, 
or embeddedness in the local economy. Furthermore, high levels of labour turnover, during the 
plant’s first five years especially, indicate considerable labour dissatisfaction and low morale 
amongst a workforce unused to motor industry working practices. It is not, however, the purpose 
of this thesis to assess the success, or otherwise, of Bathgate as a regional policy intervention, or 
to consider alternative potential development policies. Rather, its contribution is in providing a 
detailed discussion of the development of Bathgate, its role in the local economy, and the 
experience of work on its shopfloor. By drawing on the testimonies of former Bathgate workers 
21 
 
themselves, what emerges is a sense of the wider implications of a particular regional policy 
plant, which contributes to a number of important debates in the history of Scotland and Britain 
since 1945 and offers a new perspective on the role of regional policy in shaping post-war 
economic and social development.  
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Establishing Bathgate 
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Chapter One 
West Lothian – a ‘County on the Move’? 
 
In 1966, West Lothian County Council sponsored the production of a promotional film entitled 
County on the Move. Central to this film’s depiction of West Lothian as a modern, forward-
looking industrial county was the presence of the BMC’s truck and tractor assembly plant at 
Bathgate, which had been established five years previously as a result of government regional 
policy which sought to alleviate the unemployment caused by the rundown of heavy industry in 
Britain’s ‘peripheral’ regions. The film presents the BMC factory, along with the construction of 
the new town of Livingston and the improvement of the county’s transport infrastructure, as a 
symbol of what can be termed its ‘reindustrialisation’, highlighting the contrast between the 
motor plant’s relatively high-tech machinery and clean working environment, and the more 
physical work processes shown in footage of coal and shale miners working underground, and 
fireclay workers attending to large furnaces. However, while acknowledging the immediate 
unfamiliarity of motor industry work to much of the West Lothian workforce and emphasising 
the new skills and technical education that the introduction of motor manufacturing would 
therefore necessitate, the film portrays the advent of the ‘new’ industries not as a complete break 
with the county’s heavy industrial past, but rather as a new stage in its longer-term economic 
development. Recognising the continuity represented by agriculture, which still accounted for 
three quarters of the county’s land use, and drawing on the area’s mining tradition and the very 
visible impact that its spoil heaps had had on the local landscape, the voiceover claims that the 
motor industry would ‘call on the same resolution, the same spirit’ among West Lothian’s 
workers that had ‘made their grandfathers move mountains with shovels’ during its previous 
industrial experiences.
1
 
Moreover, the film acknowledges that this change in West Lothian’s industrial direction was 
deliberate; a conscious decision by the government to reshape Scotland’s economy and rebuild 
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 Scottish Screen Archive (SSA), Scottish Educational Films Agency, County on the Move, IFA (Scotland), directed 
by Laurence Henson, 1966. 
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its urban environment that was both a response to the decline of its heavy industries, and a 
reflection of the perceived contemporary importance of emulating the economic growth 
experienced in the Midlands and South-East of England especially and driven by the expansion 
of new industry and the service sector. The motor industry in particular was seen as key to the 
success of those areas in terms of creating growth and supporting full employment, and indeed 
its dispersal under the regional policy of Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government was 
informed as much by fears over the potentially detrimental impact on future growth that could be 
caused by over-concentration and inflationary pressures in the Midlands and South-East, as by 
concern with the levels of unemployment in the designated Development Areas. The 
historiography of Scotland’s economic development since 1945 has, however, frequently 
presented both BMC Bathgate and the Rootes car factory established concurrently at Linwood 
near Glasgow, as a symbol of the failure of regional policy and attempts to reindustrialise 
Scotland after 1945. The literature relating to regional policy more broadly tends to emphasise 
the extent to which factories such as Bathgate and Linwood were branch plants, operating 
remotely from their suppliers, markets, and company headquarters, offering only low-skilled 
assembly work, and doing little to encourage the growth of ancillary industries. Peter Scott has 
argued that such branch plants were of only marginal importance to their parent firms and were 
therefore acutely vulnerable to closure while, in the Scottish context, Ewen Cameron is among 
those who have highlighted the ‘footloose’ attitude of investor firms attracted to Scotland 
primarily by the availability of relatively cheap labour and often subsidised industrial premises.
2
 
This chapter moves the analysis of regional policy in Scotland away from questions about its 
efficacy to consider its broader economic and social dimensions, by using archival sources as 
well as the oral history testimony of the Bathgate plant’s former workers to explore its impact on 
life and work in West Lothian. Taking into account the cyclical nature of industrialisation and 
the structural shifts taking place in the wider Scottish economy, and recognising the impact of 
inward investment and capital mobility, the chapter will situate the development of the factory 
and the experiences of its workforce within the wider framework of Scotland’s longer-term 
deindustrialisation, and demonstrate that the history of the BMC at Bathgate is better understood, 
not as one of ill-conceived policy and inevitable failure, but as part of an attempt to manage the 
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 Scott, ‘Regional Development and Policy’, p.366; Cameron, Impaled upon a Thistle, p.257.  
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longer process of industrial change. It will begin with a discussion of the campaign against the 
plant’s closure, highlighting the cultural centrality of industrial employment, the perceived 
importance of the BMC in particular to life in and around Bathgate, and the impact of closure 
and subsequent unemployment on the plant’s workers. The second section returns to Bathgate’s 
establishment a quarter of a century earlier, discussing the extent to which regional development 
policy represented a response to an earlier phase of deindustrialisation, and indicating the 
continuous nature of economic development. This analysis is continued in the final section, 
which describes the shift in the focus of regional policy which occurred in the early 1960s and, 
emphasising the perceived importance of economic growth as a solution to Scotland’s high 
levels of unemployment, considers the extent to which the development from the mid-1960s of 
Livingston new town as the industrial, retail, and service centre of West Lothian represented a 
further stage in the county’s economic and social development. 
 
The closure of Leyland Bathgate: a challenge to industrial 
permanence 
In January 1982, members of the Leyland Bathgate Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee and their 
supporters occupied the factory in response to a proposed divisional reorganisation that would 
see a share of Bathgate’s truck production moved to Leyland in Lancashire, and its tractor plant 
closed down and sold off with ‘significant job loss’.3 The sense of crisis at the motor plant – and 
the resistance tactics pursued by some of its workers – was conditioned by developments at the 
nearby factory of Plessey Capacitors, where, on the following day, the largely female workforce 
similarly went into occupation to protect their jobs and resist the closure of what they believed 
was an efficient, technologically advanced and, above all, profitable plant.
4
 Plessey Ltd. was at 
this time the fourth largest electronics company in the UK, and at its peak in 1973 had employed 
around 2,400 people in Bathgate. However, by 1981, its workforce across the country had fallen 
by 35 per cent, and the Bathgate plant employed just 330, around 75 per cent of whom were 
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women.
5
 Plessey had moved to Bathgate in 1965 when, largely as a result of a local campaign to 
attract external capital to the area, it took over the plant formerly operated by the Telegraph 
Condenser Company (TCC), and its history in the town, like the motor plant, is therefore closely 
tied to post-war efforts to boost the local economy and mitigate the effects of the decline of West 
Lothian’s staple coal and shale oil mining industries. The TCC had opened in 1947 and, as 
Patricia Findlay points out in her 1987 study of the Plessey occupation, was the first major 
employer in the area not dependent on the exploitation of natural resources, and consequently 
also one of the first to offer employment opportunities for women in a town in which 
‘employment was almost wholly a male preserve’.6  
Findlay argues that it was precisely the female character of the workforce at Plessey that enabled 
the campaign against its closure to attract widespread support and spark a wider, community-
based effort to protect jobs and fight closure in the town. She highlights the importance of 
Plessey’s women workers in building community organisations and informal neighbourhood 
groups, and the significance that such networks can have in industrial disputes affecting many 
members of the same community.
7
 The following quotation from an oral history interview with 
Harry Bradley, a former Leyland worker, conducted in 2011, illustrates the perceived centrality 
of both factories to the economic and social life of the town, and the informal links which existed 
between them.  
I would say, oot o’ B Block, which had aboot 2,500 workers in it, men, and 
women, mostly men, the biggest majority of the men, their wives worked in 
Plessey. The reason I’m saying that is because before Leyland came to Bathgate, 
the Plessey was there it was the TCC, and the young, the guys like masel who 
worked on foondries, building sites, different places, all winched women, or girls, 
who worked in Plessey, and ended up marrying them, so a lot ae us was married 
to girls who worked in the Plessey before Leyland came. When Leyland came, 
obviously, the men who worked, eh, ootside Leyland all got jobs in Leyland and 
their wives still worked in the Plessey. So you’d a great support, because we used 
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to go to the Plessey dances, we had that mebbe once a month up the canteen, and 
it was like walking through Leyland at times, because every second guy you met 
worked in Leyland.
8
  
Findlay found that the testimony of former Plessey workers involved in the occupation was 
similarly informed by a recognition of the tight-knit nature of the community in Bathgate, as well 
as a related concern for the future employment prospects of its young people in particular. One 
former worker told her ‘we all thought the same – where are our kids going to work?’, and she 
cites the experience of a number of older women who were approaching retirement age and 
entitled to sizeable redundancy payments, but decided to forego these in order to support the 
occupation in the hopes of maintaining employment in the area.
9
 As one Plessey worker put it, 
‘people could see the community going down and down. The British Leyland dispute was going 
on and everyone was worried there wasn’t going to be any work left.’10 Jim Swan, the former 
chair of the Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee (JSSC) at Leyland, described in 2011 the 
concurrent occupations at Leyland and Plessey as evidence that ‘there was something happening 
where people were saying our economy’s going to go down the drain if we dinnae stop this,’ and 
there is certainly evidence to suggest a considerable degree of support for the workers of both 
factories within a community facing ‘severe and growing problems’ in terms of employment.11 
The Plessey occupation received donations of money and provisions from local shopkeepers, 
families and pensioners, as well as from other local factories. This wider ‘community effort’ was 
discussed by the STUC and supported by the regional and district councils, the Scottish 
Development Agency, and the local MP, Tam Dalyell, as well as the STUC itself.
12
 Indeed, it 
was reported in the Financial Times (FT) that ‘there are few political overtones to the Scottish 
strike. It has more of a community feel to it.’13 
While the involvement of women workers in the campaign arguably provided the basis on which 
such community support could be built, it should be noted that their responses to this threat to 
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their employment, as well as the ways in which they experienced factory occupation, were 
undoubtedly shaped by their gender. Harry Bradley’s 2011 testimony suggests an inversion of 
what could be described as conventional, male-centric models of class struggle, with food being 
prepared and sent out of occupied premises to feed men and children at home: 
During their strike, ehm, ma wife who was one of I think 80 sat in who wouldnae 
come oot the gates, and ehm...they controlled the kitchens, and they were making 
soup, stovies and all this sorta thing for all the workers and the women used to 
take it home at night, or them that was sitting in, they used to send it home wi’ 
other people to give to the men whose wives were sitting in.
14
 
Findlay argues that, while it was perhaps paradoxical that women were willing to participate in a 
form of industrial action which made extra demands on their time, the occupation actually 
engendered a sense of solidarity amongst workers who became aware of their common interests 
and responsibilities as women, and that this in turn fostered cooperation and mutual assistance.
15
 
Furthermore, the choice of factory occupation as a strategy in itself played a significant role in 
raising awareness of the problems facing the town and building support for the campaigns 
against closure. Ken Coates, for example, argues that the factory occupation represents a strategy 
which can be adopted as labour confronts new problems outside the realm of union influence: in 
this case factory closure and mass redundancy. In these situations, the threat of strike action loses 
its power, demonstrating the limitations of the collective bargaining process and the need for a 
new form of defensive industrial action.
16
 At Plessey the occupation prevented the transfer of 
modern and valuable machinery out of the factory, and was therefore applied as an economic 
sanction against a company aiming to centralise production elsewhere. Moreover, it helped to 
build community support for the workforce by drawing attention to the problem of redundancy 
and ensuring that this became a public social issue.
17
 Indeed, Jim Swan has described the 
Leyland occupation as ‘a PR job and a protest. It was to try and let the people out there know 
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about what was happening at the factory… We had to get big headlines and that’s why we did it 
that way.’18  
It is difficult to assess the extent to which either of these occupations can be seen as a success, 
and this depends on whether they are judged in terms of the publicity they received, the 
solidarity they engendered, or their longer-term effectiveness in maintaining employment in 
West Lothian. The Leyland occupation certainly garnered a degree of press coverage, but the 
workers occupying the factory had to leave two weeks into the occupation when they were 
served with an interim interdict and eviction notice.
19
 Moreover, it caused some friction within 
the workforce, as many of the workers in the tractor plant had been willing to take their 
redundancy payments, and argued that the decision to fight the closure of the plant should rest 
with them, rather than with the JSSC.
20
 At Plessey, the occupying workforce voted to defy an 
interim interdict and to remain in the factory at risk of fine or even imprisonment for contempt of 
court, and eventually, represented in the High Court in Edinburgh by future Scottish Government 
Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill, who would also represent Caterpillar workers occupying 
their plant at Uddingston in 1987, succeeded in having the interdict lifted in what became known 
as the ‘Plessey judgement’.21 Eight weeks into the occupation, the workers voted to accept a 
takeover bid by a company called Arcotronics which would see the factory remain open, but 
with a reduced workforce of just 80. Again, this caused some divisions amongst the workers, 
some of whom felt they were pressurised into accepting this deal by union representatives keen 
to bring the occupation to a close, but the consensus amongst Findlay’s interviewees was that 
‘[the unions] had taken us to the end of the road, and there was nowhere else they could take 
us.’ 22  A similar sense of resignation is evident in the oral testimony of Leyland workers 
following the acceptance of the tractor plant sell-off, although this is shaped by the experience of 
the eventual closure of the plant four years later in 1986. Tommy Morrison, a former vice-
convenor of the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) in the plant, describes his 
involvement in a second occupation of the plant which followed the government’s 
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announcement in May 1984 that production would cease with the loss of all remaining 1,800 
jobs.
23
 
Once they came out with the word that it’s closing, then it’s closing and you 
cannae change their minds. So [the campaign against closure] was a paper 
exercise for me... Sure I was there on the picket lines with the next yin, but I was 
there, I was half-hearted, and I was, I wasnae there as a union man, I was there as 
a worker there, ken, on the picket line and that. But by then the fight had left me 
because I knew we’d lost, I knew we’d lost, and that was it.24 
Alan Marr decided to leave the factory in 1983 to seek work elsewhere, after witnessing the sell-
off of the tractor plant and the continued run-down of the remaining truck production. 
Numerous times they had said they were going to close the plant, but that 
particular time they started stripping stuff out and taking it away, and I just said, 
there’s gonna be another three thousand guys looking for work the same time as 
me, I’m off... I think it was a, a quite open knowledge that the place was gonna be 
shutting. And eh, there was an announcement made, but I can’t remember the 
details about it, but I do remember watching them taking away the tractor plant, to 
Marshall’s, I do remember that quite vividly. And that was when it started to hit 
me that I wasnae gonna be there forever, and I had to deal with that. The only way 
I knew was to get out and look for something else before everybody else was 
gonnae look for the same job as me.
25
 
While this testimony does reflect the claim made in the FT that the workforce had been ‘half 
expecting’ the closure of the plant for at least two years, there is also a sense of surprise or shock 
that the factory could close, and a realisation that Leyland Bathgate was not a permanent fixture 
in the industrial landscape of West Lothian and could not be expected to provide employment 
indefinitely.
26
 This is implicit in the testimony of a number of other workers who apparently 
thought that such a large factory, employing so many people, would surely survive to support 
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future generations in the town. Joyce Brogan worked in the planning office, and her father was 
made redundant by the final closure. 
There was lots of rumours before it actually closed, and eh, I think it was just like 
a total shock and disbelief that that could happen after, like, I think in the heyday 
it employed about five to six thousand people for the area, so it was a bit of a 
bombshell when it actually did happen. And it put a bit of doom and gloom, I 
think, over the whole area.
27
  
Similar sentiments were expressed by Jim Bilsborough. ‘I just could not believe that they would 
shut that plant. I kept saying to myself, and I wisnae alone, how can they shut a place like this? It 
was a total shock.’28 Furthermore, a number of workers expressed their disappointment that, not 
only was their own clean, safe and reasonably well-paid employment being lost, but that their 
families would not be able to follow them into the factory. Tam Brandon, for example, had 
hoped that the plant would provide employment for his children. 
I don’t mind telling you I cried because I was looking forward to my family 
getting work there. The Leyland had a tremendous input in the social life of 
people. You’ve got to understand how many thousands of people worked in 
there... I got that word and I came home and I sat and I held my wife’s hand and I 
said ‘we’re finished’.29 
Seven members of Tommy Morrison’s immediate family worked at the plant, and so the impact 
of the closure on his life was particularly acute. 
Oh, it was disaster. Oh it was a disaster. I mean it’s like, I mean it’s like a death. 
Everybody is enjoying their self and everything laid on, and, and you were 
socialising and you had a job to go to on a Monday, nae fear of no getting a wage 
coming in every week, and everything was hunky-dory, as the name says, as the 
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word says. And, eh, all of a sudden, crash. But, crash. Nae work. There was nae 
work to go to. And this is the, this is what happens.
30
 
John Duncan had moved to Bathgate from rural Aberdeenshire to work in the tool store, a job 
which he describes as ‘a decent job and a decent pay, it was more than I ever anticipated.’ He 
was nearing retirement at the time of the closure, but his memories are nevertheless that ‘it was a 
great disappointment to me and I’m sure to a lot of the younger people who had sort of got used 
to it, you know.’31 This sense of opportunities lost, and of uncertainty in the future was shared by 
Lenny Walker, who had also moved to the area to work at the factory, and sums up the effect of 
the closure on much of the workforce: ‘We all didn’t know what we were gonnae do if the 
factory closed ‘cos it had never happened to us before.’32  
This statement encapsulates the impact that the factory had had in its twenty-five year lifetime in 
terms of providing relatively secure, stable and lucrative employment for a generation of men 
and, to a smaller extent, women in West Lothian. However, it also highlights the challenge that 
the closure represented to the notion of industrial permanence, discussed by Jefferson Cowie and 
Joseph Heathcott in their work on deindustrialisation in the United States. For Cowie and 
Heathcott, the industrial culture of Europe and the US in the twentieth century was a temporary 
condition which existed in a ‘brief moment in the history of capitalism’. 33  The sense of 
permanence lent to industrial structures and organisations by their apparently solid foundations 
in fixed capital investment, the nuts and bolts of heavy machinery, and bricks-and-mortar 
factories, has compounded the experience of job loss and deindustrialisation by undermining a 
whole society, culture and way of life built on industrial employment. The reaction of the 
Bathgate workforce to the plant’s closure is closely in line with this analysis, in which the 
experience of deindustrialisation has been experienced as ‘the end of an historical epoch’, and in 
which the retrospective acceptance of change as a function of capital mobility, even a generation 
later, cannot alleviate the continued loss and pain associated with plant closure. In the Bathgate 
context, it is arguable that this pain was particularly sharply felt due in part to the attempted 
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reindustrialisation of the area through the establishment of the Leyland plant, and the consequent 
and disproportionate continued reliance on manufacturing employment across West Lothian. In 
1981 a Scottish Office report found that manufacturing accounted for nearly four out of ten jobs 
in the Bathgate area, compared with 2.5 out of ten in Scotland as a whole, while employment in 
services stood at 49 per cent compared with 62 per cent for Scotland.
34
 Moreover, 85 per cent of 
manufacturing employment in the area was in just four plants: Leyland, Plessey, a Levi Strauss 
jeans factory which employed 410 people in Whitburn, and the North British Steel foundries at 
Armadale and Bathgate, which employed 750 between them.
35
 Of non-manufacturing employers 
in the area, the largest by some distance was the Polkemmet Colliery, which employed 1,360 and 
closed in 1986 following severe flood damage arising from a management decision to switch off 
pumping machinery during the 1984-85 miners’ strike.36 This reliance on a small number of 
large establishments, and a related absence of smaller firms and local entrepreneurs, meant that 
the area was particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the fortunes of these companies, and that 
the closures of Plessey and later of Leyland had a great impact, particularly in an area where 
manufacturing continued to dominate and, as, the Scottish Office reported, the industrial culture 
therefore remained conditioned by its heavy industrial past.
37
 The employment situation in the 
Bathgate area had been worsening even before these closures were announced, with the number 
of workers employed decreasing by 3,000, or 15 per cent, between 1978 and 1981. While 
employment was falling throughout Scotland at this time, the growth in the unemployment rate 
between 1981 and 1982 was 4.3 per cent in Bathgate, compared with 2.3 per cent across 
Scotland, indicating that even within the wider context of recession and industrial closures, the 
area had seen a relative as well as an absolute deterioration in its employment situation.
38
 
Contemporary newspaper reportage of the Leyland closure focused on the worsening 
unemployment problem, with the FT for example giving the unemployment rate as 19.3 per cent 
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in May 1984, and citing the STUC’s expectation that unemployment amongst males in the area 
could reach 50 per cent following the closure.
39
   
The impact of unemployment on workers, whose experience of both work itself and of the wider 
culture surrounding the Leyland plant had been shaped by the notion of industrial permanence in 
an area defined by and dependent on its manufacturing, was unsettling and in some cases deeply 
distressing. John Hastings was among those made redundant by the sell-off of the tractor plant in 
1982, and his testimony reflects the feelings of workers who had no previous experience of 
unemployment, and gives a sense of the powerlessness which could be wrought by redundancy, 
particularly in a large company. 
Absolutely shattered. I’d never been paid off before. That somebody had decided 
that no matter how good you were at your job…the tractor division was going so 
you were going with it.
40
 
Alex Moffat’s description of his experience of redundancy and unemployment demonstrates 
Cowie and Heathcott’s contention that the awareness of wider economic developments could do 
little to soften the impact of job loss on the individual, but also illustrates the scale of the 
problems caused by the closure at a time of economic difficulty in the town. 
It was a disaster. At that time there was a massive recession on and there wisnae 
any work so I was made redundant and tried for a period of time to get any type of 
job... I hated being unemployed. The majority of the people that were in the 
factory were in an age group where they thought that was them settled for the rest 
of their working days. So when it closed it was a complete financial and a mental 
disaster for the people that worked in it.
41
 
The difficulty of finding alternative employment, and the effect that this could have in terms of 
worsening the sense of powerlessness engendered by redundancy is highlighted in Harry 
Bradley’s memories of the closure, and of attempts made by the plant’s shop stewards to help in 
the search for work. 
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At that time when it was shutting in ‘86 there wasn’t a lot of money about here. It 
felt sad, definitely felt sad. But Plessey had already went by that time, it was shut 
a few years prior to it, there was only the likes ae Menzies’s [the North British 
Steel foundry] left here, and a couple of these new wee factories... But aye, I felt 
sad. I didnae drive then, so the week leading up to it shutting, the shop, well the 
management of the shop stewards had got these people from Bathgate and 
Edinburgh, I cannae mind what you call them, people likes of from the bureau 
[Department of Employment Job Centre] and these kind of places, and they were 
telling you more or less there was nothing there for you. And they got a big 
blackboard, I always remember this, they got a big blackboard and they drew a 
hill on it like a bridge, right, they marked you there with an X, with nae 
possibilities, nothing to dae, and over the bridge at that side, with another X, was 
jobs, right. So you could either try going to higher education, to get you o’er that 
hump, or try self-employment to get you o’er that hump, or go o’er that hump and 
go and look for jobs elsewhere.
42
 
The impression that there were no jobs and no opportunities in the Bathgate area in the wake of 
the plant’s closure is reflected in the testimony of a number of other former Leyland workers, 
who have also drawn attention to the wider social impact that high levels of unemployment had 
in terms of contributing to a more general malaise in the town. The effect of the closure and the 
loss of well-paid employment on the economy of the town centre is described by Tommy 
Morrison, and reflects similar experiences seen in US cities undergoing deindustrialisation, 
where lost factory incomes and taxes had a damaging effect on the wider economy and urban 
environment.
43
 
Bathgate was quite a big thingmy as far as shopping was concerned for women 
and that, a lot of shoe shops, a lot ae drapers’ shops. The only thing against it that 
mebbe should have come in was mebbe a big name like mebbe Marks and 
Spencer’s, and mebbe a couple of big yins like that mebbe would have been ideal, 
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but, eh, you had a lot ae, you had a lot ae places and a lot ae men’s places and 
ladies’ places, and you had a lot ae shoe shops and that and grocery shops and it 
was really full up there wi’ stores like that, but then you see what happens there is 
the money’s no coming in in Bathgate, but also because of the outlying area, they 
all depended on Bathgate, OK? So, obviously, they cannae have the same money 
to spend, because to go fae a certain wage, and eh, go doon to what they’re getting 
for the dole or assistance or whatever it was, insurance, whatever, they’ve no got 
the same spending power, so that has an adverse effect on Bathgate’s shops, so 
they gradually one by one – because, because the money’s no coming in, the 
council’s thingmying it, they’ve got to put the rates up ae shops, because it’s, if 
they cannae get it from the one side they’ve got to get it from the other. You 
know, they were getting a lot of money fae Leyland, fae what it was and that, 
whereas they lose all that so they’ve got to bring the money in to keep them 
going, to keep the place going. So they put the rates up, and by putting the rates 
up, basically what happens is that, eh, people cannae afford the rates. It’s a 
snowball effect. It’s a shame.44 
The FT, in its report on the closure plans, similarly drew attention to the impact that 
unemployment was having on life in the area, painting a bleak picture of a town in which large 
groups of men ‘spend the day in the grey centre of Bathgate near the job centre and in the 
number of small cafes which seem to have proliferated as demand has increased for places where 
people can pass the time stretching a cup of coffee’, and warning of the threat posed to local 
shops and businesses by large-scale redundancy.
45
 Bathgate and its immediate environs were 
coming to be associated with decline and industrial difficulty; as early as 1981, the report of the 
Scottish Office working party looking into the economy of the town had warned of the potential 
impact on any future investment that might be caused by the ‘low quality urban environment’, 
and the detrimental effect on the town’s image of the visibility of derelict industrial land from the 
nearby M8 motorway.
46
 With this in mind, one of the key recommendations of the working 
party’s report was ‘the removal of the visible signs of industrial dereliction and the improvement 
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of the physical environment...in order to project a positive image of quality and endeavour.’47 
The closure of Leyland and the failure to find an alternative employer to take over the factory 
only exacerbated this problem. Vince Moore is among former workers who remember that the 
site, very close to the motorway, ‘stayed just a gap for such a long long time’. For Moore, this 
gap represented a physical reminder of the jobs that had been lost, and of the families who had 
subsequently had to move away from the area in order to find employment.
48
 Indeed, it is only 
within the last decade that the former Leyland site has been redeveloped as the new community 
of Wester Inch, comprising over 2,000 private homes built around the central Leyland Road; a 
sign, perhaps, of both the town’s new role as a commuter dormitory for Edinburgh, and of the 
‘smokestack nostalgia’ described by Cowie and Heathcott and frequently used to ‘add some 
place-specific color [sic] to the otherwise generic beige landscape’ of redeveloped industrial 
land.
49
 Furthermore, the emphasis placed by Morrison, Moore, and other interviewees on the 
idea that the deterioration of the area resulted primarily from the closure of the plant, rather than 
any broader economic or political concerns, perhaps reflects the extent to which the discourse of 
reindustrialisation and opportunity which had surrounded its establishment had permeated the 
Bathgate workforce and shaped the perception of industrial permanence. 
 
Regional Policy and Reindustrialisation: Bathgate and the 
establishment of the BMC plant 
The job losses, high unemployment and industrial dereliction of the 1980s were not, it should be 
emphasised, new features of the West Lothian economy, and in fact many of the concerns that 
were expressed at the time of the Plessey and Leyland closures had in fact been prevalent in 
discussions of the area and its economic and social problems at the time of the establishment of 
the then BMC plant at Bathgate quarter of a century earlier. Table 1:1 uses census data to 
calculate the unemployment rate for West Lothian, demonstrating that it remained persistently 
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higher than the Scottish and British averages throughout the period in which the plant was open 
in Bathgate. 
Table 1:1: Percentage of total economically active population seeking work in West 
Lothian, Scotland, and Great Britain, 1961-1981. 
Census year West Lothian Scotland Great Britain 
1961 3.5 3.2 1.6 
1971 7.4 5.8 4.0 
1981 12.9 12.3 9.8 
(Source: Census, Small Area Statistics (London: HMSO, 1961-1981); Census, vol. 6, Occupation, Industry and 
Workplace (London: HMSO, 1961-1971); Peden, The Managed Economy, p.248.) 
When it was announced in 1960 that the BMC would be moving to the town, unemployment in 
West Lothian stood at 4.8 per cent; considerably lower than the 19.3 per cent recorded in 1984, 
but high enough to cause alarm in the context of post-war full employment.
50
 In 1966, by which 
time the factory had been open for five years, a survey of the area described it as ‘disfigured by 
the dereliction left by past industry, not merely in the form of bings but also ... in the shabby 
remains of deserted buildings, in the abandoned rail and canal facilities, and in the presence of 
many sub-standard houses.’51 Conditions in the area at this time are perhaps best captured by the 
views of people who moved to the area to work at the plant. Bill Raine, for example, relocated to 
Bathgate from Birmingham, where he had worked at the company’s Longbridge factory. His first 
impression of the town, possibly hardened by his experience of anti-English abuse in his first 
months of living there, was that ‘Bathgate was a dump, there was nothing there.’52 Dougie Miller 
was born in the mining town of Cessnock, New South Wales, to ‘very very left-wing’ parents 
who had chosen to emigrate because they felt that their political activism was a source of 
persecution and an obstacle to their employment in Scotland. However, they found that they 
were not able to ‘get on’ in Australia either, and chose to move back to Whitburn when they 
heard that the BMC would be opening up in Bathgate. ‘I remember getting out of the taxi, and I 
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saw the grey houses, and the grey skies. I thought “what the hell am I coming to”.’53 For those 
workers who had grown up in West Lothian, such as Ian Tennant who also lived in Whitburn, 
childhood memories of the area were shaped by the rundown of its mining industries and 
consequent high rate of unemployment.  
Sadly, I suppose even as a kid I was aware of the number of people hanging about 
Whitburn Cross and Blackburn Cross and Armadale Cross, you know, each day. I 
was aware there was a shortage of work, although my father wasn’t a miner, you 
had to be aware of the mining communities you know and their involvement. So 
even at that early stage, even as a teenager you were aware of the economics of 
the area.
54
 
The announcement that the BMC would be moving to Bathgate was therefore seen as a great 
boost to the area, particularly as much of the work that was still available in the remaining heavy 
industries was by its nature insecure and unreliable. Harry McKay worked at the steel foundry in 
Armadale. 
There was a lot of excitement in the build-up, there was a lot of people very very 
interested in it. We couldn’t believe it because I remember the headlines in the 
paper, I believe it was the Express at that particular time, and the headlines, the 
front page was ‘It’s Bathgate’, and everybody was excited about it because the 
foundry at that particular stage had its ups and downs as far as work was 
concerned, sometimes you were on a three day week, a four day week depending 
on the economical environment, depending on the export situation, so we all 
looked forward to, Bathgate was only two miles away, we knew it was going to be 
a huge plant, so we knew that well, if something happened to the foundry, there 
was an opportunity especially for a younger person.
55
 
The scale of the factory and its modernity were seen as particular reasons for optimism. Joyce 
Brogan chose a job at BMC over another offer of employment because ‘it seemed to be more 
opportunities, because it was a new plant that was coming to Bathgate’, and other workers have 
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described their excitement during the period in which the plant was being built.
56
 Ian Tennant 
was at school nearby at this time and remembers visiting the site to watch the construction work 
in progress.  
In my last year at school I, I was at the Lindsay High School, the headmaster 
allowed the senior pupils, of which I was one, to go across to see the cutting of the 
sod and the building of this new BMC plant. And since I used to cycle to 
Whitburn from the school and to and from, I used to go up the old A8 and watch 
them, the machines levelling out the site etcetera. So I was well aware there was 
this big plant getting built.
57
 
Harry Bradley similarly remembers the physical changes taking place in the landscape around 
the town as the construction of the factory got underway. 
What I mind about the Leyland when it came, when the big roundabout on the 
main road, there was a big gigantic concrete mixer and it used to get fillt all the 
time, and lorries used to come in and load it up, and the lorries went in and got 
fillt, put on the bottom of the tracks etcetera to concrete all the block surfaces, the 
floor surfaces, I can mind you that. And also, the shale mines, eh the boy fae 
Broxburn who had the businesses, I cannae mind anyway, I think he, rumour was 
that he got six pounds a ton, when they moved all the shale bings and brought it 
into Leyland for the bottom before they put the tar then the concrete on it.
58
 
This use of shale spoil in the construction of the factory highlights the extent of the changes 
which it wrought on the area, and was used as a symbol of the transformation and modernisation 
of the local economy in County on the Move, the promotional film made in 1966 and sponsored 
by West Lothian County Council and the Films of Scotland Committee, a body established by 
the Scottish Department for Development and Industry. The film focused on West Lothian and 
the structural changes taking place in the county, as spoil was used to fill the foundations for 
houses, schools and hospitals, and to build the roads and motorways which it was hoped would 
encourage the growth of new, high-tech industries. Writing about recent attempts to 
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commemorate the steel industry in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Kirk Savage has discussed the 
symbolism of the slag heap as ‘the perfect postindustrial monument...an ironic counterpoint to 
the official landscapes of urban rejuvenation’. One generation earlier in Scotland, it was their 
destruction, as survivors and reminders of a previous stage in West Lothian’s economic and 
industrial development, which was presented as central not only to such rejuvenation, but to the 
growth of a new industrial era.
59
 The film casts the shale bings as representatives of old industry, 
old ideas, and old constraints, forming ‘a skyline of unseen effort...casting shadows where once a 
great family of men burrowed their lives away’, and their removal is depicted as an opportunity 
for the area to ‘shake off the dust of the past’ and build a future based on new skills, new 
technology and new industries including, most prominently, motor manufacturing.
60
 It is a clear 
illustration, then, of the continuous nature of Bathgate’s industrial development and of the 
imagery associated with the redevelopment of industrial areas, that the 1981 recommendations to 
improve the town’s image in anticipation of the closure of the Leyland factory included not only 
measures to improve the appearance of derelict industrial land, but also the removal of the large 
Easton shale bing and the use of its spoil in new housing.
61
 
Indeed, the construction of the plant in Bathgate can itself be seen as part of a government 
response to a previous wave of deindustrialisation; an attempt to reindustrialise both the West 
Lothian area itself and Central Scotland more broadly, and to mitigate the effects of the rundown 
of shipbuilding on the Clyde as well as the local staple industries of coal, shale and, to a lesser 
extent, steel. The negotiations between the Macmillan government and the BMC which 
eventually culminated in the decision to build the factory in Bathgate will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter Two, but here it is important to place the factory’s establishment within the context of 
the longer term development of regional policy, and its changing priorities and outcomes. In his 
seminal study, Regional Policy in Britain, Gavin McCrone traces the origins of government 
attempts to control industrial structures and trade patterns in the regions to the 1930s, and the 
need to provide assistance to the depressed industrial areas, including Clydeside-North 
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Lanarkshire, which were designated Special Areas in an act of 1934.
62
 These were areas defined 
by their structural reliance on the ‘traditional’ and ‘heavy’ staple industries which had provided 
the basis for Britain’s nineteenth century prosperity – coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding and 
textiles – but were affected severely by the worldwide depression of the 1930s. The national rate 
of unemployment in shipbuilding, for example, stood at 61 per cent in 1934, while in particularly 
vulnerable areas such as Jarrow on Tyneside or the Rhondda mining village of Taff Well it was 
as high as 77 per cent and 82 per cent respectively.
63
 The first steps towards regional policy, 
which comprised financial assistance and tax inducements to small companies opening up in the 
Special Areas and a policy of ‘industrial transference’ which sought to move labour out of the 
depressed areas to more prosperous regions, were a response to what was interpreted as a 
moment of ‘unusual emergency’ in Britain’s economic development, which was, in fact, the first 
stage of its deindustrialisation.
64
 The structural nature of the difficulties, and therefore the 
longer-term necessity of regional policy, was subsequently recognised, initially in the Report of 
the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, or Barlow Report, 
published in 1940, with considerable influence over the development of the 1944 Employment 
Policy White Paper on and the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act. The latter both signified the 
recognition that increased government intervention in post-war planning would be necessary to 
avoid a return to mass unemployment, and, in a further reflection of the change in policy 
priorities brought about by the post-war consensus and shaped by the experience of the interwar 
years, placed greater importance on economic growth as the means by which regional disparities 
in unemployment and wellbeing could be avoided.
65
 
Jim Tomlinson has noted the difficulty of assessing the impact of economic management during 
the 1950s and 1960s, as the very idea of economic success in the longer post-war years has been 
ignored or denied in a body of literature which has generally accepted the dominant narrative of 
British industrial failure and decline.
66
 However, the positive result of improved living standards, 
a key feature of the post-war ‘Golden Age’ up until 1970, was partly the consequence of the 
government’s attitudes towards regional development. As discussed in the Introduction, 
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McCrone and Peter Scott have both suggested that, during the high employment years of the 
1950s, regional policy was shaped more by its social than economic aspects, focusing primarily 
on providing jobs in unemployment black spots.
67
 In the 1960s, however, the importance of 
economic factors was reasserted, and regional policy initiatives can be understood as driven by 
the need to secure economic growth – more evenly shared by spreading the prosperity associated 
with the new industries geographically – as well as a response to the rundown of the traditional 
and heavy industries. The implications that this increased focus on growth had for Scotland’s 
reindustrialisation will be considered in more detail in the final section of this chapter, but here it 
is important to recognise the three major categories of ‘regional problem’ identified by 
McCrone. The first two of these, agricultural regions which lag behind industrialised areas, and 
industrial areas suffering from stagnation, were each marked by their inability to provide 
sufficient employment, and subsequent high levels of emigration and low incomes. The third 
category, ‘congested regions’, suffered from the very opposite set of problems; chief amongst 
these were the inflationary pressures caused by full employment and continued in-migration.
68
 It 
was these pressures, identified in the Barlow Report and given renewed focus by the 1960 
publication of The South-East Study into congestion in London and the South-East conurbation, 
which McCrone argues transformed the view of regional policy from ‘a fad of the Celtic fringe’, 
concerned with relieving unemployment in depressed areas, to a matter of national rather than 
merely peripheral importance.
69
 The role played by the relatively new and growing industries of 
the Midlands and South of England in driving those areas’ growth, prosperity and congestion 
was recognised. Regional policy intervention was seen as the means of dispersing investment in 
such industries away from these areas and into what were now termed Development Areas or, 
from 1960, Development Districts. Industrial Development Certificates (IDCs), introduced in 
1947 as a result of Barlow’s recommendations, and requiring Board of Trade planning 
permission for any industrial development over 5,000 square feet, were increasingly used to 
compel companies to invest in the Development Districts and, while it was the unemployment 
rate in these areas which necessitated their reindustrialisation, it was the success of the motor 
manufacturers in driving growth and creating congestion in the Midlands in particular which 
decided the manner in which they would be regenerated. In 1960, and under pressure from the 
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Macmillan government, a number of car-makers announced that they would be moving to new 
factories in Development Districts. These included Ford, refused an IDC for the expansion of its 
existing plant at Dagenham, along with Rootes, whose application for an IDC in Coventry had 
also been rebuffed, and the BMC, allowed to expand at Longbridge only on condition that it 
moved a significant proportion of production to the Development Districts.
70
  
The BMC was the first of these motor manufacturers to establish a factory in a Development 
District, and its experience in Bathgate was therefore being watched closely by other companies 
as a ‘test case’ of the government’s attitudes to and expectations of these regional policy plants.71 
It was joined in Scotland in 1963 by Rootes, which moved to Linwood near Paisley, and these 
two developments, along with the construction of the Colville’s steel strip mill at Ravenscraig in 
Lanarkshire were seen as central to the modernisation and diversification of the Scottish 
industrial base. While ostensibly a response to the relatively high levels of unemployment in 
Scotland, and West Lothian in particular, the plant’s establishment can also be seen as in line 
with the ‘Scottish consensus’ described by David Stewart, which had developed during the 
1950s around Ravenscraig and its potential to support younger forms of manufacturing.
72
 The 
STUC, for example, had long expressed concern about Scotland’s reliance on the heavy 
industrial staples, and had campaigned for investment in the new industries, and particularly in 
the motor industry. In a 1961 statement the STUC set out its vision of a Scottish economy 
reinvigorated by the creation of a well-integrated motor industry based on, but not limited to, 
these three major developments: 
It is projects like that of the Rootes Group, to be established at Linwood, and of 
BMC at Bathgate that will help to change the pattern of Scottish industry. No 
longer can our dependence for employment rest so heavily, as it has in the past, on 
coal mining, shipbuilding and marine engineering. With the employment for Scots 
labour and the use of sheet steel from the new strip mill at Ravenscraig, the 
coming of the Rootes Group and BMC represent a great acquisition to industrial 
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Scotland ... The break-through of Scotland into the motor car industry can, we 
believe, supply the dynamic which the Scottish economy has sorely needed for 
many years.
73
 
Films such as County on the Move and The New Scotland, produced in 1964 by Educational 
Films of Scotland following an economic survey of the country, emphasised the modernity of 
these factories and their potentially transformative effect on the landscape and economy of 
Scotland. County on the Move drew a sharp contrast not only between the shale bings and the 
factory they were used to build, but also between the experience of physical work in coal and 
shale mines, and that of more skilled and technical work in modern manufacturing. Similar 
imagery pervades The New Scotland, which focuses specifically on Linwood, Bathgate and 
Ravenscraig as examples both of the changes in the ways in which work was experienced in 
Scotland, and symbols of a much broader modernisation encompassing housing, education, 
leisure and transport. The sense of opportunity expressed by the Bathgate workforce, and their 
expectations of motor industry employment are similarly marked by both the scale of these 
developments in terms of both the factory itself and the BMC organisation, and the very 
‘newness’ of motor manufacturing to the area. Guthrie Aitken remembers his reaction to the 
news that the BMC would be moving to the town, and his expectations of the opportunities it 
would afford. 
I would be 19, 20 years of age. I went into the paper shop to buy a paper before I 
got the bus to my work and there were banner headlines on the newspaper and if 
memory serves me correctly it just said two words, ‘It’s Bathgate’. There had 
been speculation of course, because there were a lot of sites that were up for 
consideration but then it was confirmed it was Bathgate. I remember at the top of 
the hill going up from Blackridge to Harthill, between the football ground and the 
chip shop, there was a big notice board erected not long after this announcement 
was made and it gave you the numbers around this plant. The number of trucks 
they were going to be building, the number of countries they were going to be 
exporting to, the number of tractors they were going to build, the number of 
people they were going to employ. It was something we just couldn’t envisage, it 
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was mind boggling at that time. So it was opportunity, opportunity, opportunity, 
and I wanted to be part of that opportunity.
74
 
The scale of the factory, bigger than anything that had been in the area previously, made a huge 
impression on many of the workers. Alan Marr, for example, started work at the BMC as an 
apprentice, and was struck by its size. 
I thought it was massive. I’d never been in anything like it before in my life. But I 
wasnae long in orientating myself and finding out... I was just quite amazed at all 
the different types of things that they were doing.
75
 
Fred McCormick was similarly impressed by the size of the factory, and described his first 
reaction to B Block, which contained the main truck assembly line as, ‘Wow – this is some size 
of a place.’76 
Alongside their focus on the economic modernisation of Scotland, films such as County on the 
Move also emphasised the concurrent changes taking place in the social fabric of the country. 
The New Scotland in particular highlights the modernisation of the urban environment, depicting 
the slum clearance and redevelopment programmes which were getting underway in what it 
described as a ‘frenzy of destruction’.77 In 1959, West Lothian County Council had signed an 
overspill agreement with Glasgow Corporation under the Housing and Town Development 
(Scotland) Act, 1957.
78
 Under this agreement, the County Council would build and make 
available three hundred new homes in the village of Blackburn, around two miles from Bathgate, 
for let to ‘approved persons’ for a period of ten years. 79  This highlights the importance, 
emphasised by McCrone, of considering the social as well as the economic aspects of regional 
policy, not least because this agreement itself formed part of a programme of policy which 
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sought to tackle the social problems associated with Glasgow’s over-population and lack of 
employment opportunity, and illustrated in The New Scotland.
80
  
Image 1:1 – Main Street, Blackburn, mid-1960s 
 
©The Scotsman Publications Ltd. Licensor www.scran.ac.uk 
Moreover, it contributed to an increase in the population of West Lothian of over 50 per cent 
between 1951 and 1981 which had a considerable influence on the development of the county 
and of many of its decaying mining settlements over this period. Following the announcement 
that the BMC would be moving to Bathgate, West Lothian County Council agreed to provide 
further new housing for incoming workers, again mostly in Blackburn, contributing to an 
increase in its population from under 6,000 in 1961 to over 10,000 by 1963.
81
 The modernity of 
this housing, illustrated by the contrast between the nineteenth century streetscape of Image 1:1 
and the modernist, mid-twentieth century housing of Image 1:2, had a considerable impact on the 
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urban environment, and was to provide an important attraction for many BMC workers moving 
to the area from Glasgow in particular.
 82
  
Image 1:2 – new maisonettes on the Murrayfield Estate, Blackburn, early 
1960s 
 
©The Scotsman Publications Ltd. Licensor www.scran.ac.uk 
John Moore, for example, grew up in the Gorbals area of Glasgow and was working for Albion 
Motors in the city when he decided to take a job at the BMC in spite of what would be a 
considerable drop in his wages. 
I’d heard in the Albion there was recruitment taking place in the Bathgate BMC 
and there was houses going. At the point in time in 1964 when I applied I was 
staying in what they called a room and kitchen in quite a rundown part of 
Glasgow, Whiteinch. So anyway we had two children at that point in time and I 
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was desperate to take the opportunity that was offered. I came out here in January 
’65 and I was with the plant until it closed.83 
Moore’s experience was typical: of 92 overspill families living in Blackburn and Whitburn and 
interviewed for the 1966 Lothians Regional Survey and Plan, 54 had lived in a single room in 
Glasgow, and 52 had had no bathroom or toilet facilities of their own.
84
 Jim Bilsborough lived in 
similar conditions in Glasgow and moved to Blackburn under the overspill agreement. 
Blackburn was all Leyland. All these hooses were built for the Glasgow overspill. 
Where I stayed in Glasgow it was just a room and kitchen and I had two kids at 
the time. The toilet was out in the stair, on the landing. So I applied for this house 
in Blackburn. It was a case of saying yes right away because it was a lovely 
house. Three bedrooms! The kids were just coming up at the time. My third one 
was born there and they were all brought up in Blackburn. It was a new house, 
new job.
85
 
The development of Whitburn and Blackburn as overspill reception areas predated the 1962 
designation of the nearby New Town of Livingston and had emerged from a different policy 
background, but in many ways can be seen as broadly in line with some of the wider social 
trends which characterised the growth of Scotland’s New Towns.  
In his study of England’s Invincible Green Suburbs, Brave New Towns, Mark Clapson warns 
against reducing working-class motivations for migration in the 1950s and 1960s to a simple 
binary of ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors, arguing instead that push factors such as poor housing and 
slum clearance were intertwined with pull criteria such as the appeal of a new house and a 
cleaner, safer environment, and emphasises the voluntary nature of most out-migration.
86
 This is 
also commented on in the Lothians Regional Survey which found little evidence in either 
Blackburn or Whitburn of the so-called ‘New Town Blues’ thought to result from the break-up 
of working-class communities, and central to many contemporary depictions of life in New 
Towns and peripheral estates, relating to a sense, described by William Knox, that ‘the 
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community spirit of slum life was traded for an indoor toilet and bath.’ 87  The positive 
atmosphere in West Lothian, it was felt, was due to Glasgow Corporation’s policy of offering 
overspill housing to all families on its list rather than only those in condemned housing and thus 
the absence of either any element of coercion in the move, or of the ‘arbitrary disruption’ of 
existing communities.
88
 
 
Figure 1:1 shows the primary reasons given by these families for deciding to move, but it should 
be noted that the Survey goes on to state that ‘in further discussion it usually emerged that a 
combination of these factors had led the family to make the move, and that in all cases the house 
was a powerful motive.’89 Furthermore, there was a clear preference expressed for terraced 
housing and cottage-style flats which allowed a family to have ‘our own front and back door’. 
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Those who had been rehoused in flats, primarily in Blackburn, were most likely to express 
disappointment at having been moved ‘from one tenement to another’.90  
The age profile of Blackburn and Whitburn’s overspill population was skewed by the presence 
of the BMC and its preference for younger workers, but the predominance of young couples and 
young families in their demographic structure, and the relative absence of middle-aged people 
and adolescents, again reflected broader trends in the development of Scotland’s New Towns 
and overspill estates. In his study of ‘Social and Geographical Mobility in the Scottish New 
Towns’, Garry McDonald writes that, in spite of the relative absence of the kind of cheap, 
private housing more readily available in the English suburbs, working-class migration to 
Scotland’s New Towns was defined by young couples and growing families seeking ‘low-
density, family housing in a suburban setting’. 91  For McDonald, such migration can be 
characterised as ‘a conscious and intended break from the past rather than an involuntary 
decision imposed from above’, in which the type of work available and opportunities for 
promotion, career advancement or higher earnings were of only secondary importance.
92
 In these 
terms, McDonald argues, the behaviour of those manual workers who moved to the Scottish 
New Towns can be seen as broadly in line with the influential Affluent Worker analysis, 
according to which manual workers were increasingly coming to see their work as a means to an 
extrinsic end rather than an end it itself; an idea which will be considered more fully in Chapter 
Five in relation to the culture of work at the BMC.  
It is clear, however, that the arrival of so many young incoming workers and their families, and 
the employment available to both them and commuters from nearby towns, had a considerable 
impact on life and work in and around Bathgate. John Hastings lived in Whitburn, and enjoyed 
his work at the BMC precisely because of the opportunity it gave him to mix with people from 
other areas. ‘For the first time ever I was working with people outside Armadale, Bathgate – 
people from all sorts of places, Shotts, Salsburgh, even a few from Edinburgh.’ 93  Similar 
thoughts are expressed by Vince Moore, who grew up in the village of Armadale and started at 
the plant as an apprentice in 1979. 
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That was the first time that I met guys, people, from Whitburn, Pumpherston, 
Livingston, Broxburn, and all, the whole kinda, whole kinda range of folk from all 
over really, and that was really quite interesting.
94
 
This demonstrates the degree to which the plant was able to attract workers from across the West 
Lothian area, and is also, perhaps, an indication of the previous isolation of West Lothian’s 
scattered mining settlements and the extent to which the presence of the BMC contributed to 
their modernisation; something which is also reflected in Joyce Brogan’s memories of the wider 
changes to the area brought about by the construction of the plant and the arrival of its incoming 
workers.  
I can remember it was a boom time for the Bathgate area with a lot of incomers 
coming from Glasgow to settle in Blackburn because they built a community in 
Blackburn for incoming BMC workers.
95
 
The idea of Bathgate as a ‘boom town’ is one which emerges from the testimony of a number of 
the plant’s former workers, and especially those who had grown up locally and witnessed the 
longer-term development of the town and its surrounding villages. Ian Tennant, for example, 
grew up in Whitburn and his description of the impact of the plant on the area reflects his 
memories of the conditions in the town prior to its establishment. 
It has a fantastic place in the history of this area. If we look at the social thing in 
the late ‘50s, mid to late ‘50s, this area was depressed, and I mean really 
depressed. The number of guys who were out. It was a political decision taken by 
the Tories in the ‘50s, they obviously realised you had to get people working...and 
it was social engineering. Thatcher did it in the wrong way but this was done in 
the right way. It proved that one, you can take people with very little skill and 
make them useful in a productive sense, and give them a sense of belonging, a 
sense of pride, because there was a lot of pride in Bathgate. There were a lot of 
mistakes made...but it was a good part of social engineering by the politicians, one 
of the better parts I think for Scotland... But looking back and reading the history 
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of the time, ehm, it put this county, it put a lot of money into this county every 
week. You know, I was there in Bathgate when there was six thousand employed, 
that was six thousand probably the majority of people would be on fourteen or 
fifteen pounds a week, that’s a lot of income into this area, ehm, it provided 
Bathgate to, brought Blackburn to grow, not in the best possible way but it really 
gave Blackburn, Blackburn was a kinda run down village, it provided Whitburn 
with the opportunity to expand. Bathgate did exceedingly well out of it during the 
‘60s and ‘70s.96 
In other cases, the memories of these workers are marked by a clear nostalgia shaped by the 
area’s current perceived problems. Alan Marr’s testimony overlooks the high unemployment and 
rundown of the mining industries which had led to the establishment of the factory in the town, 
and instead suggests a sharp contrast between the ‘bustling’ Bathgate he remembers growing up 
in during the 1950s and 1960s, and the Bathgate of today. 
Bathgate was quite a bustling place, there was - the shops were so different to 
what they are just now. Ehm, there was a bit of everything there. Ehm, there was 
lots of work as well, because we had the Plessey was there, the pits were still 
open, we had, the foundries were still there, the shovel works was still there, the 
brick works at Armadale were still there, so there was loads of work for 
everybody.
97
 
Andy Hunter draws a more explicit parallel between the prosperity brought to the area by the 
factory, and the difficulties wrought by its closure. 
I think obviously British Leyland changed, or the BMC changed West Lothian for 
the good, I think West Lothian was a much more thriving and prosperous area. I 
mean, everything seemed to be doing well, I mean if you look round about 
Armadale, Bathgate now it’s basically they’re ghost towns, and when British 
Leyland was going and that, at its peak, every Main Street seemed to be, seemed 
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to be flourishing. And ehm, I think, just sad sad days when British Leyland 
went.
98
 
While this suggests the degree to which the closure of the plant has been perceived to have 
affected life in the town, the idea that Bathgate was ‘thriving and prosperous’ while it was open 
indicates that not only did the factory alleviate unemployment, it did so by providing work which 
was considered well-paid and well-regarded. Wages at the factory were amongst the highest in 
the area, and working conditions significantly better than anything that had been experienced in a 
coal or shale mine, or iron foundry. The work culture and working conditions of the plant will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapters Three and Four, but here it should be noted that, as well as 
aiding the improvement of the area’s housing stock and urban environment, the establishment of 
the BMC plant clearly modernised the labour force of the county by providing new skills as well 
as new expectations of work.  
 
The economic and social impact of Livingston New Town 
The Bathgate initiative was of clear importance to West Lothian’s economic and social 
development but it was arguably compromised, albeit unintentionally, by the designation in 1962 
of Livingston, around five miles away, as Scotland’s fourth New Town, with a target population 
of 185,000 by 1986.
99
 New Towns had emerged as an important tool in urban development, 
rather than economic or regional policy, and had grown initially as a response to slum clearance 
and the need to rehouse urban populations and repair war damage.
100
 In Scotland, the Clyde 
Valley Regional Plan, published in 1946, highlighted Glasgow’s poor housing conditions and led 
to the designation of New Towns at East Kilbride (in 1947), Glenrothes (1948), Cumbernauld 
(1956), Livingston and Irvine (1966), which were to be self-contained communities providing 
employment as well as housing for their inhabitants.
101
 It was envisaged that these towns would 
accommodate as many as 300,000 people displaced by Glasgow’s redevelopment in 
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environments which would use novel architecture and public sculpture to assert their modernity, 
and demonstrate what Catriona M. Macdonald has described as their ‘self conscious desire to 
break with the past’.102 Peter Scott has written, however, that during the 1950s the policy of New 
Town development in the UK as a whole cut against regional development policy, and New 
Towns themselves took precedence over the Development Areas. Scott has differentiated 
between two different government approaches to location of industry policy before 1960. In this 
analysis, the development of New Towns, and particularly the London New Towns (LNTs) was 
a growth-oriented strategy which sought primarily to decentralise London’s population and 
industry and alleviate its congestion, while Development Area policy remained focused on short-
term job creation in unemployment blackspots.
103
 Indeed, focusing on Scotland alone obscures 
the fact that the majority of New Towns were in the South-East of England, which diverted 
government attention and economic resources from the northern regions, where growth was 
slower, and perpetuated the concentration of population and industry near London. Eight new 
satellite towns were built around London, requiring industrial development to support their 
populations, and over the decade to 1961 these towns increased their employment by 100,000, 
while regional policy created only 73,435 new jobs in the designated Development Districts.
104
 
By the mid-1960s, however, the success as centres for industrial growth of some New Towns in 
the Development Districts, including East Kilbride as well as Peterlee and Newton Aycliffe in 
the North-East of England, had highlighted their potential role as ‘an important weapon of 
regional policy’ and, McCrone writes, their proposed size and siting consequently came to be 
considered with this in mind.
105
  
The development of Livingston New Town, and the ‘Greater Livingston Area’, reflects both this 
change in the role of the New Town, and a shift in the focus of regional development policy, 
particularly in Scotland. Published in 1966, The Lothians Regional Survey and Plan was 
undertaken with the aim of providing the local councils and Livingston Development 
Corporation with a comprehensive regional scheme of development, and was influenced directly 
by the report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Scottish Economy, known as the Toothill 
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Report and published in 1961 and, to a lesser extent, the Macmillan government’s 1963 White 
Paper, Central Scotland. While the establishment of BMC Bathgate was shaped by an emergent 
consensus which emphasised the potential role of motor industry development in modernising 
the Scottish economy and promoting a sustainable model of growth, these two documents 
reasserted the increasing importance of growth as a policy priority, and contributed to a change 
in the way that regional development was approached in Scotland. Toothill contended that 
unemployment was a symptom of low growth that could best be reversed through the 
development of newer industries; a view characterised in the Lothians Regional Survey as ‘an 
observable trend of thought towards the view that what the Scottish economy needs is growth 
areas rather than rescue areas.’106 Investment would therefore no longer be directed to those 
areas of highest unemployment, but rather to ‘growth zones’ defined by their ‘specially 
advantageous communications, urban renewal and public services’, and emphasis would be 
placed on the development of the ‘new’ science-based and consumer durable industries rather 
than the rescue of the older industrial sectors.
107
 Indeed, Toothill recommended the incremental 
rundown of the heavy industries as an element in Scotland’s modernisation, in part because it 
would create a pool of surplus labour, cheaper than obtainable in the ‘congested’ English 
districts, that could attract investors from the new industries. While it remained the main 
objective of Livingston New Town to provide housing and employment for the Glasgow 
overspill population, it was stated in the Regional Survey that: 
The emerging philosophy of growth areas suggests that instead of these people 
simply being thought to be pushed out of Glasgow by shortage of housing 
accommodation, we are now to regard them as a strategic population available to 
develop growth areas.
108
 
During the negotiations which had taken the BMC to Bathgate, the Scottish Council for 
Development and Industry had argued that Scotland would be in a strong position to attract 
further motor industry development due to its relatively high levels of unemployment and 
therefore its potential for sustained growth in the longer term, while it had been tacitly 
acknowledged by both the Scottish Development Department and, perhaps surprisingly, by a 
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group of Scottish Labour MPs lobbying the President of the Board of Trade that labour 
availability and consequent lower production costs were among ‘the attractions that the 
unemployment areas [could] offer’.109 However, the centrality to the Lothians Regional Survey 
of the idea that Glasgow’s unemployed represented an ‘underutilized resource’ highlights the 
extent to which regional policy priorities had shifted. While the potential usefulness of a reserve 
of unemployed labour was acknowledged in 1960, not least in terms of its potential to defuse 
inflationary pressures in more congested regions, the principal aim of regional policy had been to 
alleviate unemployment and mitigate its effects on the economies of the Development Areas. By 
1966, on the other hand, it was accepted that West Lothian’s depressed jobs market could be 
used as an asset with which to attract investment and drive growth, because development in this 
area – unlike Glasgow – would not be hindered by the residue of traditional or heavy industry: 
there was the physical space for new growth as well as the labour to facilitate it. This perhaps 
supports Jim Phillips’s suggestion that, in seeking to improve living standards for all social 
classes by emphasising rapid economic growth over greater wealth redistribution, post-Toothill 
regional policy was ‘shaped to suit the interests of industrial employers rather than meet the ends 
of social justice’.110  
It also highlights the discrepancy between the development of Scotland’s New Towns, and that 
of the LNTs. In Scott’s analysis of pre-1960 location of industry policy, the relatively low-skill 
and low-wage Development Areas were considered suitable only for labour-intensive branch 
plant production, while more high-tech industrial development would continue to cluster around 
London.
111
 Furthermore, the LNTs were designed to attract skilled labour, and ‘provide 
prospective employers with a virtually hand-picked labour force’.112 This is in sharp contrast to 
the post-Toothill focus in Scotland on the availability of cheap labour, and its potential to attract 
investment to New Towns such as Livingston. Moreover, the reality of regional policy and the 
way in which it shaped Scotland’s economic development could be very different from the 
rhetoric of documents like Toothill and the Lothians Regional Plan, which advocated careful, 
integrated development based on growth points and sustainable improvement. In practice, the 
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implementation of these ideas was complicated by the democratic imperative to provide people 
with the jobs, incomes and housing that were needed in the short term, and could lead to 
contradictory outcomes. Certainly, the idea that capital would be better served in the growth area 
of Livingston, and the extent to which investment was subsequently directed into the New Town, 
had significant consequences for West Lothian’s older and apparently ‘less fortunate’ industrial 
settlements, and led to the unintended ‘crowding out’ of towns such as Bathgate. The Regional 
Survey describes the town as ‘the most important settlement in the Survey Area’, with a 
population in 1966 of 14,000, and an important function as a centre for shopping, education, and 
as a transport hub.
113
 However, it recommended that shopping facilities in the town ‘should not 
be extended’ and that Livingston should instead be developed as both the main retail and service 
centre for the county. Jim McCulloch worked at the BMC from 1961 until 1968, travelling to 
work from his home in Fauldhouse, and his description of the change in Bathgate’s town centre 
both reflects the sense of Bathgate as a BMC-inspired ‘boom town’, and highlights the impact 
that the growth of Livingston is perceived to have had, even in spite of the continued presence 
throughout the 1960s of both the BMC and Plessey in the town.  
Bathgate was the same, it went through a boom time when the factory, when the 
BMC factory was there, and TCC, Telegraph Condenser Company, they were 
there, it was mainly female labour in there, and again it was quite busy for a while 
until Livingston came on, and the council I think focused more on Livingston to 
do all the things that they wanted, because they’ve built this big McArthur Glen, 
the big shopping centre, I’m sure you’ve been, you’ll have seen it, that’s – They 
had a place at the Five Sisters, Freeport, but the council never ever endorsed it 
very much, so that’s lying derelict now. Everything was targeted into 
Almondvale, McArthur Glen, the retail parks. So Bathgate became a wee bit of a 
ghost town again.
114
 
Robert and Christine McAndrew moved to Bathgate from Grangemouth, but left the area when 
Andrew decided to leave his job at the plant in 1970. They have similar memories of the 
apparent decline in Bathgate’s fortunes, and of the role of Livingston in that decline. 
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Christine: Well, Bathgate was like where we are now, ehm, when we were 
younger everybody went to Falkirk on a Saturday. Well, up there everybody went 
into Bathgate, into the shops in Bathgate, that was the main shopping area, but 
once they got Livingston, I mean, well, occasionally we’d go up or if we’d been 
down at Edinburgh we’d drive back down through it and it was really really 
depressed, wasn’t it? I mean, it isnae maybe quite so bad now, but I mean maybe 
you’re talking about fifteen years ago, maybe twenty years ago, and we came in 
and thought thank goodness we don’t live here, because it was really, really 
depressing. 
Robert: It was depressing to see what had happened. 
Christine: It just seemed to have gone really downhill, but I suppose that would be 
because everybody was going to Livingston, you know, they were all going to the 
New Town to shop, and – and businesses in Bathgate were running down.115 
This description seems to refer to the period following the closures of both Leyland and Plessey, 
when high unemployment would have had its own impact on Bathgate’s shops and businesses. It 
is notable, however, that it is the growth of Livingston, rather than Bathgate’s own economic 
problems, which is perceived to have been most damaging, and this reflects the extent to which 
the emphasis on the New Town as the focus of West Lothian’s economic and social development 
affected life in the area more broadly. It was recommended in the Regional Survey, for example, 
that the population of Bathgate should not be allowed to grow much beyond 18,000, and the 
build-up of Livingston would also impose limits on the development of Whitburn and Blackburn 
as reception areas for Glasgow’s overspill population. At the time of the survey Whitburn had a 
population of 9,000 which it was recommended should not rise beyond 10,000, while Blackburn, 
which had grown from under 6,000 in 1961 to nearly 10,000 by 1963, was given a maximum 
target population of 15,000 by 1985.
116
  
In spite of the apparently contradictory impact that the implementation of post-Toothill regional 
policy had on West Lothian’s older industrial settlements, however, it is important to recognise 
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the improvements that this policy brought to the citizens of West Lothian more widely in terms 
of both living standards and access to and experiences of work. There was, for example, a 
qualitative difference between the way in which it was envisaged that Livingston would develop 
as a New Town and growth zone, and the earlier expansion of Blackburn in particular as a 
reception area for the BMC’s incoming workforce.  
Image 1:3 – Craigshill, Livingston, under construction, c.1966 
 
©Almond Valley Heritage Trust. Licensor www.scran.ac.uk 
The Regional Survey repeatedly emphasised the need to ‘rehabilitate’ West Lothian’s built 
environment and to provide high quality private housing for rent and for owner-occupation as 
well as local authority housing, as it was considered vital that the New Town ‘should be as 
attractive to the executive type as to the manual worker’.117 This reflects the role that it was 
envisaged the New Towns would have in the spread of owner-occupation in Scotland, where it 
was generally considered there was ‘less social stigma attached to living in a subsidized council 
house’ and rates of home ownership were markedly lower than in England, and indeed Scott 
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stresses the extent to which New Town development grew out of Macmillan government’s 
commitment to housebuilding and the ‘populist agenda of fostering a “property-owning 
democracy”’.118 In addition, it underlines the extent to which Livingston’s development was 
shaped by the importance placed by post-Toothill regional policy on economic growth, and the 
expansion of white-collar employment and the service sector. The recommendations of the 
Regional Survey are underpinned by an assumption that society would continue to become 
wealthier, and that this increase in affluence would necessitate the construction of what it 
describes as middle-income housing as well as improved social and educational facilities. In this 
respect, Livingston’s proximity to Edinburgh, and its potential to develop as both a service 
centre for the city and as a commuter town for ‘managerial employees’ priced out of the capital 
but perhaps reluctant to move too far from its cultural amenities, was seen as key.
119
 
Furthermore, the Regional Survey identified the potential role of Bathgate and other, older 
industrial settlements in the wider redevelopment of the Livingston area. 
In the Lothians Area the evident circumstance that Livingston will be the centre of 
growth does not invalidate the part which Bathgate or Whitburn, for example, can 
play in the development of the Area as a whole.
120
 
In the case of Bathgate in particular, there was a recognition that the presence of the BMC could 
help to establish the town as an industrial centre as well as a labour market for the expansion of 
Livingston, and it advised that the town’s industrial development should not be restricted.121 The 
survey was in fact notable for its remarkably pragmatic approach to the wider growth area’s 
economic development; while foreseeing an eventual concentration in the growing areas of 
electronics and chemicals, which would also benefit from Livingston’s ease of access to the 
affluent consumer goods markets in Edinburgh, its recommendations were based on the principle 
that ‘no industry which is prepared to develop in the area is undesirable’. The survey recognised 
that primary industries in the area were in decline and that manufacturing employment was 
unlikely to expand greatly in future, and accepted that development would necessarily be limited, 
at least initially, to those firms willing to move into the area. While these firms were more likely 
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to be from the growing ‘new’ industries, it was also stated that ‘some may be at the growing end 
of declining industries and should be equally welcome’.122 The first industrial concern to be 
established in Livingston was the Cameron Iron Works, which went into construction in 1963 
and would produce forgings for the aircraft and nuclear power industries. As an iron works more 
typical of the traditional heavy industries which had prevailed in West Lothian previously rather 
than the new light engineering and consumer durables industries, its establishment apparently 
reflected the pragmatism which marked the Regional Survey’s approach. However, the survey 
was keen to emphasise that the works represented a wholly new industrial acquisition which was 
the first of its kind in the UK and would not draw on any pre-existing industrial concentration or 
expertise, and thus ‘should not be regarded as part of the existing structure, but rather as the first 
step towards the proposed new development of the Area’. 123 Moreover, as a branch plant of an 
American firm, employing a wholly male workforce of 2,000, only ten per cent of whom would 
be skilled, the works was symbolic of a number of trends which have come to characterise 
Scotland’s post-1945 economic development, and the industrial growth of its New Towns in 
particular.
124
 
Table 1:2 reproduces data from Peter Scott’s study of ‘Regional Development and Policy’ in 
Britain since 1945, and shows that, by 1981, 65.9 per cent of Scotland’s manufacturing 
workforce was employed in plants situated over a hundred miles from their Head Office.  With 
the exception of Wales, where the figure was 68.1 per cent, this was by some distance the 
highest rate in the country, with the lowest rates to be found in the South-East of England and the 
East Midlands, where the figures stood at 12.7 per cent and 17.1 per cent respectively. Perhaps 
most telling is the data in the second column, which indicates the extent to which the Scottish 
economy had become subject to external control by very large, distant, corporations. As Scott 
notes, there is a close relationship between the distance of a plant from its Head Office and the 
likelihood of its being used for assembly and ‘other routine functions’ only; a function of what is 
described in the literature as the ‘regional dualism’ that resulted from the contradictions inherent 
in a regional policy which, in spite of the influence of Toothill in Scotland during the 1960s, was 
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for much of the period overwhelmingly driven by immediate problems and employment creation 
rather than longer-term regional development. 
Table 1:2 – indicators of regional divisions of production by function, c.1981  
Region 
% of 
manufacturing 
workforce in plants 
over 100 miles from 
Head Office 
% of workers in 
previous column in 
firms employing 
over 10,000 workers 
South-east 12.7 8.2 
South-west 45.2 42.3 
East Anglia 33.2 6.7 
North-west 55.5 48.4 
West Midlands 26.7 25.4 
East Midlands 17.1 12.8 
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 31 23.4 
Scotland 65.9 50.4 
North-west 53.7 27.4 
Wales 68.1 55 
(Source: R. Harris, ‘Market Structure and Market Control in the Regional Economies of Great Britain’,Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, 35:4, 1988, p.337.) 
In Scott’s analysis, regional policy failed to shift the ‘centre of gravity’ to the ‘peripheral’ 
regions of Britain, which became dependent on labour intensive branch plants while white-
collar, research and development work remained concentrated in the ‘core’ of the South-East 
and, in the motor industry context, the West Midlands.
125
 Furthermore, this was in part a result of 
the regional division of labour which emerged from the conflict between Development Area 
policy and the growth of the LNTs especially.
126
 The idea that post-1945 Scotland came to 
operate as a ‘branch plant economy’ dependent on such plants for employment has become a 
prominent theme in its historiography, and is linked closely to wider debates surrounding the 
change in its industrial structure, summarised by Knox as the move ‘from ships to chips’, and the 
role of external capital in driving this change.
127
 If, in the late 1950s and early 1960s the focus of 
regional policy had been on encouraging English motor manufacturers to move production to 
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Scotland, the growing awareness of the difficulties associated with jittery and intermittent car 
sales contributed to the emergence of US-owned electrical and engineering firms, what Ewen 
Cameron has called the next ‘panacea’ for the revival of the Scottish economy.128 Companies 
such as IBM and Ferranti, attracted by government incentives including the availability of IDCs 
as well as grants for building and for plant and machinery, had established factories in Scotland 
during the 1940s and 1950s, and between 1950 and 1968 manufacturing employment dependent 
on US firms rose fourfold.
129
 During the post-Second World War period, Scotland received a 
greater volume of inward investment from overseas firms than any other part of the UK, and, 
after Canada, was the second most popular location for US foreign investment.
130
 75 per cent of 
foreign-owned manufacturing output was in electronics, and J.N. Randall has shown how far 
external investment in the new industries shaped the economic development of the New Towns 
in particular: in the periods from 1963 to 1968, and from 1973 to 1978, for example, the New 
Towns attracted over a third of all jobs created by ‘incomer units’ opening in Scotland and, by 
1978, 39 per cent of all manufacturing employment in the New Towns was in mechanical, 
instrument and electrical engineering, compared with 26 per cent in Scotland as a whole.
131
 
This had important implications for Scottish workers, and the terms on which their labour was 
engaged. Knox and Cameron are amongst those who have emphasised the loss of traditional craft 
skills associated with the growth of the new industries as US-owned branch plants concentrated 
on semi-skilled assembly work.
132
 In this respect, the Cameron Iron Works can be seen as 
typical, although its employment of a wholly male labour force was more in line with the older 
industries than the new, as electronics in particular was notable for the number of women 
productive workers it employed. Furthermore, the new industries also engendered new skills 
amongst both male and female workers, and the creation of technical skill in maintenance and 
engineering in particular has contributed to what could be termed the modernisation of the 
Scottish industrial base. The idea that the loss of craft skill contributed to the destabilisation of 
industrial employment in Scotland is, however, central to the branch plant economy thesis, and is 
closely linked to the use of the country’s unemployed labour reserve as a tool with which to 
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attract external investment. This will be considered in greater detail and in relation to the work 
available at BMC Bathgate in Part Two, but here it is important to highlight the broader 
significance of capital mobility in shaping Scotland’s economic development since 1945. Recent 
research by Pavos Dimitratos, Ioanna Liouka, Duncan Ross and Stephen Young has highlighted 
the extent to which cost cutting has been the key motivating factor for multinational firms 
moving to Scotland since the 1960s, and has described an ensuing lack of ‘embeddedness’ in the 
local economy.
133
 For George Peden, this resulted from the failings of a regional policy which 
was ‘guided almost solely by immediate employment creation, without consideration of what 
linkages there might have been with the local economy’, and which apparently gave little serious 
thought to the availability of supply networks locally.
134
 There was in fact some awareness of 
these problems in the Lothians Regional Survey, which was clearly influenced in this regard by 
the importance placed by both Toothill and the 1963 Central Scotland White Paper on improving 
Scotland’s transport infrastructure in order to both attract further industrial investment and to 
ease any potential pressures associated with the cost of transporting goods to and from Scottish 
branch plants. The Regional Survey’s analysis of the BMC’s experience at Bathgate, for 
example, drew attention to the difficulties that the company had had in sourcing supplies of 
components from within Scotland, as well as the problems caused by its subsequent continued 
reliance on transporting supplies by road from the Midlands.
135
  
It is arguable that the growth of Livingston contributed to the BMC’s difficulties in this regard, 
as the focus from the mid-1960s on electrical engineering as the privileged goal of inward 
investment-geared regional policy drew attention and resources away from motor engineering 
and inhibited the development of component industries which, it had been hoped, would cluster 
around Linwood, Bathgate, and Ravenscraig. The problems associated with attracting ancillary 
industries will be considered in the context of the motor industry’s longer-term development in 
Chapter Two, but here it is important to recognise the extent to which the perceived centrality of 
motor manufacturing to the Scottish economy had, even by the late-1960s, begun to wane. The 
STUC had been closely involved in attempts to persuade either Ford or Vauxhall to build their 
mooted regional policy plants in Scotland as it was hoped that the presence of a third major 
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motor manufacturer would provide enough incentive for component makers to expand or 
relocate, but the eventual decision of both firms to move instead to Merseyside led some within 
the organisation to accept as early as 1968 that ‘Scotland was now unlikely to have an industry 
complete in itself in this field.’136 The short-term instability of work resulting from both Bathgate 
and Linwood’s continued reliance on components sourced from the south was compounded by 
concerns over its longer-term insecurity, as the absence of ancillary industries contributed to 
fears that, as long as the motor industry remained unassimilated into the wider Scottish economy, 
it ‘could be lifted out of Scotland lock, stock and barrel’.137 Furthermore, the main benefit of 
Merseyside for companies such as Ford and Vauxhall was the relative ease of transport to the 
Midlands; a further indication of the perceived problems of Scotland as an industrial location, 
and their impact on its industrial development. The Regional Survey was keen to emphasise that 
‘Scotland is not the Arctic Circle’ and repeatedly stated the need for a ‘first-class, modern 
network of communications’ to aid the growth of Livingston, while the depiction of West 
Lothian as a County on the Move was shaped by its position as a ‘pivot’ at ‘the very centre of 
Scotland’, and illustrated with shots of the Forth bridges and the rapidly expanding motorway 
network.
138
  
The evidence suggests, however, that in spite of improved transport and communication links, 
Scottish manufacturing remained heavily reliant on what have been described in the literature as 
‘cathedrals in the desert’; that is to say, large, modern factories operating remotely from their 
markets, supply networks, and company headquarters, and offering overwhelmingly semi-skilled 
work.
139
 Moreover, in spite of the Regional Survey’s insistence that ‘a desert can be made to 
blossom like the rose if an expensive enough supply of water and fertilizers is provided’, the 
extent to which Scotland’s unemployed were used to attract investment has had the effect of 
engendering the ‘footloose’ attitude described by Cameron amongst companies for whom, with 
nothing to keep them in the country bar relatively cheap labour, it has often been all too easy to 
close their Scottish factories in order to move production to countries where labour might be 
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cheaper still.
140
 Thus, while external investment undoubtedly shaped the modernisation of 
Scotland’s industrial structure, enabling the growth of the new industries and creating clean, safe 
jobs in New Towns like Livingston especially, the mobility of capital has also led to a second 
wave of deindustrialisation as investor companies, attracted initially by relatively low wages and 
the availability of subsidised industrial premises, have moved out of Scotland and into what 
Cameron terms the ‘new periphery’ in Eastern Europe in particular.141 In 2001, for example, it 
was announced that the Japanese electronics firm Motorola would be closing its factory at 
Bathgate with the loss of 3,000 jobs. Former BMC worker Joyce Brogan’s description of the 
impact that this had on her family echoes both her own memories of her father being made 
redundant from the plant in the 1980s, and the perceived need for employment in the town which 
had led to its establishment in 1961.  
These kindae things have been happening though, because it’s the same kindae 
situation has been happening with Motorola, where my husband worked who 
loved his work, and who got government grants to set up the plant and beautiful 
building, great working conditions, great company to work for, and then all of a 
sudden they decided to stop production there and move it elsewhere abroad where 
it was cheaper, they moved it to Germany. And that put thousands on the dole, 
thousands out of work again. So that was another big blow for the Bathgate area 
when that happened, and gradually it’s just all sortae gone over to computerised 
stuff now, but still in the area I don’t feel there’s enough jobs and opportunities 
for young people.
142
 
While Brogan’s testimony implies a degree of continuity in terms of redundancy and 
unemployment, her family’s experience also encapsulates neatly a sense of generational change 
which provides a clear demonstration of the cyclical nature of West Lothian’s industrial 
development. In this context, the establishment of the BMC at Bathgate represents a short-term 
response to industrial change which, by providing jobs and creating new skills, mitigated the 
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impact on the county’s industrial workforce of the painful, longer-term process of 
deindustrialisation.  
 
Conclusion 
The closure of Leyland Bathgate in 1986 inarguably had a devastating effect on the factory’s 
workforce as well as on the wider economy of the town and its surrounding villages. This 
chapter has demonstrated that this was not, as it has sometimes been presented, necessarily the 
inevitable outcome of an ill-conceived regional policy, and provides a corrective to declinist 
analyses of post-1945 failure and disaster. There were transparent flaws in a policy geared to 
providing as many jobs as possible in the short-term and in the way in which it was 
implemented, but in spite of contradictory outcomes – such as the ‘crowding out’ of older 
settlements such as Bathgate, and the extent to which the focus on electrical engineering in the 
New Towns diverted attention away from motor engineering – the attempt to create a viable 
Scottish motor manufacturing industry around Bathgate and Linwood cannot be characterised 
solely in terms of failure. Chapter Two will consider Bathgate’s development in the context of 
the wider motor industry, but here it is important to both emphasise the longer-term context of 
industrial change in West Lothian and Scotland more broadly, and to recognise the extent to 
which the branch plant analysis has obscured the impact that such plants could have on the lives 
of those workers and communities directly affected. What emerges here, and has often been 
overlooked, is that the living standards, life expectations, and experiences of West Lothian 
citizens were undeniably enriched by the existence of the plant at Bathgate. Established as a 
response to high levels of unemployment, the BMC provided clean, safe and relatively well-paid 
work which mitigated the impact of the rundown of West Lothian’s predominant coal and shale 
mining industries, and contributed to the modernisation of both the area’s industrial labour force 
and its urban environment. Bearing in mind the shift in regional policy priorities which occurred 
not long after its establishment and the change in industrial structure which accompanied the 
development of Livingston New Town, the role of the BMC and British Leyland at Bathgate can 
be seen as providing a necessary short-term response to the decline of West Lothian’s heavy 
industry and an attempt to manage its experience of deindustrialisation. This was a longer-term 
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process which, in the words of the local MP, Tam Dalyell, at the time of its final closure in 1986, 
went ‘beyond Bathgate, beyond Scotland’.143  
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Chapter Two 
Bathgate’s position in a changing motor industry 
 
BMC Bathgate was the first of a number of motor plants that were established in the 
Development Districts during the 1960s as successive governments sought to create jobs and 
encourage growth outside of the increasingly congested Midlands and South-East of England. 
The Rootes plant at Linwood was designed to function alongside Bathgate and the steel strip mill 
at Ravenscraig in driving motor industry development in Scotland, while the BMC opened 
further new factories at Llanelli in South Wales and Kirkby on Merseyside, where major 
assembly plants were also built by Ford at Halewood, Vauxhall at Ellesmere Port, and Standard 
Triumph at Speke. Gavin McCrone has noted the exceptionally high levels of government 
financial assistance given to the motor industry developments in Scotland and on Merseyside as 
they were judged to be ‘projects of unusual political and economic importance’, not only in 
terms of creating jobs in potentially sensitive areas but also in providing a sustainable model of 
development based around a growing and prosperous industry which it was hoped would induce 
substantial secondary development.
1
 In the Midlands, motor manufacturing and the supply chain 
it supported in engineering and small metal manufacture had driven a period of remarkable 
economic growth and job stability, with the unemployment rate in the West Midlands region 
scarcely rising above one per cent throughout the 1950s and the area accounting for 40 per cent 
of all UK exports, and it was the replication of this example which it was hoped the dispersion of 
the industry would encourage elsewhere.
2
 
It is important to stress the success of the motor industry in the Midlands during the 1950s and 
the effect that this had in shaping government thinking on regional development policy, as much 
of the historiography both of the motor industry itself and of its role in the post-war British 
economy more generally can be characterised as ‘declinist’, often focusing on the industrial 
relations difficulties which attracted widespread media attention and dominated press coverage 
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of the industry during the 1970s in particular.
3
 This is especially the case with BL, the ‘national 
champion’ created through the merger of the BMC’s successor British Motor Holdings (BMH) 
and the Leyland Motor Company, which became central to what Tim Claydon has described as a 
‘meta-narrative of disorder’ in contemporary newspaper reportage and has remained something 
of a byword for relative industrial decline and a popular symbol of the ‘British disease’ of 
supposed low productivity, weak management, shopfloor militancy and poor quality products.
4
 
More nuanced studies of the British motor industry and of BL’s prominent position within it 
have highlighted the importance of considering the longer-term development of motor 
manufacturing in Britain and recognising the consequent structural and organisational changes 
which took place in the 1960s and 1970s especially as manufacturers sought to rationalise their 
own production and simplify what were often complex supply lines. Paul Wilman and Graham 
Winch, for example, are among those who have emphasised the extent to which the problems 
experienced at BL during the 1970s can be understood as the outcome of the extremely complex 
structure of that company, caused by its development through a process of company acquisition 
rather than natural growth. This perhaps epitomised the long-term growth of the industry in 
Britain, where both vertical and horizontal integration remained markedly low.
5
 
Other analyses have suggested that that the advent of the regional policy plants in Scotland and 
on Merseyside caused difficulties for the companies involved by fragmenting the motor industry, 
creating over-capacity, and in some cases causing unrest amongst and between both new and 
existing workforces.
6
 This unrest will be examined in detail in later chapters, but here it is 
important to note the perception among manufacturers – and reflected in some strands of the 
historical literature – that government intervention in industrial location had a negative impact on 
the performance of British motor manufacturing, particularly during a period when the 
rationalisation of the motor industry and its supply chain were seen as essential in maintaining 
international competitiveness.
7
 It is arguable, therefore, that the aims of a regional policy driven 
more by social than economic concerns were perceived, not least by motor manufacturers 
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themselves, to be in direct conflict with attempts to improve the industry’s performance.8 The 
position of the Bathgate plant must be considered in this context, although it will be remembered 
that policy was also derived from concerns that the Midlands and South were over-congested, 
with damaging inflationary pressures the consequence. This chapter will explain the historical 
development and concentration of the motor industry within the West Midlands, highlighting the  
strategic implications of this for the regional policy branch plants, before examining the specific 
experience of the BMC and later the eventually nationalised BL at Bathgate during a period in 
which both that organisation and the wider British industry experienced profound changes to 
their structure, as well as a marked increase in foreign competition particularly following the 
UK’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. 
 
The industry and its structure in the Midlands 
In 1974 and following a difficult period which had seen the share enjoyed by British Leyland 
Motor Corporation (BLMC) of the British car market fall from 40.6 per cent at its inception in 
1968 to 30.9 per cent, the Labour government of Harold Wilson appointed a committee under 
industrial adviser Sir Don Ryder to formulate a long-term rescue strategy for the company.
9
 
British Leyland: The Next Decade, known informally as the Ryder Report, was published in part 
in 1975 and recommended substantial investment to improve outdated plant and machinery 
which, along with poor industrial relations, incompetent management, and low sales, it blamed 
for the organisation’s problems.10 Similar reports were published in response to Ryder by the 
Trade and Industry Sub-Committee and the government think tank, the Central Policy Review 
Staff. These three studies of the BLMC each found different causes and potential remedies for its 
problems, but agreed that the company had been in real difficulty since its creation through the 
merger of BMH and the Leyland Motor Company in 1968, and that this was in part due to the 
scale of restructuring that this large and unwieldy organisation required.
11
 The BLMC was the 
world’s second largest motor manufacturer outside of the United States, and it had been hoped 
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by the Wilson government of 1966-1970, whose Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) 
encouraged the merger, that the consolidation of British car manufacturing into one large 
company would create economies of scale and improve the fragmented structure of the industry 
by encouraging further rationalisation of production.
12
 However, as Timothy Whisler has argued, 
there was little real attempt made by BLMC management to overhaul existing institutional 
structures as the new organisation’s constituent firms were simply ‘lumped together’ rather than 
more closely and systematically integrated, and so by 1974 the company still had 48 factories, 
including 23 major manufacturing plants, and what one member of its management team 
described as ‘a multiplicity of everything’.13  
Vertical as well as horizontal integration in the British motor industry had also remained low by 
international standards and, in spite of a broader trend towards the concentration of capital 
underway across the industry and its supply chain from the late 1950s onwards, Ryder found that 
the BLMC’s continued reliance on ‘bought-out’ components sourced from independent suppliers 
was costing the firm at least £4.6 million each year throughout the early 1970s.
14
 In-house 
component manufacture therefore became a stated aim of the Ryder Report, in the hope that this 
would increase efficiency and remove the value added by independent component makers to 
externally made goods, which amounted to around 60 per cent of the average motor 
manufacturer’s costs.15 The role and importance of independent component manufacture was 
largely an outcome of the longer-term development of the motor industry in Britain and its early 
concentration in the West Midlands, where industry had long been characterised by a system of 
‘unequal interdependence’: towns that had grown up around the Black Country’s scattered 
deposits of coal and ironstone supplied raw materials and often highly specialised metal goods to 
manufacturers and engineering firms in Birmingham and Coventry.
16
 This encouraged the 
development of a much larger and more diverse components sector than existed elsewhere in 
Europe, where the production of cars had developed earlier and motor manufacturers had 
traditionally made many of their own parts as the metal manufacturing skills and businesses 
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simply did not exist to supply them.
17
 British motor manufacturers were therefore able to rely on 
competition between suppliers as a means of cost control and could also allow component 
manufacturers to bear the brunt of design and development costs, creating a strong disincentive 
to closer integration.
18
 While this produced enormous complexity in the supply chain and led to a 
situation in which the BMC was spending £320 million on components from as many as 4,000 
different outside suppliers by 1963, it also drove a prosperous regional economy in the West 
Midlands which ‘led the nation into the boom’ of the post-war years and, as discussed in Chapter 
One, shaped the way in which regional policy would be used to both ease congestion in the 
Midlands and reindustrialise the Development Areas.
19
  
However, this historical concentration of the motor industry and its unusually complex supply 
network in the Midlands and, to a lesser extent, the South-East of England, also had significant 
strategic implications for those motor manufacturers encouraged by the government to move to 
the Development Areas, and Scotland and Merseyside in particular. The BMC, as the first of 
these, expressed serious reservations about the potential impact that a move to Scotland would 
have and, in its negotiations with the Board of Trade over its expansion plans, showed great 
reluctance to move any significant portion of its production away from the Midlands.
20
 
Moreover, the Board of Trade’s position in these negotiations highlights the difficulties caused 
by the conflict between a government regional policy driven by short-term local employment 
needs and what was at the time of negotiations in 1959 a private company extremely unwilling to 
move away from an area in which it benefitted from easy access to both its biggest markets and 
an established supply network. Chapter One reflected on the extent to which regional policy in 
Britain until the early 1960s remained focused on alleviating unemployment ‘black spots’ rather 
than taking a more active approach encouraging sustainable, longer-term industrial development 
around designated ‘growth points’. Peter Scott argues that the decision to disperse the motor 
industry was essentially political and, for the government and Board of Trade, justifiable largely 
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on social policy grounds alone.
21
 In this sense Bathgate could be seen as a ‘pre-Toothill’ 
development, geared to the reduction of unemployment in Central Scotland, although the fact of 
its motor industry character in a sense looked forward to the ‘growth point’ emphasis on ‘new 
industry’ assembly goods manufacturing. The President of the Board of Trade, Reginald 
Maudling, admitted that moving production away from the motor industry’s manufacturing 
centre would incur additional production costs for the companies involved.
22
 This was chief 
among the concerns of the BMC, whose eventual decision to choose Bathgate over a number of 
other sites in Scotland was influenced by its transport links to the ports of both the Clyde and the 
Forth, as it was hoped that the ease of export, especially from Grangemouth to European 
markets, could help to off-set the increase in the cost of transporting components from, and 
finished vehicles to, suppliers and markets in the Midlands and South of England.
23
 Furthermore, 
it was intimated at a meeting between representatives of the STUC and Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan in May 1960 that, in order to mitigate the effects of an estimated cost of transporting 
castings and other parts from the Midlands to Bathgate of 32 shillings per ton, the BMC would 
be willing, where possible, to buy components for those vehicles to be built at Bathgate from 
local Scottish firms.
24
 
However, in a further indication of the short-termism of pre-Toothill regional policy, the 
government was criticised for its failure to ‘back up’ the motor industry in Scotland by 
encouraging either motor component makers to move production to Scotland, or existing 
Scottish engineering firms to move into the manufacture of component parts.
25
 Stephen Young 
and Alan Reeves have pointed out that central purchasing departments in large companies such 
as the BMC often over-looked the needs of their branch operations, and have highlighted the 
obstacles which prevented successful government intervention in ancillary development.
26
 It was 
the assumption of the Board of Trade that the dispersal of motor assembly to Scotland and 
Merseyside, as well as the construction of the steel strip mill at Ravenscraig, would be enough in 
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itself to encourage the growth of ancillary industries, although doubts were expressed about the 
efficacy of this approach from an early stage.
27
 The STUC, for example, argued that ‘the 
manufacturers of components for motor vehicles and motor cars [would not] set up their plants in 
Scotland unless they were obliged to do so’, and called repeatedly for greater government 
intervention in directing industry to Scotland.
28
 There was in fact a considerable financial 
assistance available for local firms to move into component supply, but take-up was slow and 
piecemeal. Young and Reeves argue that this was in part due to the administration of such aid 
being outside of Scotland, and therefore discouraging to Scottish businesses.
29
 Existing 
component suppliers in the Midlands, meanwhile, had little incentive to move production to 
Scotland. Tam Dalyell, Labour MP for West Lothian between 1962 and 1983 and then for 
Linlithgow until 2005, describes in his memoirs various meetings which he held with component 
makers during a visit to Birmingham in the summer following his election. The response he 
received from these companies is typified by the reaction of one small firm, the manager of 
which explained that he had no reason to open a new factory in Scotland as the existing plant 
could already produce enough steering wheels in just three weeks to supply both the BMC at 
Bathgate and Rootes at Linwood for an entire year.
30
 Dalyell goes on to recount a conversation 
he had later in this trip with George Harriman, managing director of the BMC, and Alec 
Issigonis, then the company’s technical director, during which Harriman reportedly warned him 
that ‘the Bathgate move will end in tears’, before going on to state that ‘we never wanted to go to 
Scotland in the first place – we were pressurised and encouraged by the Cabinet to do so.’31 
Similar sentiments were expressed in the press at the time of the factory’s opening, with the 
Scotsman reporting in March 1961 that Keith Sinnott, managing director of BMC (Scotland), had 
told a meeting of the British Institute of Management that ‘we didn’t want to come to 
Bathgate’.32  
This reluctance to move was reflected in the company’s own unwillingness, in spite of its stated 
intention to source supplies locally where possible, to engage with Scottish engineering 
companies or to encourage them to produce components for the Bathgate plant. In July 1960, the 
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Scotsman reported that more than 300 Scottish industrialists had attended a meeting with the 
Scottish Board for Industry (SBI) to find out about the supply requirements of the new factory.
33
 
However, while the chairman of the SBI claimed to be ‘delighted at the response’ to the meeting, 
the manufacturers themselves found that, in the absence of any officials from the BMC itself, 
many of their key questions about the plant’s requirements went unanswered as the SBI did not 
have sufficient information about the timescales involved or the likelihood of repeat orders for 
firms considering laying out plant for BMC supplies.
34
 This lack of guaranteed repeat orders 
highlights an important difference in the manufacturing cultures of Scotland and the Midlands. 
The company complained that Scottish firms were too risk averse, demanding prolonged runs of 
production which were not practicable in the motor industry and which the BMC had never had 
in place with its suppliers in England, where the company could exploit competition between 
suppliers in order to keep costs down.
35
 Established Midlands firms could supply components at 
far lower prices – an average of £0.096 per part – than their counterparts in Scotland, where the 
corresponding figure was £0.246.
36
 The BMC also bemoaned the reluctance of Scottish 
engineering firms to manufacture the kind of small, simple components required by the factory 
and made by ‘literally hundreds’ of small firms operating from ‘backyard factories with simple 
equipment’ in the Midlands.37 Bill Raine worked at Bathgate from the plant’s establishment until 
1982, initially as a superintendent and then in managing and maintaining tool and material costs. 
He describes his experience of sourcing, or attempting to source, components in the Bathgate 
area. 
We went round Bathgate and different places trying to get people to make 
different things for us, and it was just hopeless. We were getting, say, a piece of 
metal like that from Birmingham delivered for thruppence or four pence. They 
were asking for two and six, or two and three shillings, the local people. You just 
couldn’t even think about giving them the jobs, so you had to rely on the people 
down there. We had tanks made down at Pumpherston somewhere, petrol tanks 
and things like that, but the little things, no way. Costs were terrible. They wanted 
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pounds to drill a hole in a piece of metal and things like that ... Just ridiculous, we 
were getting things supplied, delivered from Birmingham for four pence and five 
pence, he wanted two pound and things like this. Stupid.
38
  
As early as 1961, the Glasgow Herald had predicted these problems, stressing in a progress 
report on the BMC at Bathgate that there was little point in Scottish industrialists trying to 
compete with established specialist suppliers in the Midlands, and that the movement of existing 
Scottish industries into the supply of components such as castings and forgings would therefore 
be slow.
39
 The newspaper also reported that ‘those optimists who expected an anxious rush of 
firms to get into the Lowland belt while good sites could still be chosen have been disappointed’ 
due to the BMC’s policy of buying from the most economical market, and its determination that 
it was ‘not their [sic] brief to bring other industries to Scotland’.40 
This again highlights the conflict which existed between government and company policy, and 
also demonstrates both the historical embeddedness of motor manufacturing and its supply 
network in the Midlands and the difficulty of replicating its success in an area with a markedly 
different industrial culture, particularly in the absence of any political commitment to further 
intervention in the direction of industry. Bathgate’s subsequent position as a ‘cathedral in the 
desert’, isolated from its markets and suppliers, caused the BMC significant difficulties in 
accessing supplies and maintaining production, and led to labour difficulties which will be 
central to the analysis of Chapter Five. However, here it should be recognised that, even within 
the closely integrated Midland industry, motor assembly plants could experience major problems 
in their supply lines, and that these problems increased during the later 1960s and 1970s 
especially as the concentration of capital which had been underway throughout the motor 
industry since the Second World War, perhaps epitomised by the creation of the BLMC through 
a complex series of mergers and takeovers, became a feature of its component sector also. The 
complexity of the motor industry supply chain and the consequent vulnerability of motor 
assembly plants were famously brought to public awareness by a prolonged strike by 22 machine 
setters at Girling Brakes, a Birmingham-based subsidiary of Joseph Lucas, which led to the lay-
off of over 5,000 workers across the industry in 1968. This shaped some of the details of the 
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Labour government’s industrial relations White Paper, In Place of Strife, which proposed 
unprecedented powers of state intervention,
41
 and represented the first serious challenge to the 
consensus underlying collective bargaining as ‘the best method of regulating questions of pay 
and conditions of employment’. While the proposals in the White Paper were not enacted, 
countered by fierce opposition from both the Trades’ Union Congress (TUC) and sections of 
rank and file trade unionists, the episode contributed to emerging political debates over the 
nation’s industrial position and the perceived threat posed by supposedly militant trade unions, as 
well as highlighting the susceptibility of the wider motor industry to disruptions in its supply 
chain.
42
  
Disruptions resulting from strike action had, during the 1950s and early 1960s, been relatively 
rare, as industrial relations in the motor component sector were notably peaceful. Indeed, Turner, 
Clack and Roberts omitted component makers from their 1967 study of labour relations in the 
motor industry as they found unrest to be concentrated in assembly firms, and that ‘outside the 
car firms…the motor industry’s incidence of industrial unrest is not particularly remarkable’.43 
Furthermore, it should be emphasised that supply shortages did not always result from strike 
action, and could occur due to scheduling problems, transportation difficulties, or machine 
breakdown in what were, in many cases, ageing component factories. Strike action in component 
firms did, however, increase markedly from the later 1960s and, while the scale and significance 
of the Girling dispute were perhaps atypical, instances of smaller-scale unrest could also leave 
car-makers facing unexpected and potentially damaging consequences. A prime example of this 
came in June 1969, when Jaguar was forced to supply its luxury XJ6 saloon cars to customers in 
an unfinished state, as a month-long strike at Wolverhampton Die-Castings left the company 
without supplies of radiator grilles.
44
 Such problems became more frequent during the 1970s 
especially, as the position of independent component manufacturers and the security of 
component workers were increasingly threatened both by external economic forces and related 
structural changes within the motor industry and its component sector. In 1968, when BLMC’s 
establishment marked the culmination of motor industry mergers which had been ongoing since 
the Second World War, The Times predicted a similar future for component manufacturing, 
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drawing parallels between the state of the contemporary supply industry and its ‘multitude of 
interlocking suppliers of bits to the motor industry’, and the conditions which had prevailed in 
the motor industry itself a decade earlier.
45
 Moves towards vertical integration accelerated 
following the recommendations of the Ryder report, but had been in progress across the industry 
for some time, as car-makers sought to rationalise their supply lines and remove the potential for 
disruption either by taking a share of component manufacture in-house, or by buying component 
makers outright. Timothy Whisler describes a gradual breakdown in relations between 
assemblers and component producers during the 1950s and early 1960s, as relationships 
previously characterised by good communication and close cooperation over production 
planning were strained by demands for increasing numbers of unique parts, irregular ordering, 
and higher tooling costs.
46
 The experience of the engine and gearbox manufacturer Henry 
Meadows perhaps typifies such developments. The company’s neighbour in the Fallings Park 
area of Wolverhampton was Guy Motors, the only remaining motor assembly plant in the city 
and an important customer.
47
 In 1961, Guy was taken over by Jaguar in order to allow that 
company to circumvent the rules which, under regional policy, required an Industrial 
Development Certificate to be granted for any large industrial expansion, and allow it to develop 
beyond its Coventry plant whilst remaining within the Midlands.
48
 Four years later, Jaguar also 
took over Meadows and, although the company claimed that contracts with other motor 
manufacturers would stand, it planned that Meadows concentrate production on a new engine 
project for Jaguar itself.
49
 
This was typical of a longer-term move towards ‘lean production’ which emerged in tandem with 
increasing concentration of capital, and prioritised flexibility and variety over large volume mass 
production.
50
 In practice this meant a significant change in working practices, as the increasing 
emphasis on the production of highly specialised components on short runs led to frequent 
instances of ‘waiting time’, which damaged the potential earnings of workers paid by the piece 
and therefore caused considerable unrest. Union representatives of the Meadows workforce 
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stressed that such problems dated ‘from the time when Henry Meadows became an odd-job 
shop’, producing small, specialised parts for Jaguar rather than its own engines and gearboxes, 
and drew attention to the difficult relationship between the Meadows workforce and its new 
parent company.
51
 Within ten months of its takeover by Jaguar in 1966, three disputes reached 
local conference level, and one Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) representative said of 
the new company structure, ‘I do not know which parent [Jaguar] is; I suppose actually it is a 
step-father.’ 52  This sense that component workers, and particularly those employed in the 
comparatively small metal manufacturing firms of Wolverhampton and the Black Country, were 
the ill-treated step-children of the car assembly firms of Birmingham and Coventry is one which 
emerges in dispute reports from a number of companies, often seemingly exacerbated by the 
takeover of component firms by motor manufacturers themselves. Certainly, much of the discord 
at Meadows resulted from an initial lack of uniformity across the Jaguar organisation in terms of 
pay, and the failure of the parent company to take into account the different working practices of 
a component factory when subsequently attempting to introduce the piece rate structure used in 
its Coventry car plant. Similarly, workers at the Coseley factory of Pressed Steel, the car body 
manufacturer which became part of the BMC in 1965, went into dispute with their employers the 
following year due to the company’s insistence that earnings at Coseley should be comparable 
with those paid in what one director rather disparagingly termed Pressed Steel’s ‘backstreet 
competitors’ in neighbouring Black Country towns, rather than in the BMC’s more prosperous 
assembly plants in Birmingham and Coventry.
53
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Regional policy, the supply chain, and troubles in West Lothian and 
the West Midlands 
It is arguable, then, that in seeking to rationalise their supply lines and minimise the likelihood of 
supply shortages, motor manufacturers actually exacerbated the situation by introducing new 
working practices and complicating company structures, contributing to a rise in shopfloor unrest 
in component factories and therefore increasing the potential for disruption. This places the 
troubles of Bathgate, or indeed Linwood, in a different light. The literature on these Scottish 
motor plants tends to dwell on their particular supply chain and labour problems but these in fact 
were more general features of the motor industry at large. On the specific case of Bathgate the 
difficulties resembled those of the broader commercial vehicle sector. Trucks and buses were 
complex vehicles produced in smaller volumes than cars, and therefore reliant on a ‘multitude of 
parts’ made on comparatively short runs.54 Figure 2:1 uses data from a manufacturing review of 
British Leyland Truck and Bus Division undertaken in 1974 as part of Ryder’s investigations into 
the problems facing the BLMC. It illustrates the extent of the production losses across the 
organisation caused by failures in the supply line, as 8,921 vehicles, or 79 per cent of a total 
shortfall of 11,288 vehicles, were lost as a result of material shortages in the twelve months 
preceding May 1974 alone. This review illustrates clearly that problems in motor production were 
not primarily the result of strike action and, although it was felt that profitability was being 
undermined by what were described as ‘fundamental labour problems’ at a number of the 
division’s factories, the focus of the company’s concern was instead on the effects of material 
shortages, compounded by weak management.
55
 The review identified what it called the ‘top ten 
delinquent suppliers’ causing production problems and, although Bathgate was in fact recognised 
as one of the division’s more ‘well-managed plants’, its supply of engines from Morris Engines in 
Coventry was highlighted as a cause for particular concern. 
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In the year to May 1974 alone, 378 units had been lost at Bathgate due to problems in accessing 
engines, while the factory also suffered from frequent shortages of frames. These were supplied 
by Rubery Owen, one of the largest suppliers of components to the motor industry but another of 
those causing disquiet, responsible for the loss of 189 vehicles across the Truck and Bus division 
in the period under review.
56
 It is notable that Rubery Owen was one of the few component 
makers to open a factory in Scotland. This was established, with significant government funding, 
in the new town of Cumbernauld in 1961 and heralded in the FT as the first of ‘a number’ which 
would open north of the border as component firms moved or expanded to supply both Bathgate 
and, later, Rootes at Linwood.
57
 In spite of its proximity to Bathgate, however, the company 
could not guarantee a reliable supply of components to the factory.
58
 As Jim McCulloch, who 
worked as a driver at Bathgate from 1961 until 1968, remembers, ‘it just took a lorry to break 
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down on the way in and the chassis didn’t arrive, and the work all came to a standstill, and the 
men were laid off.’59 Moreover, the distinct Rubery Owen (Scotland) business did not trade until 
1966 and then ran at a considerable loss every year until its closure just five years later in 1971, 
and so by the 1974 review the company had reverted to supplying Bathgate with frames from its 
main factory at Darlaston in the Black Country.
60
  
It is clear, then, that material shortages were a structural feature of the motor industry supply 
chain resulting from the long-term development of a system which, by allowing motor 
manufacturers to rely on competition between suppliers as a means of keeping costs down, could 
benefit car-makers as well as causing supply problems. Such problems were endemic throughout 
the British motor industry, but were exemplified by the experience of the BMC and BL at 
Bathgate as the difficulties associated with transporting parts, described by Jim McCulloch, were 
magnified by the distance from the industry’s core in the Midlands to its new West Lothian 
periphery. The following is from a 1964 Ministry of Labour report into what it termed the 
‘problems associated with the setting up of new factories in Scotland, South Wales and 
Merseyside’, and highlights the transportation difficulties which affected all regional policy 
plants, but seemed to represent a particular challenge to production at Bathgate. 
Supply problems have arisen at Bathgate because of the distance of the factory 
from Midland and London suppliers. In spite of heavy stocks being held the 
300/400 mile pipeline has been proved a difficult problem to overcome especially 
in Winter, when it has become common for 40/50 vehicles to be held up daily in 
transit. When the production facilities of suppliers are heavily strained (such as is 
the case at the present time) the distance from the production centres is a 
particularly severe handicap.
61
 
The failure of the government to ‘back up’ its regional policy plants, or of the company to 
engage with local engineering firms, meant that the factory remained reliant on supplies sourced 
from over 400 English firms, compared with just 30 based in Scotland.
62
 In these terms, the 
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position of the Bathgate plant can be seen as broadly in line with the branch plant analysis 
introduced in Chapter One; that is, the tendency for Scotland in the second half of the twentieth 
century to function as a ‘branch plant economy’, reliant increasingly for employment on 
assembly plants operating remotely from their markets, suppliers and company headquarters, and 
often providing only low-skilled and insecure employment for their workers. This is, as 
discussed in Chapter One, an idea which is well established in the historical literature and closely 
related to the way in which successive governments used regional policy in their efforts to 
overhaul the economies of Development Areas defined by their high levels of unemployment. 
The extent to which Bathgate’s position as a branch plant shaped its work culture and industrial 
relations will be developed in detail in Part Two, but here it is important to highlight the severity 
of the labour problems caused ostensibly by supply shortages and exacerbated by the uncertainty 
of employment in branch plants. In this context, George Peden’s criticism of a regional policy 
‘guided almost solely by immediate employment creation, without consideration of what 
linkages there might have been with the local economy’ bears repeating, as the evidence suggests 
that, in moving motor assembly to Scotland, little serious thought was given to the availability of 
supply networks locally.
63
 Bathgate’s consequent reliance on a high proportion of imported 
supplies therefore exacerbated the impact of the material shortages which were a common 
feature of work throughout the British motor industry, and, in contributing significantly to the 
instability of work within the factory, led to tension and unrest on the shopfloor. 
In 1966, and at the request of a National Union of Vehicle Builders (NUVB) shop steward, an 
inquiry was set up at Bathgate under the auspices of the renowned industrial conciliator Sir Jack 
Scamp. This inquiry’s terms of reference were specifically ‘the causes and extent of lay-offs’ 
and, although the company felt that output per worker, which stood at around 60 per cent of the 
Midlands level, was far too low largely as a result of the attitude of the workforce and the 
incidence of unofficial strike action, the problem of maintaining supplies emerged as a 
significant area of concern during initial investigations and dominated discussions during the 
court of inquiry itself.
64
 A Ministry of Labour official visited the factory in 1965 to collect 
evidence, and came to the following conclusion about the production situation at the plant: 
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Production difficulties are to my mind linked closely with industrial relations 
problems at the factory. Lack of supplies of component parts has meant temporary 
suspensions on a number of occasions. These suspensions are one of the main 
irritations and causes of industrial troubles.
65
  
This is certainly borne out by the figures for the causes of internal unofficial strikes given at the 
inquiry. Figure 2:2 shows that between the plant’s opening in 1961 and the inquiry in 1966 there 
was only one strike related to pay, and this was just a half-day protest stoppage by workers 
unhappy at the length of time taken for their pay claim to go through procedure.  
 
Meanwhile, the vast majority of stoppages were due to ‘working hours and conditions’ which, it 
became clear during the course of the inquiry, usually meant lay-offs and short-time working. 
However, while the question of short-time working was central to the Scamp inquiry, its 
significance was contested as certain members of the largely English management team disputed 
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the exceptionality of the situation at Bathgate. Referring to the problems of short-time caused by 
difficulties in accessing supplies, one representative from the company stated: 
There is nothing unique in the question of supplies that you have raised today that 
we do not have in the Midlands. I don’t feel that you are losing any more time or 
much more time than the Company is in the Midlands.
66
 
Indeed, an article in a 1967 edition of the Ministry of Labour’s magazine claimed that in the 
Midlands car industry, ‘some short-time working is usually present somewhere, like frost in 
May.’67 
It should not be inferred, however, that the issue of short-time in the Midlands was seen as 
unproblematic, and there is in fact evidence to suggest that the impact of regional policy on 
Midland workforces, as well as concern that Midland workers would be undercut by cheaper 
labour in the development areas, exacerbated a problem prevalent even in the supposedly 
affluent car factories of Birmingham and Coventry. At the time of the creation of the regional 
policy plants, frustration over short-time working related to wider concerns at the level of work 
in the BMC’s factories and throughout the motor industry more generally, was prevalent across 
the organisation. Indeed, the idea that the growth of the motor industry in the Midlands was 
unbridled and potentially damaging to the wider economy of that region as well as the position 
of the UK as a whole is perhaps tempered by the reaction of the BMC’s Midland workforce to 
the news that the company would be moving commercial vehicle production to Scotland. At a 
meeting of the BMC Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee (BMCJSSC), shop stewards from the 
Austin plant at Longbridge expressed concern at the opening of the company’s new plant, 
referred to revealingly as ‘Bathurst’. It was perceived that this would inevitably entail the 
transfer of work away from the Midlands, and the decision to move production to Bathgate had 
come at a time of some difficulty within the company and the wider motor industry.
68
 In March 
1961 the BMCJSSC, a company-wide organisation with representatives from each BMC plant, 
discussed the fact of widespread short-time working throughout the company, with SU 
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Carburettor in Birmingham, where 400 people had just two and a half days’ work and orders had 
been completed three months in advance, amongst the worst hit.
69
 There was also considerable 
discontent amongst workers in the company’s foundry division, as it was claimed that the 
Coventry and Wellingborough foundries had been on short-time for as long as three years. At the 
same meeting, concern was expressed by Austin shop stewards over the transfer of all 
commercial vehicle work from Longbridge to Bathgate. Thirty-two workers were to be affected 
by this at the outset and would be found alternative work, but it was claimed that there was ‘a far 
greater problem still to be faced in the press shop and eventually in the rest of the factory’.70 By 
December of that year, a recruitment freeze was in place and it had been confirmed that 800 of 
the 1,200 Austin workers employed there on a commercial engine programme would be losing 
their jobs as a result of this work going to Scotland. There were also concerns in the Tractor and 
Transmissions division and at Nuffield Metal Products, while the Morris Commercial plant, 
already on a three and four day week, was losing ‘a large part’ of its commercial and tractor 
production to Bathgate, with no sign of any other work coming in to replace it. The Morris 
Commercial delegate to the December 1961 committee meeting stated that: 
The main worry of all workers at the above factories was that up to the present no 
positive action had been taken by the Union or Management to prove to [the 
workers and stewards] that new contracts would keep them fully employed, and it 
seemed highly improbable to the workers that the work would be moved from 
Birmingham for any other reason than to get it done cheaper in Scotland.
71
 
The delegate from Tractor and Transmissions claimed that at least 300 workers engaged on 
tractor production there had lost all their work, and that ‘the feeling in the factory was very high, 
and it was not the intention of the workers to take this without a fight’. He went on to state that 
he ‘would like to see the BMC Shop Stewards fight for a policy of no work to move until all 
workers at BMC were fully employed’.72  
This perhaps reflects wider fears for the future of the industry, as well as suspicions over the 
company’s motivations in moving work away from the relatively affluent and supposedly 
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congested Midlands to what were termed the ‘unemployment areas’. As a delegate from Morris 
Cars stated: 
It was generally believed that the Bathgate factory would not affect Morris Cars 
but...this was just an illusion. If it were cheaper to do the job in Scotland, then it 
would be done in Scotland.
73
  
The degree of disquiet and the strength of ill-feeling caused by the loss of work to the BMC’s 
new plants and subsequent concerns that the company’s Midlands workforce could be undercut or 
replaced altogether by cheaper labour at Bathgate or indeed other regional policy plants was 
further emphasized by the discovery, reported to the joint shop stewards in June 1962, of anti-
Scottish slogans written on components being sent to Bathgate from the Midlands.
74
 Dougie 
Miller, a former Bathgate shop steward, has similarly recalled receiving parts with the words 
‘Scots coolies’ scrawled on them, suggesting the extent of the hostility engendered in the 
Midlands workforce by this new threat to their job security during a period in which Britain 
slipped from its position as the second largest car producer in the world behind the United States. 
By 1982 it was near the bottom of that ‘league’, producing less than France, Spain, Germany, 
Italy and Japan, when car imports were 58 per cent of the market, where they had been only 8 per 
cent in 1968.
75
 
The extent to which the West Midlands regional economy relied upon motor manufacturing for 
employment was highlighted in a 1968 report in the Times, which expressed nascent concern at 
the continued dominance of small metal manufacture, and the importance of the major car 
manufacturers as customers. This investigation focused on the Black Country, where 50 per cent 
of the workforce, compared to the national figure of 38 per cent, was at this time employed in 
manufacturing, and where the Times found that ‘the supply of component parts to the motor 
manufacturers dominates the whole life of the region’.76 Three years later, in July 1971, the same 
newspaper published a report on the economic situation in the area which claimed that in the 
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previous 12 months, 282 manufacturing firms across the region had made 26,112 workers 
redundant, and that ‘men from Birmingham, Coventry and Wolverhampton who once proudly 
claimed “Only the daft and the bone idle cannot get a job here” are themselves standing in dole 
queues.’77 Unemployment across the region grew from an average of below one per cent in the 
1950s and early 1960s, peaking in 1983 by which time a slump of ‘unrivalled magnitude’ during 
the later 1970s had led to over 40 per cent of the economically active adult population registering 
as unemployed, and the overall level of unemployment standing at 17 per cent.
78
 This drastic 
change in labour market conditions in one generation in the Midlands had consequences in terms 
of exacerbating the supply situation. The anxieties were revealed by the greater activism of shop 
stewards, such as those at the Wolverhampton-based firm John Thompson Motor Pressings, 
involved in just one incident of strike action during the whole of the 1950s and 1960s, who 
responded to increased employment insecurity by organising and taking part in a series of 
regional and national protest stoppages, as well as sending delegates to lobby MPs at Westminster 
over ‘the serious situation of unemployment in the West Midlands’.79 A detailed discussion of the 
complex range of issues facing British motor manufacturers and their workers during the 1960s 
and 1970s is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is essential here to recognise the scale of the 
change in the industry’s fortunes during this period and the significant implications which this 
carried for the regional policy plants as well as the economy of the Midlands. Ken Spencer’s 
description of the West Midlands as ‘an industrial wasteland’, written in 1986, echoes similar 
portrayals of West Lothian a quarter of a century earlier, highlighting both the cyclical nature of 
industrial development and demonstrating the vulnerability of the peripheral branch plants 
established in the hopes of mirroring the earlier successes of what was by the mid-1970s itself an 
industry, and a region, in decline.
80
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Production at Bathgate 
Bill Raine worked as a foreman at Longbridge before moving to Bathgate in 1962, and describes 
the feeling in Birmingham at the time of the move: 
It was a relief really because in those days the trucks were a, they were a, you 
know a sore, they didn’t pay and they didn’t employ many people, but the Mini 
coming in, it took off like a bomb, and they employed thousands of people on 
making this Mini. So the fact that they lost the truck, which was a political move 
by the way – there was a lot of stories about the government, I think it was 
Macmillan at the time, he was gooin’ to help the poor Scots and the poor people 
in Liverpool and the poor people in the North East of England, send them work 
up, typical politics.  
Raine’s account of the ‘stories’ circulating about government policy, and his disparaging 
reference to the ‘poor people’ in the Development Areas, reflects the concerns expressed by the 
BMC shop stewards about the company’s motivations in moving production to Scotland. 
However, his description of the loss of truck production to Scotland as a ‘relief’ is at odds with 
the responses at the time by shopfloor workers, already examined here. These encompassed 
growing unease over the changing labour market conditions in the West Midlands which were 
undermining job security and fostering anxiety over the short-time working which was a long-
established, structural feature of motor industry employment. Moreover, the contention that truck 
manufacture was unprofitable and undesirable is indicative of the company’s attitude to its move 
to Bathgate, and underlines the company’s reluctance in moving any of its production to the 
development areas. Initially, the BMC had proposed building only a small tractor plant in 
Scotland, employing around 1,200 people, while creating around 9,000 new jobs elsewhere, 
including at Longbridge. However, these plans were rejected by the Board of Trade following 
the recommendation of the Distribution of Industry Committee, which was concerned that if they 
were to be accepted they would set a precedent allowing motor manufacturers to expand in their 
present areas, provided that they made only ‘relatively small gestures’ in the designated 
92 
 
development areas.
81
 The BMC retained reservations about the distance between Scotland and its 
supply networks in the Midlands and about the suitability of the Clyde for vehicle exports, and it 
was only when encouraged by ‘a juicy carrot in the form of a substantial financial bonus’ that the 
company amended its proposals and instead agreed to forego its expansion at Longbridge and 
move all of its production of tractors and heavy commercial vehicles to a new factory in 
Scotland.
82
  
Image 2:1 – aerial view of Bathgate factory, c.1982 
 
(Source: Bryan, Bathgate Once More, p.12.) 
 
The commercial and agricultural vehicle sectors of the motor industry remain under-researched 
in comparison to the volume car sector, perhaps reflecting the perceived contemporary 
undesirability of truck and tractor manufacturing. The evidence available suggests that the 
Bathgate factory, which built tractors, trucks, and diesel engines and is shown in Image 2:1, 
thought to date from 1982, was not insulated against the difficulties facing its car-making 
counterparts during the 1970s especially. But these difficulties were far from relentless. In the 
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mid-1970s, for instance, there was an apparent boom in production, which resulted in the 1977 
construction of the B Block extension. This was built as part of BL’s plans to expand output at 
both Bathgate and its Albion Motors works in Glasgow, and came ostensibly as the culmination 
of a successful period of production at the plant.
83
 In May 1972, an Amalgamated Union of 
Engineering Workers (AUEW) delegate reported to West Lothian Trades’ Council that the 
factory was ‘booming,’ and the next year shop stewards were involved in negotiating a move to 
three shift working in order to keep up with demand for engines.
84
 Harry McKay worked in the 
pre-pack section, which consisted of the knock-down (KD) and complete knock-down (CKD) 
departments which prepared vehicles for export. He describes his perception of the factory’s 
position within the wider BLMC organisation during the mid-1970s. 
I think 1975, ‘76 would be the best years of production in Bathgate. Bathgate 
were then perhaps, ehm, doing lots of benefit for Birmingham then, because 
Birmingham wasn’t doing too well in those days. And I think we kept them alive 
and afloat for a long time, I’m quite sure we did.85 
Certainly, truck and tractor production were less reliant on the mass market and therefore less 
vulnerable to fluctuations in demand than car production. Roy Church has shown that between 
1967 and 1972, the BLMC’s Austin-Morris volume cars division contributed 17 per cent of the 
company’s profits, while trucks and buses accounted for 34 per cent. This marked a significant 
change as in the early part of the 1960s volume car production had created more than three times 
as much profit as either trucks and buses or specialist cars.
86
 However, it is possible that these 
figures reflect the weakness of the ageing Austin-Morris range of cars and the impact of import 
penetration as much as the success of the commercial vehicle sector. By 1968 the company’s 
top-selling models, the Mini and the Morris 1100, were nine and six years old respectively, and 
even new models such as the Austin Allegro and the Morris Marina were considered out-dated in 
comparison to their Ford and Vauxhall competitors.
87
 Furthermore, the BLMC, even following 
attempted rationalisation, continued to produce a wide and under-efficient range of 24 different 
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models of car, in low volumes, and therefore often in plants with excess capacity. Church claims 
that this was a result of the company’s reluctance to concentrate production in fewer factories 
with a smaller overall workforce, particularly at a time of difficult labour relations. Foreman-
Peck, Bowden and McKinlay have argued that this eventuality was an outcome of the post-
Second World War premium placed on maintaining full employment. This had led to the 
establishment of the company’s regional policy plants, and, even by the time of the Ryder Report 
in 1974, made the prospect of closing outdated or unprofitable plants unappealing.
88
 
Furthermore, even as the Bathgate expansion was announced, The Times was reporting that 
demand for trucks had fallen by 21 per cent in 1974 in the wake of the previous year’s oil crisis, 
and that sales were down 16 per cent in the first half of 1976 compared with the same period in 
1975.
89
 However the newspaper saw as necessary the £10 million being invested by Leyland 
Truck and Bus in Scotland, with the aim of increasing output of diesel engines at Bathgate by 30 
per cent and of axles at Albion by 60 per cent, as BL’s truck factories had been ‘starved of 
capital investment’ for as much as eight years while the company gave priority to its car 
division.
90
 In 1972, the same newspaper had reported on the introduction of the new Leyland 
Buffalo range of heavy trucks, which was to be built on a new assembly line in Lancashire. 
Bathgate’s truck production would concentrate on what were termed ‘biscuit tin trucks’, or 
smaller trucks produced using mass production, assembly line methods, which the Times argued 
were best placed to sell in the Common Market as none of the major European manufacturers 
produced an equivalent model on an equivalent scale. This report, however, claimed that ‘it is a 
matter of growing concern [to British Leyland] that the backbone of this effort is Bathgate’, 
described as a ‘consistent loser’, and a ‘doubtful quantity’, whose future ‘must remain in 
doubt’.91 The Times – reinforcing stereotypes – attributed this to labour relations troubles which 
it claimed had ‘plagued’ the plant ever since it opened. These issues are explored in Chapters 
Four and Five, where it will be seen that even some former Bathgate workers supported the 
pejorative characterisation that production at the plant was continually disrupted by labour 
difficulties. Yet there is considerable counter-veiling evidence to show that the problems facing 
the plant and threatening its future were more complex than this analysis suggests, and included 
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the quality of the factory’s output as much as the attitude of its workforce. Alan Marr started as 
an engineering apprentice in the plant in 1969, and admits that it acquired a reputation for poor 
quality products precisely because of what he terms a lack of discipline on the shopfloor. 
It would be unfair to say that people were particularly lazy, but I think what you 
got, the system wasnae regimented enough for me, if you look at it that way. I 
mean there were people who would do lots of work for about four hours a day and 
nothing for the rest of the day, and I don’t know if that affected quality as well. I 
think some of the quality was poor, from their product, and that probably told in 
the end. I think the JCB company used to buy power units from us, and I think 
there was a big row about the stuff not being so good, and [JCB] brought a digger 
in one day and buried one of the power units in front of all the managers and 
everything, dug a big hole and dumped it and then put the dirt back on top of it. 
So I think that’s probably lack of regimentation and discipline which, because it 
was so big I think it was quite hard to keep that.
92
 
It is arguable, however, that this perceived lack of discipline was itself a result, rather than a 
cause, of poor quality products, and a reflection of consequent low worker morale. Other strands 
of oral history evidence certainly demonstrate that Bathgate’s workers were aware of some of the 
problems with their output. Robert McAndrew, for example, worked as a maintenance engineer 
at the plant from 1961 until 1971, and describes fundamental failures in the design of the Morris 
FJ. This was a ‘biscuit tin truck’ introduced in 1964 with a tilting cab designed to improve access 
to the engine, making servicing quicker and easier, and which it was hoped would be able to 
compete with the market-leading Ford and Bedford light trucks.
93
  
They brought in a new truck, and it was a tilting cab, and eh, Leyland had 
produced, this was before the amalgamation, and Leyland had, and I think Ford 
had eh, beaten the BMC to it, and eh, to accommodate the tilting cab they had to 
turn the engine sidieways and, eh – it didnae really work, the engine didnae work. 
A good one, a good one probably got down to Carlisle, a bad one didnae get past 
eh, what do you call it, Whitburn. The engines were seizing up, exploding and eh, 
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the initials on the truck were FJ – and in workshop language, the second word is 
junk [laughter].
94
 
The FJ engine does seem to have garnered a degree of notoriety amongst former workers. As a 
planning engineer, Ian Tennant had responsibility for solving, or attempting to solve, the kind of 
problems described by McAndrew, and he highlights the introduction of the FJ as one of his 
most memorable times at the plant. 
The introduction of the FJ, the tilting cab FJ, with the engine lying at, I think it 
was about a 45 degree angle the engine lay at, because the designers didn’t think 
they could get it under the floor sitting vertical. As it turned out they could, later 
on, somebody did it, and that was, and the FG [an earlier model] had been on the 
go for a couple of years. It was, the FJ was a, it was badly, it was hurriedly put 
into production, and there was a lot of bad design parts in it, but we had, it took a 
while to get out, and the engine was kinda suspect at the start, but again by the end 
of the engine’s life the engine really became a very very good engine.95  
It should be noted, however, that the problem of the exploding FJ engine was eventually resolved 
not at Bathgate, but at Albion, and that Robert McAndrew’s assessment of the resulting device 
highlights a new set of limitations. 
The Albion engine wasnae a race machine, it was a plodder, but it would have 
plodded on to time immemorial, you know. There was no killing an Albion 
engine, but it wasnae hot stuff, as far as performance was concerned.
96
 
Bill Raine’s testimony is marked by anti-trade union rhetoric and strong criticism of the factory’s 
shop stewards, who he believed were disruptive and partly responsible for low levels of 
productivity at the plant. However, even he highlights the weaknesses of the outdated models 
produced at Bathgate as one of the key problems facing the factory. 
The attitude of these people [the shop stewards] marching about saying this and 
that, and to be quite honest they were turning rubbish out. It wasn’t their fault. 
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They were doing the job properly, but they were years and years out of date with 
the model. They couldn’t sell them.97 
Raine is referring here to the trucks built at the plant, and goes on to describe certain problems 
with their design. 
Abroad, nobody wanted to know. They were rubbish. The designs – the one truck 
we were making when I left [in 1982], we’d been making in 1938 in Birmingham. 
They brought a new truck out, a new cab. When I looked at it, I thought, 
whoever’s designed and thought this out must be stupid. On the big front panel 
there was a great big lettering, Leyland. Each letter had got three holes drilled in 
the front panel for the pins to hold it. I said that’s the most stupid thing you can 
think of, because that will rot in no time, and you’ve got a rusty front panel on a 
truck, doesn’t matter what you do, you’ll never cover them holes up. And it must 
have cost a fortune to put those punch-holes in that front panel. So they took it 
out, and they put a plastic Leyland thing on the front.
98
 
The importance of selling products abroad is alluded to here, and at the time of the Bathgate 
expansion in 1977, it was reported that ‘most’ of the vehicles produced at the plant were 
exported.
99
 Certainly, at the time of the Lothians Regional Survey and Plan in 1966, 45 per cent 
of trucks and 80 per cent of tractors went for export, while around 20 per cent of all output for 
the home market was sold in Scotland.
100
 Traditionally, the company’s biggest overseas markets 
were in Commonwealth countries and South Africa, although the Middle East and EEC countries 
became increasingly important during the 1970s.
101
 Bathgate’s products were mostly shipped 
overseas in knocked-down form, explained here by former CKD worker Harry McKay. 
Well, semi-KD and CKD was mostly for tractors at that particular stage. What 
you would get was a built up tractor which was just a preparation, you got a built 
up tractor, it’d only be a part preparation, for example do you take the steering 
wheel off, do you take the linkages off, get underneath the bonnet, and at that 
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stage you would put a piece of wax cloth paper over the bonnet, tense it with the 
steel strapping, and stencil the front of it where it was going. Semi-KD was you 
would take a tractor and you would take all the axles off it, put it into a packing 
case with all the, you know once the front axles the rear axles were taken off, the 
linkage at the back, and it’d be completely in a packing case. CKD was, the 
tractor was never built, it was just given to you in bits and pieces.
102
 
The CKD system was peculiar to British overseas motor manufacturing, and relied upon 
agreements with independent local companies rather than the creation of wholly or majority-
owned overseas subsidiaries.
103
 CKD kits containing all the necessary components for a vehicle 
would be packed in British factories and sent to these overseas agents for re-assembly. This 
required minimal investment and allowed British firms to gain access to Commonwealth and 
European markets, but could lead to problems for parent companies who had very limited control 
over their overseas manufacturing partners, and in some cases found that they lacked 
manufacturing experience and expertise.
104
  
Furthermore, the requirements of export markets could present new design and engineering 
challenges to those at Bathgate. Bruce Davies, a mechanical engineer who moved to the plant 
after graduating from Manchester University in 1969, describes technical modifications which he 
was required to make to the Nuffield tractors produced at the plant so that they could be sold in 
South Africa. 
They started selling tractors to South Africa, and it was hot, and they have what is 
called a Limited Ambient Temperature, and LAT it quickly becomes called, so if 
you’re in this country the ambient temperature, what is it today, three, four, and 
then you have a number which you add on to it to make it to ninety degrees. So if 
you have an LAT of 42 it means you can run up to sixty degrees outside before 
the tractor boils, OK, and so you just had these numbers – so in England, 
Scotland, Ireland, Wales, France, Germany, it’s never gonna be an issue for the 
tractors overheating. Soon as you go to the African continent, suddenly you don’t 
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have this gap, you don’t have this thermal capacity and, initially we did some tests 
to work out what the tractor went like, and we then did what turned out to be two 
very simple things – one we made the fan fit better within the radiator fan ... we 
discovered if we just got the fan to fit better, inside the radiator on the tractor, we 
immediately got an extra five or ten degrees bonus. We then found we could run 
the fan faster but that didn’t make as much difference as we thought, so we then 
just looked at where the air came from. We just discovered the way they attached 
the side panels on the tractor really got all the air off, so we just changed the way 
they welded them on and that got us another, and that was enough. So it was one 
of these things that really didn’t make much difference to the tractor at all, but just 
by tidying up little details in it, it got very analytical but it solved the problem.
105
 
Davies enjoyed his work largely because of the problem-solving it entailed, but it should be 
noted that many of the difficulties which he and his fellow design engineers encountered were 
themselves a result of poor management or, it would seem, a certain intransigence during the 
transfer of work and machinery from Birmingham.  
It turns out the work, it was very interesting, very exciting in some ways because 
tractor research at that time were transferring all their know –  I’m not high 
enough up the tree there to know what was going on, but I knew there was this 
organisation called Tractor Research that was reluctant to give Bathgate 
engineering much information, we had a full set of drawings for the tractor but we 
didn’t have the engineering test reports that explained why the particular hydraulic 
system worked in the way it did, why the cooling system was like it was, why the 
gearbox was as like it was, although I subsequently discovered that the ten speed 
gearbox was an extract from a tank, they’d just put it into a tractor after the war 
and it hadn’t really changed.106 
The lack of information available to the Bathgate engineers, and their difficulty in 
communicating with colleagues elsewhere in the organisation, reflects further potential problems 
associated with branch plants such as Bathgate operating remotely from company headquarters, 
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and also highlights the related tendency for such plants to provide predominantly low-skilled, 
assembly line work. The extent to which this was true of Bathgate will be examined further in 
Chapter Three, but here it should be noted that, although much of the work available at the plant 
was on the main truck and tractor assembly lines, it has also been claimed the factory had the 
largest concentration of machine tools in Europe, and it employed a considerable number of 
semi-skilled and, to a smaller extent, skilled workers in its machining and engineering areas.
107
 
Furthermore, and as Bruce Davies’s testimony attests, the plant’s production and design 
engineers were able to exercise considerable autonomy in making modifications and 
improvements to the design and engineering of the trucks and tractors which the factory 
produced.  
Davies worked exclusively on the tractors made at Bathgate, which were sold initially under the 
Nuffield name and then, from 1969, as Leyland Tractors. These were widely regarded as good 
products, and indeed the 1982 sell-off of the tractor plant to Marshall Tractors was taken by 
many Bathgate workers as a sign that the ‘writing was on the wall’ for the rest of the factory as 
well. Andy Hunter, for example, was a member of the Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee, and 
describes his decision to take voluntary redundancy in 1980. 
I left during one of the sortae, first redundancies, when we had met Michael 
Edwardes, Pat Lowry in the executive canteen, and Mr Edwardes was sitting 
swinging his legs and stopped Pat Lowry speaking and basically told us that the 
tractors were going, and I’m sitting thinking well, this is the start of the end, if the 
tractors go because I mean the tractors were very very successful, my brother-in-
law was a farmer and his brother-in-law was a farmer as well, and eh Andrew 
Jack bought Leylands and my brother-in-law bought Davey Browns, and I can 
always remember my brother-in-law saying to me that basically a Leyland could 
pull the front end off a Davey Brown, and a Davey Brown was the name in 
tractors, but Leyland had got up to a spec that were beating Davey Browns and 
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obviously to be up there and selling the best tractor basically in the world as far as 
I’m concerned, and they were hiving that off, didnae sound good to me.108 
However, in spite of the Leyland tractors’ reputation for good quality, and a perception amongst 
the factory’s workforce that the tractor plant was its most profitable department, there is 
evidence to suggest that problems with their design and build quality had been growing for some 
time. Bill Raine, for example, recalls seeing a letter from an important customer threatening to 
stop buying tractors from Bathgate; something which he took as a sign of the severity of the 
problems facing the plant by the mid-1970s. 
I picked up this letter and it was from the big chief importer of tractors in New 
Zealand, the big franchise holder. If you send me any more rubbish, to this 
country, three months from now you won’t sell one more because I’m going to 
close everything down. And if you send any more idiots from your factory to me, 
and they don’t know the back or the front of a tractor, that’ll compound it. And 
this is my last warning. And I thought, I don’t believe this...I didn’t know much 
about or care much about tractors then, but when I saw that I thought well, then 
you’ve got the trucks as well, then you’ve got these guys marching about saying 
they run the factory ...
109
  
Bruce Davies left the factory in 1975 after becoming disillusioned with a new tractor model 
which the company was developing, and which he ‘didn’t think ... was gonna work’. 110 
Furthermore, he had long been frustrated by what he perceived as misjudged management 
decisions and, in a sign of the limitations of the autonomy enjoyed by the Bathgate engineers, a 
lack of flexibility in both commercial and technical decision-making. He describes, for example, 
what he believes to have been a loss of potentially lucrative orders due to the management’s 
refusal to consider changing their financial model in order to accommodate engineering 
adjustments required for an export model. 
The main thing that I still regret is a few things that I thought of, management 
decisions were wrong, you know. One of them was, the whole of the financial 
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model of the plant came from making five thousand cars a week, thousands and 
thousands and thousands of cars. So if you got an order for a small number of 
tractors, and by small, some people wouldn’t think of it as small, some people 
would think of, a hundred tractors for somewhere, they wouldn’t ever do a 
machine, a tool room job to make a hundred parts. So for example, we had an 
inquiry for I think it was high clearance tractors to go to, I think it was South 
Africa, we’ll stick to South Africa, wherever it was it was somewhere like that, 
and we had to raise the tractor up six inches to do it, so the obvious thing was to 
just get longer kingpins at the front, larger diameter wheels at the rear, make sure 
everything cleared and that was it. But to do that you had to machine the front 
axle of the tractor differently, and machine the kingpins that do the steering wheel, 
that allows the wheel to pivot, and I think it was some track rod ends, but not 
much, the main thing was the kingpins had to be different to lift the tractor up 
because at the back all you did was put some big wheels on and put a chunk out of 
the mudguard. And they came back and they said it would cost a quarter of a 
million pounds to do this, and I said that can’t be right. So I went to a local 
engineering firm and I asked them how much it would cost them to make a 
hundred, or two hundred of them because we’d probably want a few spares, a 
hundred to maybe up to four, two hundred, and he came back with a price, put that 
into the tractor and you’re making a nice – and they said no no, you can’t do it 
like that, I said what do you mean, and he said well if we’re going to make that 
we’re going to have to get an automatic machine in that’ll only do that, because 
we need to make five thousand a week. So all their costing was all on the basis 
that you only made five thousand, or five hundred even a week, and they couldn’t, 
they had no financial mechanism that says we won’t make them, I’ll just get a 
local engineering firm to make four hundred of these, to make two hundred 
tractors to go away.
111
  
He goes on to describe earlier failings in the development of the Mini Tractor, introduced in 
1965 and poorly received. 
                                                          
111
 WEA, interview with Bruce Davies. 
103 
 
The mini tractor should have become the grandslam tractor of today. It was a 
delightful tractor to drive, you could hurtle around anywhere in it, and they 
refused to do two basic things initially, and one was change the clutch on it from a 
single clutch to a double clutch, because if you stopped everything stopped. All 
tractors at that time, 1966, you put the clutch down you only stopped the tractor, 
you didn’t stop the spreader, you didn’t stop anything else, it didn’t have a live 
hydraulic pump. And there were various little things like that that could have 
made it a world beater. And the other thing that started at that time was going 
towards four wheel drive. And the powers that be decided there was no market for 
a small four wheel drive tractor. Every golf course in Scotland’s got three of them 
now haven’t they.112 
These problems highlight both the impact of management decisions on the development of the 
products built at Bathgate, and, arguably, the extent to which the capacity of Bathgate’s 
engineers to improve and innovate was constrained by the plant’s position on the periphery of 
what was a very large organisation with its headquarters over 300 miles away in Birmingham.  
 
Management change and corporate restructuring 
These issues are also, however, signs of the weaknesses of senior BL management which are 
central to a number of analyses of the motor industry in Britain, including Jonathan Wood’s 
Wheels of Misfortune, which is particularly critical of Lord Stokes, chairman and managing 
director of the company from 1968 until 1977, who confessed to being ‘a bit doubtful about 
budgets’, and once admitted to his finance director John Barber, ‘I don’t know what’s going to 
happen tomorrow, let alone next year.’113 Stokes had worked his way up through the company, 
joining as an apprentice at the age of 18 and becoming a celebrated salesman, but his elevation to 
chairman and managing director in spite of his own admitted lack of marketing, engineering, or 
managerial expertise, typified a management culture marked by its inexperience, and its 
‘unfashionable’ unwillingness to employ graduates from either an arts or engineering 
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background.
114
 Barber, who, as a former finance director of Ford was the only member of the BL 
board with any experience of direct involvement in the management of a major car producer, 
describes his initial impressions of working at Longbridge. 
It was a terrible make-do-and-mend company. The intellectual calibre was very 
low. But they were good at getting out of difficulties. If they had a major problem 
in production, they could get out of it, but they weren’t any good at planning on 
how not to get into it.
115
 
The design and engineering problems described by Bill Raine and Bruce Davies were certainly 
not unique to Bathgate, although it is notable that Stokes described the plant as ‘a disaster 
because every truck they made broke down.’ 116  It is, however, generally accepted in the 
historiography of the British motor industry that BL, even more so than its competitors, suffered 
from a reputation for poor products both at home and abroad. In 1976, for example, a Midlands 
News television report into ‘Foreign Cars’ asked members of the public their opinion of British-
built cars. ‘What’s wrong with British cars? What isn’t wrong with them! I told you about that 
Rover – the exhaust fell off, the handle fell off!’ 117  Timothy Whisler has found numerous 
examples in the contemporary motoring press of similar problems, including an ‘ordinary 
housewife’ who became so ‘nervous and neurotic’ following a series of breakdowns that she 
abandoned her new BL car outside the factory gates, a Triumph Spitfire which, in its first year 
alone, required two engines, a gearbox, two door locks, and a fire brigade to extinguish its 
burning engine, and an Austin 1300 which dispensed water rather than air through its heater, and 
the windows of which fell out upon opening.
118
 Such sensationalist reporting was, as Whisler 
makes clear, targeted disproportionately at the ‘national champion’ of BL, which in fact 
produced cars to a build-quality roughly equivalent to the standards of its British competitors. 
Most contemporary accounts of the industry’s problems attributed defects in the quality of 
British vehicles to human error on the assembly line, often linked to fractious industrial relations. 
One man, asked by Midlands News to explain his preference for foreign cars, explained that 
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British cars were more likely to be faulty because workers leaving their workstations and 
assembly lines to go on strike lost track of their work and consequently ‘left bits off’.119 Whisler 
admits that assembly errors were a ‘chronic problem’, but argues they were part of a far more 
complex set of interrelated difficulties which included weaknesses in the design process, low 
corporate standards, ageing machinery, and superficial quality control and inspection systems.
120
 
The haphazard nature of quality control across the industry was demonstrated by a dispute which 
occurred at the body maker Pressed Steel in 1970 when, in order to allow a number of its 
marques to expand into the American market, BLMC management insisted on tighter inspection 
as part of a move to introduce safety and quality control checks more stringent than the ‘clout’ 
with a hammer and chisel which had previously been the test of the strength and durability of 
welding work. For the workforce at Pressed Steel, this was a sign that ‘an American life is of 
infinitely more value than a British life, so we should do all we can to ensure that the vehicles 
sent to America are much safer than those which are supplied to the mugs over here.’121 
This difference between British build-quality and the requirements demanded by the US 
government of any vehicle imported into that country highlights the problems facing Britain’s 
motor manufacturers in the 1970s particularly, as the standards which had been concealed by the 
protected home market were exposed by increasing import penetration, and the subsequent need 
to expand new and existing export markets.
122
 Import tariffs were reduced from 1963 onwards, 
falling to 8.3 per cent by the time of Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973, and virtually 
disappearing by 1977.
123
 Church has identified 1971 as a key year for British car makers, as the 
availability of easy credit combined with low purchase tax produced an increase in car sales of 
43 per cent; a demand which could not be met by domestic production alone, and which 
therefore provided a catalyst for what was to be a permanent shift in favour of foreign cars.
124
 
This change in Britain’s position as a car producer was compounded by the effects of the global 
recession which resulted from the oil crisis of 1973, and contributed to the severity of the 
problems experienced by the BLMC, leading to its request for state aid which was to prompt the 
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government’s appointment of Don Ryder to investigate the company’s difficulties. The main 
implications of the Ryder Report for Leyland and its workers at Bathgate arose from its two key 
recommendations: that output should be expanded, and that there should be no redundancies.
125
 
This both explains the ‘boom’ seen at Bathgate in the late 1970s, and reflects the reluctance on 
the part of Lord Stokes, described in an internal appraisal as ‘a soft-hearted man who finds it 
difficult to fire people’, to make any redundancies, particularly as he felt that as the ‘national 
champion’ the company had a social responsibility to defend jobs as far as possible.126 Indeed, 
Stokes is on record as saying, ‘I don’t like firing people. I hate it. I didn’t agree to the merger of 
the British motor industry to get rid of people. I thought we were going to create jobs.’127 
Ryder’s resistance to redundancies was also, however, in line with the Labour party’s policy of 
employment preservation, and a source of criticism from both the House of Commons Trade and 
Industry Subcommittee and John Barber, who as finance director of the firm was perhaps less 
sympathetic to its social responsibilities. Barber argued that Ryder ‘knew what the Government 
and particularly Tony Benn wanted ... a big nationalised volume car company ... and that’s what 
he gave them on paper.’128 Whisler has found no evidence of the conspiracy implied by Barber 
between Benn, then Secretary of State for Industry, and the BL trade union committee, but writes 
that Benn influenced the manner of the company’s rescue, rejecting any radical restructuring and 
attempting to forge a compromise which had the effect of reinforcing the company’s existing 
‘institutional and evolutionary path’.129 
The subsequent appointment in October 1977 of Michael Edwardes as chairman and managing 
director of the nationalised British Leyland has been portrayed erroneously by a number of 
former Bathgate workers as part of the Thatcher government’s attack on nationalised industry. 
Andy Hunter, for example, describes Edwardes as ‘Maggie Thatcher’s puppet, so he was 
carrying out the Conservative party role for the management of British Leyland.’130 This is no 
doubt a result of conflating the impact of Edwardes with that of his deputy, Ian McGregor, who 
was appointed by Thatcher to chair first British Steel and then the National Coal Board, although 
Edwardes did have an important role in the eventual closure of Bathgate. His appointment, by 
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Labour Prime Minister Jim Callaghan, did, however, mark the beginning of a pronounced shift in 
the way in which the company was run, which would have significant implications for the 
Bathgate plant and its workers, and arouse suspicion particularly amongst its shop stewards. 
Edwardes, described by Church as ‘a self-styled apostle of free enterprise’, felt that the 
objectives of the Ryder Plan were ‘unachievable’, and argued that the only way to save the 
company was ‘to restructure, de-man, modernise, and drive through the product plan’ with 
minimal government intervention.
131
 At Bathgate, however, the B Block extension was 
underway as part of a major programme of investment which sought to modernise the plant and 
its equipment, and, in Edwardes’ words, ‘the workforce still seemed to be suffering from a 
euphoric post-Ryder sense of security.’132 This is certainly reflected in the experience of Tommy 
Morrison, a TGWU shop steward who was one of two spokesmen from the Bathgate JSSC who 
would attend regular meetings of the British Leyland Trade Union Committee, usually held in 
Birmingham, Coventry, or at Leyland in Lancashire. He recalls one such meeting which he 
attended around this time, and his description of this meeting and the way in which his news 
from Birmingham was received at Bathgate is worth including at length. Although Morrison 
does not give a date for this meeting, it can be inferred from his reference to the B Block 
extension and from the nature of the news imparted that it was after Edwardes’ appointment, but 
prior to his first visit to the plant in the spring of 1978. 
I went down to a meeting in Birmingham and there was the top people all there 
from the management side, and that particular day I was just there myself, and 
when I went down to Birmingham on the train and that, all these top people who 
were there who I’d never seen before, and what they were there for, they were 
gonnae gie a break down of how British Leyland was working, Truck and Bus, 
and the changes that was gonnae be made. Now when I went down to that meeting 
I never knew anything was gonnae take place, and I’m sure the people in Bathgate 
never knew that, and I’m sure the people in Albion didnae know that, but the guys 
down south seemed to have an idea. Anyway I was sitting and taking notes, and 
they gave a breakdown of Guy Motors there closing, and Leyland Lancs and this 
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and that, different things and different places down there. I wasnae interested in 
that as such, and then they come to Bathgate, and Scotland, he says, and two 
places Albion and Bathgate, he says. Now, Bathgate is what’s, and I’ll never 
forget it, it’s a possibility it’d be suicide to try and close Bathgate in a one-r. 
[Unclear] Closing it. He says, it could be achieved in a three to four year period. 
Full stop. Full stop, and he went on to the next plant. But because that was 
interesting to me as Bathgate I took note of that. Long story short, I come back 
from Birmingham and I was really sick because of what I’d heard. I come back, 
and I’ll give you the reasons for it, I come back tae, and here, lo and behold, I 
didnae know there was a mass meeting getting held ... So I went over to the 
meeting, and as I walked in I heard somebody fae A Block say there’s Tommy 
Morrison back the now, he’ll mebbe tell you something important. And it caught 
me cold, know what I mean. And Swanny [JSSC convenor Jim Swan] was on the 
thing at the time talking, and he had said ehm, have you anything to report? I says 
to him no, I think I’ve got to report to youse first before I go to the body of the 
hall, and he looked at me, and no he says, we’ll gie you back in to give a report 
later on, he says, he wants to see the Joint Shop Stewards first, and I just sat doon. 
So anyway they called a Joint Shop Stewards’ meeting because you usually do 
after a big meeting, and I went over and at that time we were talking about 
building a new G Block, the new G Block was getting built at Bathgate, this was 
prior to me going down there, the G Block was getting started and they’d already 
started it, they’d already started the throes of a new B Block extension, and they’d 
already started, once they’d finished that they were going to start making inroads 
so they could build an engine line, so to build deep in the founds and build a 
thingmy. So that was already working on it before I came back. Years before, a 
year before you understand? So when I come back and I says I’ve bad news for 
you boys, and they look and say what you on aboot, and I says I think Bathgate’s 
gonnae close. Of course I won’t use the sweary words [unclear]. Anyway, long 
story short, he says well I’ve heard everything noo, and he says you representing 
us, he says, and you come back with a story like that. And my name was like 
muck, really muck in the eyes of the Joint Shop Stewards, I was the laughing 
109 
 
stock of the place because it fed back into the shop flaers, that Bathgate was 
closing, and this was a year before it happened, do you see where I’m coming 
from, so it looked bad on ma part. I think I was the most hated person, for being a 
goody goody guy. I said look, can I say something to you – do you think I would 
come back and tell a lie about something that I’d heard with my own two ears, and 
noted it down?
133
 
The degree of shopfloor hostility which greeted Morrison’s news was reflected in the reaction of 
the plant’s General Manager. 
“Who the effing hell do you think you are, causing problems in a plant that I 
know for a fact it’s here to stay and we’re building a G Block and we’re building 
this and we’re building that?” I said I’m sorry, I know you’re the top person here, 
I’m sorry, I can only tell what was stated.134 
This is a clear demonstration of the confidence in the plant’s future which the investment 
programme had engendered in workforce and management alike; a confidence which, in 
Edwardes’ analysis, contributed to a prolonged, unofficial strike in 1978 by 1,800 machinists at 
the plant who felt that their pay should increase in line with the greater skill required to operate 
the new, computerised machinery introduced under the modernisation programme, and a related 
increase in productivity.
135
 Management responded by threatening to cut future investment at 
Bathgate and an agreement was eventually reached, but there is a sense in the oral history 
testimony of former shop stewards, including Morrison, that such strike activity confirmed 
Edwardes in his belief that Bathgate, a plant he describes as ‘regularly under review’, should 
close. In early 1978, Edwardes had visited the plant to meet its management and senior shop 
stewards. Tommy Morrison attended the meeting. 
So then we had a man coming down started looking at the plant, a Mr Edwardes ... 
He come doon and had a meeting with the Joint Shop Stewards, and he had a 
couple of sidekicks with him, and he went on, he was quite this and that about the 
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way Bathgate had been operating, all doing this and all doing that. Next thing 
phone goes, personnel manager, and that’s him saying heat treatment had walked 
oot in B Block. Oh god, I says, oh no, he says this is typical of Bathgate, couldnae 
depend on you. He really lambasted us as union men, and a lot of time we were 
tied, us hands were tied, and that was the turning point. That’s when I put two and 
two together.
136
  
Bill Raine’s responsibilities did not include negotiating with the shop stewards, but his testimony 
similarly presents Edwardes’ visit to the plant and his experience of its industrial relations as a 
decisive moment. It should be noted, however, that the attempted physical attack on Edwardes 
which he describes does not feature in the testimony of any other former worker or, indeed, in 
Edwardes’ memoirs, and is perhaps a reflection of the strength of Raine’s own robust anti-trade 
union views. 
So Michael Edwardes came up one day, they were on strike, and I saw them 
trying to drag him out of his car by his neck. These people were standing at the 
gate and tried to get him – and one bloke says something and I said look pal, 
you’ve made the biggest mistake of your lives. When that guy gets back to the 
Midlands the first thing he’ll do is start people looking somewhere for a site for 
this factory, and you’ll all be out of work. And I wasn’t very far short.137 
Contemporary press coverage of the 1978 machinists’ strike also emphasised the extent to which 
‘a dramatic worsening in labour relations’ undermined the position of the plant, particularly at a 
time when Leyland Vehicles, as the Truck and Bus Division had been renamed, was 
experiencing a fall in its share of the UK commercial vehicle market.
138
 The plant’s industrial 
relations and the nature of its shop stewards’ movement will be central to Chapters Four and 
Five, but here it should be noted that, in spite of this assessment, it was generally accepted even 
in the press that Bathgate’s shop stewards under the leadership of convenor Jim Swan were 
notably moderate. At the time of the 1982 campaign against closure, for example, the Financial 
Times wrote that ‘although they are a determined strike force, the Bathgate workers have a 
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record for moderation’, while Swan’s response to the end of the 1978 strike – telling his 
workforce to ‘prove that we can perform to capacity levels and that we can be stable’ – does 
little to support Edwardes’ contention that at Bathgate, as elsewhere in BL, ‘the militants were 
firmly in charge’.139 
Church is among those who have highlighted Edwardes’ confrontational approach to the trade 
unions, and the extent to which this was shaped by his determination to end the overmanning 
which Ryder had uncovered but done little to reduce, and the need to close inefficient plants or 
those operating with excess capacity that this would seemingly inevitably entail.
140
 This had 
particular implications for the regional policy plants, highlighting the conflict that existed 
between the economic and social aims of a policy which created over 50,000 new jobs and 
helped to promote prosperity and improve living standards in the Development Areas, but, in 
doing so, had arguably increased costs and contributed to the industry’s over-capacity. 141 
Edwardes’ approach to the regional policy plants demonstrates the extent to which he eschewed 
any consideration of a social purpose for the motor industry, and for the ‘national champion’ of 
BL, focusing instead on the strategic pursuit of economic goals. By accessing and reinforcing 
declinist tropes which focused on the poor performance of British motor manufacturing as a 
result of the inefficiency and misbehaviour of its workers, Edwardes was able to ease away from 
the social responsibilities which had concerned Stokes and Ryder, and focus instead on the 
economic priorities of shutting plants and firing workers in order to achieve greater profitability. 
In May 1978, BL’s regional policy plant at Speke on Merseyside became the first to be closed 
under Edwardes’ leadership. Characterised at the time as a response to the strength of the plant’s 
trade union movement and its rejection, following a four month strike, of management attempts 
to increase productivity, this closure can more accurately be seen as a result of poor sales of the 
Triumph TR7 produced at the plant, and resulting low capacity utilisation.
142
 Edwardes describes 
Speke as ‘one of those misguided efforts by successive governments to impose their will on the 
motor industry’ which had, like its counterpart at Bathgate, been under periodic review and, by 
nature of its location and the costs associated with transporting components from Birmingham 
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and Coventry, was considered ‘a prime candidate for closure’.143 Furthermore, the decision to 
close Speke and move production of the TR7 to the main Triumph plant at Canley in Coventry 
reflected Edwardes’ plan for the wider corporate restructuring of BL, which had already seen the 
firm split into five divisions – Austin Morris, Jaguar Rover Triumph, BL Components, Leyland 
Vehicles, and SP Industries – in the hope of increasing loyalty amongst workers by tapping into 
traditional marque and factory identities, and which would lead to the decentralisation of 
production.
144
 This was to have serious implications for Bathgate, particularly as Leyland 
Vehicles was continuing to experience problems and, in Edwardes’ words, ‘overmanning was 
still rife’.145 In the first half of 1981, for example, it lost £47 million, and the domestic market for 
trucks had fallen from 80,000 in 1979, to just 40,000.
146
 Management responded to this by 
announcing a survival plan which would see production concentrated in fewer factories, with the 
loss of 4,000 jobs. As part of these plans, production of the light ‘biscuit-tin’ trucks built at 
Bathgate would move to Leyland in Lancashire, while Bathgate itself would concentrate on what 
was described in the FT as a ‘geriatric’ range of truck engines, and the large, heavy trucks 
previously built at Guy Motors in Wolverhampton, which was to close.
147
 
These trucks, the Landtrain and Landmaster, were produced in much smaller numbers than the 
lighter weight models, and were mainly for the export market, contributing to fears amongst 
Bathgate’s shop stewards that not only would production be scaled down, but the plant would be 
reduced to manufacturing trucks in knock-down form only.
148
 Moreover, these plans also 
included the sell-off of the ostensibly successful tractor plant with 1,360 redundancies. Andy 
Hunter was a member of the JSSC and remembers hearing the news that the tractor plant would 
close. 
To be honest with you, my thinking was oh Michael Edwardes is in Scotland, so 
he’s obviously, I mean we were the only Scots, us and Albion, and I thought he 
was just basically up to Bathgate to pop in and tell us how well we were doing or 
whatever it may be, the tractor sales were up through the roof and things were 
                                                          
143
 Edwardes, Back from the Brink, pp.69-70. 
144
 Whisler, The British Motor Industry, pp.139-140; Wood, Wheels of Misfortune, p.218. 
145
 Edwardes, Back from the Brink, p.54. 
146
 Ibid, p.159. 
147
 ‘Bathgate’s credibility problem’, FT, 15th February 1982. 
148
 Ibid. 
113 
 
going well. I know on the truck side of it it could have been a lot better at that 
point in time, we were still plodding away though and I thought he was maybe up 
to give us a wee pat on the back for the tractor working as well as it was. And 
ehm, it was just a total bombshell when we sat down, I mean I can remember it as 
if it’s just now, I was sitting, sort ae head management were in the front row, trade 
unions were in the second row and Michael Edwardes was just sitting across 
there, and it was just a total bombshell to us all, we couldnae believe it and we 
knew, I mean everybody just turned and looked at one another, we knew that that 
was the, the writing was on the wall if they were getting rid of a tractor that was 
so good, in the industry, the farming industry it was proving itself so good, and to 
take that away basically was a disaster. An absolute disaster.
149
 
This triggered the first campaign against closure, discussed in Chapter One, which sought to stop 
the tractor plant sell-off. It is notable, however, that Jim Swan, who led the campaign and 
attracted considerable media attention at the time, has stated in his oral history testimony that the 
sell-off provided something of a distraction, and that if the shop stewards had instead given their 
attention to blocking the move of the light trucks to Leyland, then the plant may have been in a 
better position. 
They were gonnae move the trucks that we were building, oor range of medium 
light trucks, down to Leyland, and Guy Motors, big heavy trucks, were coming to 
Bathgate, eh, and the big Guy Motors trucks were being sell’t to Nigeria, which 
was the only market place they had, and we, the only thing I think we might have 
done, is when we had the management on the ropes, when we were occupying the 
factory, and they said is there anything we could dae, and we played the naw, 
you’ve got to give the tractor back, but we thought, I think we all thought they 
were negotiating with us at that point, because the idea was tae, tae look at the 
tractor, and I know the tractor guys wanted their redundancy and we were losing 
that bit of the fight, but if we’d saved the range of trucks it would have gave us a 
better fighting chance. And it might have been right at that time to trade, keeping 
the trucks for stopping the strike on the tractors, eh, but we’ll never know if that 
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would have been the right thing or no. We were disciplined and we stood our 
ground on principle at that time.
150
 
Furthermore, and as Andy Hunter’s testimony suggests, it was recognised at the time of the 
tractor sell-off that the company’s commitment to Bathgate and therefore the long-term future of 
the plant, was in doubt. The FT reported that ‘British Leyland’s assurances about the future of its 
Scottish operations are treated with scepticism’, and there are suggestions in the oral history of 
the extent to which the relationship between workforce and management had been damaged by 
the way the plant had been treated under Edwardes. Harry McKay, for example, has stated that 
Edwardes ‘was wearing these type of glasses when he came to Bathgate, he only saw the bad 
things’, but perhaps most telling is Tommy Morrison’s description of the response he received 
from his colleagues and fellow shop stewards when it emerged that the plant would close, and 
that he had therefore given an accurate report from the meeting he had attended in Birmingham 
shortly after Edwardes’ appointment. 
Later on when the members said to me ‘why did you think they were going to 
close it Tommy when you found oot they were spending hundreds, no just 
thousands, hundreds of thousands pounds building a new B Block extension, 
building a new track already, building big machinery for this new G Block. Big 
crans was going in in CKD, spent all that money in the eighteen month prior to it 
shutting. He says, how did you still think that, or why would they dae that? Well, 
can I say something to you. If one of the most successful plants in British Leyland 
Truck and Bus was Bathgate, it was proved, it’s in the figures money-wise, how 
could they doon there, Edwardes and his crowd and his cronies, how could they 
turn round and say we’re gonnae close Bathgate? The first thing people look at, 
well I would, they want to see what the profit is here. But if you make a place top 
heavy, and you put hundreds of thousands of pounds into stuff, machinery and 
that, it’s never gonnae be used, it’s still going against the plant. And I says, they 
say wait a minute they’ve made four million pound here but wait a minute there’s 
a million and a half going to come off for this, and the wage and that, oh, I can see 
where you’re coming from.’ [Interviewer – so you think it was as deliberate as 
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that, putting that investment in?] I could put ma life on it, I know how businesses 
work. I’m no naive or stupid when it comes to that.151 
While there is little evidence to support these allegations, they do suggest that the way in which 
the closure of the plant was handled demonstrated to its workers the company’s longer-term lack 
of commitment to its branch plant operation at Bathgate, and the extent to which the BMC’s 
initial reluctance to move to the Development Districts was reflected in BL’s apparent 
determination to close what was one of its most modern facilities. Taken with the earlier closure 
of Triumph’s factory at Speke, this indicates the vulnerability of the regional policy plants 
particularly in the context of the economic challenges and structural changes experienced in the 
wider British motor industry during the 1970s especially. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the position of the BMC and BL at Bathgate in the context of the 
profound changes which took place in the structure of British motor manufacturing and its 
supply chain during the 1960s and 1970s in particular, and has examined the complexity of the 
problems facing a plant set up as a result of a regional policy which was shaped more by its 
social than economic concerns. The company’s reluctance to move to the Development Districts, 
and the difficulties associated with sourcing supplies of parts from within Scotland, resulted from 
the longer-term growth and concentration of the industry and its component making sector in the 
Midlands, and contributed to the production difficulties seen at the plant. It is important to note, 
however, that supply chain problems were not unique to the regional policy branch plants, and 
that in this respect Bathgate experienced in exaggerated form the difficulties of the industry more 
broadly, accentuated by the shorter runs associated with truck production, and the geographical 
distance between the plant and its suppliers. Moreover, the evidence suggests that strikes, go-
slows and other forms of worker protest had little bearing on the performance of Bathgate, and 
that this was affected more by weaknesses in the design and engineering of its products. This 
was a further reflection of the challenges facing British motor manufacturers, particularly as 
imports increased markedly during the 1970s. The plant’s supply chain difficulties and design 
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problems were, however, deemphasised by Michael Edwardes, who, as Chairman of BL, moved 
away from the concern with the social purpose of motor manufacturing which had been stressed 
by his predecessor Lord Stokes, and instead reasserted the fundamental privileging of economic 
priorities, with serious implications for the company’s regional policy plants. In this context, it 
was easier politically for Edwardes to cite labour difficulties as the key factor in the diminution 
of BL’s operations at Bathgate and the plant’s eventual closure, drawing on and reinforcing the 
dominant declinist narrative of poor production and labour culpability. However, the causes of 
the strike action which did take place at Bathgate, as well as the design problems experienced at 
the plant, illuminate in a variety of ways the character of branch plant production, and will be 
explored further in Part Two. 
 
 
  
 Part Two 
 
Working at Bathgate 
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Chapter Three 
Experiences of work 
 
In 1969, a delegate to the STUC drew attention to the difference between the location of industry 
and ‘the location of the policy-makers in industry’ and, in describing the tendency for plants 
established as a result of regional policy to be run from company headquarters hundreds of miles 
further south, identified what would later become known in the historiography as ‘branch plant 
syndrome’. According to this delegate, Scotland would soon find itself in a situation in which its 
main exports were ‘whisky, footballers and brains’, as young people were pushed out of the 
country due to a lack of opportunity, and forced to move to the south, and London especially, in 
order to find skilled work.
1
 The STUC had frequently stressed the point that Scotland’s economic 
development was ‘not simply a question of more work and more jobs, but a question of the right 
kind of work, the right kind of economic development’,2 and had hoped that the growth of a 
cohesive Scottish motor industry around Bathgate, Linwood and the steelworks at Ravenscraig 
would provide stable employment in modern industries which would help to diversify the 
Scottish industrial base. The perceived centrality of the motor industry to contemporary ideas 
about the growth of affluence, and its expected role in driving economic growth in Scotland, was 
underlined in a 1960 submission by the SCDI to the Secretary of State for Scotland. This stressed 
that the establishment of motor car manufacturing in Scotland must remain a primary objective if 
Scotland was to ‘have a foothold in the future prosperity of the UK’.3 As discussed in Chapter 
Two, however, ancillary industries proved reluctant to follow the BMC and Rootes to Scotland 
and, in spite of attempts to persuade either Ford or Vauxhall to build their mooted regional policy 
plants in Scotland, the eventual decision of both firms to move instead to Merseyside led to a 
recognition within the STUC that, by the late 1960s, Scotland was ‘unlikely to have an industry 
complete in itself in this field’.4  
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Moreover, it is arguable that the premium placed by both the STUC and the SCDI on motor 
industry development had been predicated on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of 
motor industry employment, which although relatively well-paid, was monotonous and 
consequently potentially problematic.
5
  These dilemmas were explored in John Goldthorpe’s 
influential Affluent Worker studies, which demonstrated the extent to which the experiences and 
attitudes of such workers represented the impact of deskilling on industrial workforces as much 
as the modernisation and increasing prosperity of manufacturing industry. Goldthorpe and his 
colleagues analysed the industrial, social, and political attitudes and behaviour of workers at 
Vauxhall Motors and two other major employers in the prosperous and expanding town of Luton 
and found that, in order to achieve the improved material conditions which had previously been 
taken as a sign of working class ‘embourgeoisement’, Luton’s affluent workers were moving 
away from work of a solidaristic orientation, containing intrinsic benefits such as a degree of 
autonomy and opportunity, in favour of positions with an instrumental orientation, providing 
greater extrinsic rewards in terms of better pay and improved job security. In other words, they 
were coming to see work as a ‘means to an extrinsic end’, rather than an integral part of their own 
lifestyle and identity.
6
 Subsequent studies of motor industry industrial relations, such as Huw 
Beynon’s Working for Ford, similarly describe the monotony associated with the 
overwhelmingly semi-skilled nature of motor assembly work and the extent to which relatively 
high wages were seen as a ‘pay off’ for this loss of autonomy. Furthermore, the contested nature 
of assembly production, and the ways in which workers responded to the boredom of the 
assembly line by searching for autonomy and creativity and by seeking to control their own time 
and effort in order to challenge the discipline of the line, became central to declinist analyses of 
motor industry production which linked the industrial relations of British car firms to their wider 
difficulties, and drew on contemporary press coverage of the role of supposedly militant shop 
stewards in propagating unofficial strike action.
7
 
This has significant implications for the understanding of the branch plant economy, and 
indicates the paradoxical position of the affluent motor worker in Scotland in the 1960s and 
1970s, and in the subsequent historical literature. The development of motor manufacturing, as 
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the largest of the new industries, was seen as crucial to future national prosperity, and yet the 
automated and overwhelmingly semi-skilled nature of the work provided by a Scottish motor 
industry which remained limited to the branch plants established at Bathgate and Linwood 
contributed to the contemporary concerns of the STUC and has since been taken as an indication 
of Scottish industrial decline. William Knox and Ewen Cameron are among those who have 
drawn a link between the advent of the branch plant and the deskilling of the Scottish workforce, 
with Knox characterising the new factories as ‘little better than low level assembly production 
units’.8 These analyses generally include the developments at Bathgate and Linwood as part of a 
broader narrative covering the rise of inward investment particularly from the US electronics 
firms which established factories in Scotland during the 1950s and 1960s, but it is important to 
consider the extent to which the ‘branch plant syndrome’ apparently affecting Scotland’s motor 
plants was in fact a reflection of the nature of motor industry work, rather than a result of their 
position within larger corporate structures in which design and investment decisions were reached 
at distant headquarters. This chapter will therefore begin with an examination of the type of work 
available at Bathgate, and the extent to which this was in line with industry-wide trends in terms 
of skill, training, and health and safety, before moving on to consider how far the behaviour of the 
Bathgate workforce reflected that of workers elsewhere in the motor industry. 
 
‘The right kind of work’? Skill, training, and apprenticeships 
In their seminal study of Labour Relations in the Motor Industry, Turner, Clack, and Roberts 
dismiss the ‘green labour’ theory of strike causation in car firms, according to which strike-
proneness is attributed to ‘an exceptional influx of workers without experience of industrial work 
routines or of proper union procedures.’ 9  They find no evidence of either any connection 
between the growth of motor industry employment and its incidence of strike action, or of higher 
levels of strike-propensity amongst those supposedly ‘green’, or inexperienced, workforces 
employed by the motor industry plants established in Scotland and on Merseyside. Indeed, they 
suggest that the very opposite could be true, and that it may have been the previous industrial 
and trade union experience of these workers which lay behind some of the particular difficulties 
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associated with the opening of new plants.
10
 Implicit in this analysis is the idea that the work 
processes and industrial culture of motor manufacturing required different skills and approaches 
than work in the traditional heavy industries; an idea which was central to contemporary 
discussions of some of the problems facing production at Bathgate in its first few years 
especially. In 1964, for example, a Ministry of Labour (MoL) report on the BMC’s ‘labour 
problems in the development districts’ commented on what it described as ‘disappointing’ 
production efficiency at the plant, which it estimated to be around 70 per cent of the Midland 
level, and which it perceived to be a product of the West Lothian area’s coal and shale mining 
tradition.
11
 The report stated that: 
The vast majority of those recruited had no experience of modern mass production 
factory conditions. Many difficulties have arisen because of lack of familiarity 
with the normal customs of factory life, and there has been reluctance to accept 
disciplinary codes considered normal in e.g. Midlands.
12
 
Similar ideas marked the description of the BMC’s progress at Bathgate in the 1966 Lothians 
Regional Survey and Plan, which described the local labour force as ‘untrained in the particular 
techniques of the motor industry’, and commented on the perceived difficulties associated with 
the mining background of many of the plant’s workers. 
The company has pursued a policy of seeking its labour force mainly and in the 
first instance from the local Labour Exchanges, thus a not inconsiderable 
proportion of its employees are redundant coal-miners, traditionally one of the 
least adaptable sections of the labour force.
13
 
The pervasiveness of these ideas and the extent to which they have shaped retrospective 
perceptions of the Bathgate plant, are indicated in the following passage from the recent memoirs 
of local Labour MP Tam Dalyell, who suggests that Bathgate’s efficiency problems were a 
product of a fundamental difference in the industrial cultures of Scotland and the Midlands. 
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The Scots had a deserved international reputation as engineers but high-speed 
repetitive work on assembly lines was in the blood of those brought up in 
Coventry and Birmingham but it was not in the blood of the ex-coalminers and 
ex-shale miners in their late thirties, forties or fifties. Through no fault of their 
own, many Scots tended to be less productive than their English counterparts.
14
  
It is certainly arguable that the cultural inheritance of coal and shale mining – industries in which 
the worker was able to retain significantly more control over the work process than was the case 
in motor manufacturing – influenced the behaviour of the Bathgate workforce and necessitated 
additional training effort in order to encourage greater output. The evidence suggests, however, 
that the training provided by the company at Bathgate was limited and, in this context, the low 
level of production efficiency experienced at the plant, rather than a sign of inherent cultural 
difference, can be seen instead as a symptom of a workforce expected to learn new skills and 
adapt to new working practices ‘on-the-job’ in a factory which, in its early years, was still being 
built around them.  
The 1964 MoL report accused BMC management of ‘impatience’ with its new labour force, and 
trade union delegates to the 1966 inquiry into production at the plant, carried out by the Motor 
Industry Joint Labour Council (MIJLC) under the industrial conciliator Sir Jack Scamp and 
referred to hereafter as the Scamp inquiry, were similarly critical of the company’s treatment of 
what was termed the ‘green labour’ it employed at Bathgate.15 The 1964 report, which stated that 
the amount of training required at the plant was ‘far greater than is customary in the Midland 
factories’, condemned what it described as the ‘hand-to-mouth variety’ of what little was 
provided by management slow to recognise and respond to the unfamiliarity of the labour force 
with motor industry work.
16
 The company had arranged for a number of supervisory workers 
from the Midlands to move temporarily to Bathgate in order to oversee initial training, with some 
moving permanently, but the extent to which workers were able to benefit from this expertise 
seems to have varied across the plant. Malcolm Black describes his, very positive, experience. 
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There was men up from Longbridge. They showed you what to do... That was my 
training. Arthur was his name. He was a proper gentleman... We got on great. Of 
course, he’d been 30 odd years at the job. He knew the machines backwards.17 
Other workers, such as Harry McKay, who worked in the pre-pack section and had previously 
been an apprentice moulder in an iron foundry, have reported far more basic levels of training. 
McKay remembers receiving ‘none whatsoever. You just had to hit it running. Hit it running.’18 
As this implies, the factory’s production demands required that its new workers develop the 
skills necessary for motor industry work extremely quickly; something which is reflected in the 
testimony of Tommy Morrison, another former foundry worker whose only training for his new 
role in the cab trim section at the BMC was very much on-the-job. 
You picked it up yourself. [The foreman] come along with all these blueprints and 
all these papers and that, and he would say right, ehm, I’m putting on the big 
screens, you know, and I mean it just took me hours to even put this rubber round 
about, cos it was just springing off, and I mean, I mean really it was terrible to 
start with, you said how am I gonnae manage this. And then he came along with a 
big glass to put in to it, and then you’ve got to work it to put the glass in, and then 
you’ve got to put stuff in round about to seal it, and then you’ve got to come along 
and then put something like this round about it again. And it was really, it was 
really – and then, see before we were finished, we were just flinging them in. It 
was just too easy. It was surprising just how much, and it was very very good, and 
I’ll never forget the amount of people who started in the trimming, and other 
places – I’m not just talking about cab trimming at the time – how they adapted to 
that, and how you could put that, how you could put these things together, you 
know. You knew all the quick ways to do it but at the self same time you had 
inspectors there to make sure that it was done right, it wasnae just shoddy work. It 
had to be done correct, right so.
19
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While time restrictions and production pressures meant that assembly workers such as McKay 
and Morrison had to learn new skills as they worked, the training available even to workers in 
some of the plant’s more skilled sections could be limited by the factory’s piecemeal, and 
apparently somewhat ad hoc, development. John Cooper, for example, had previously been an 
apprentice baker, and in 1962 became one of the first production workers to be taken on at the 
plant. The training he received, as one of the first four workers in the engine assembly section, 
was restricted by the facilities available at that time. 
There were no engine assembly, there were only holes in the ground. And all we 
did for the first five or six weeks was, ehm, six cylinder or a four cylinder engine, 
stripped it down, built it back up again, stripped it down, built it back up - every 
day we did the same thing, stripping it down til you could, you knew every part of 
that engine, fae the shells on the crankshaft to the tappits or whatever, you knew 
every, on both of them.
20
 
While this approach allowed Cooper and his colleagues the time necessary to develop their 
knowledge of the engines they would be building, it is perhaps indicative of the extent to which 
workers’ first experiences of the plant were shaped by the physical ‘newness’ of the factory 
building, as well as an apparent lack of understanding on the part of company management of the 
corresponding newness of motor industry work and working practices to the majority of its 
Bathgate workforce. 
This essentially declinist narrative of untrained, demoralised and therefore unproductive labour 
does, however, require qualification. There is, for example, some resentment among former 
workers, including Tommy Morrison, of the idea that the plant was inefficient and its workforce 
poorly trained.  
Dinnae blame the workers of Bathgate. They were good workers. They adapted 
well to factory work. You get the “Aw they did nothin’ up there”. We couldnae 
have produced what we produced if naebody was workin’. So that’s a fallacy that. 
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There were some jobs better than others, some jobs cleaner than others, but 
overall the people that was there, whatever they got paid, they worked for that.
21
 
John Weir, who started work at the plant as an engineering apprentice, similarly refutes these 
negative insinuations about the plant’s productivity. 
We made some good stuff here. We made some very good stuff. But with a big 
place like that you always had your knockers, there were always people that run 
us down and gave us a hard time, but we did a good job basically as far as I can 
see.
22
 
Furthermore, ‘on-the-job’ training was common throughout the motor industry, and it should be 
emphasised that such training was generally regarded as perfectly adequate for the 
overwhelmingly semi-skilled work involved. In his 1973 study Working for Ford, Huw Beynon 
cites Henry Ford himself, who estimated in 1925 that 43 per cent of his workers required only 
one day’s training, and quotes a conversation with a worker at Ford’s regional policy plant at 
Halewood on Merseyside where the attitude to training seems remarkably similar to that 
experienced at Bathgate. 
‘Oh, they’ve got a great training programme here. A great training programme. I 
can’t remember how long it is...two days I think. I’m not sure though. I didn’t get 
any training at all when I came here, but I think they get two days now.’ 
What does this training involve? Do men still go straight on to the line? 
‘Oh yes, they go straight on the line alright. You know the sort of thing ‘this is 
Fred, he’ll show you what to do.’ ‘Hello’ says Fred ‘you stick this in here and that 
in there - I’m not paid for this y’know’. You either do it or you don’t.’23 
Beynon goes on to write that ‘the automobile industry is the domain of the new ‘semi-skilled’ 
worker. Less than one worker in a hundred in a car plant can call himself skilled in any real 
sense.’ 24  Table 3:1 gives the skills classifications of the 5,009 workers employed at BMC 
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Bathgate at the time of the 1966 Scamp inquiry, and demonstrates the extent to which its 
workforce was dominated by semi-skilled labour.  
Table 3:1 – Classification of workers at BMC Bathgate, 1966 
Skill Classification Number of workers 
Staff 
 
902 
Skilled 
 
688 
Semi-skilled 
 
2832 
Unskilled 
 
360 
Youths and females 
 
188 
Apprentices 
  
 
Craft 17 
 
Technical 6 
 
Commercial 16 
Total 
 
5009 
 (Source: MRC, MSS.178/15, dossier of information submitted to inquiry.) 
It is clear from this information that a majority of the workforce, approximately 57 per cent, was 
classed as semi-skilled, and it is likely that this included most, if not all, of the assembly workers 
employed on the plant’s truck, tractor, and cab production lines. Beynon’s 1/100 skilled worker 
proportion appears in this light an exaggeration, although the extent and definition of skilled 
labour at Bathgate is ambiguous. Heavy trucks were traditionally built in smaller numbers and to 
more bespoke specifications than cars, although it should be noted that Bathgate’s production 
was geared towards lighter trucks and that the plant was consequently designed as one of the first 
truck plants which would utilise mass assembly processes. Furthermore, and in light of the 
emphasis placed by branch plant analyses on the link between branch plant employment and the 
deskilling of industrial workforces, it is important to note that the technological changes which 
resulted from the rundown of Scotland’s heavy industries and their replacement by the new 
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forms of manufacturing could create new skills as well as removing the need for more 
traditional, craft-based skills. William Knox is among those who have described the loss of skill 
often associated with branch plant work, but he also recognises that ‘the impact of technological 
change can be contradictory and does not necessarily presume an irresistible move in the 
direction of a deskilled proletariat.’25 Certainly in the case of Bathgate, there is evidence that a 
significant number of workers were able to benefit from the opportunities afforded to them by 
work in a large, modern plant run by a nationally important employer. The company was, for 
example, keen to stress how few of its managerial and supervisory staff were brought up to 
Bathgate from its factories in England. A progress report published in the Glasgow Herald in 
1962 claimed that only the ‘merest percentage’ of the 2,300 workers then employed at the plant 
had moved up from the Midlands, while around 40 local men had already been promoted from 
the shopfloor into ‘positions of responsibility’. 26  Moreover, the plant’s apprenticeship 
programme, which began in 1964 and was run in conjunction with the new Bathgate College, 
seems to have had a significant impact in terms of bringing new skills to the area and providing 
new opportunities for its young people. 
This programme provided craft, technical, and commercial apprenticeships for male school 
leavers, and, reflecting the gendered division of labour within the factory, trained female school 
leavers in clerical and secretarial skills. There is no record of the number of women employed at 
the plant, but at the time of the Scamp inquiry, 188 of a total workforce of 5,009 fell into the 
category of ‘youths and females’.27 Andy Hunter remembers working with a woman known as 
‘Wee Totes’, whose job was to clean out the trucks once they left the line and prepare them for 
delivery, but claims that there were no women working on the assembly lines themselves.
28
 It is 
likely that Wee Totes was one of only a handful of female production workers employed in a 
small number of apparently gender specific areas. Harry McKay’s first job was ‘to look after the 
girls in the pre-pack section’ and to stop any unauthorised men from speaking to them, but it 
seems likely that the majority of women employed in the plant worked in clerical roles in its 
various offices, some of which were located outside the factory itself.
29
 Christine McAndrew 
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moved to Bathgate in 1961 when her husband Robert got a job in the plant as a millwright in the 
maintenance department, and started working there herself shortly afterwards. She describes the 
short time she spent in the buying office, and her reason for leaving. 
I got a job with the BMC in the buying department, and I was there for about a 
year and a half, ehm – not actually working in the factory ‘cos our office was in, 
eh, sort of prefabricated buildings outside the factory gates, and ehm, worked 
there for about a year and a half I think I worked there didn’t I? And then family 
came along, and in those days you had to leave your job, and you didnae get it 
back [laughter]. So, changed days.
30
 
Joyce Brogan started work at the age of 15 and had various jobs in the drawing and planning 
offices. The clerical and secretarial apprenticeship programme had not got underway when she 
first started work at the plant in 1967, but her description of the training she received 
subsequently demonstrates the extent to which the position of the plant’s women workers was at 
that time entrenched in the apprenticeship scheme. 
When I arrived the first day, ehm, I was sent up to the print room and I wasn’t 
expecting that was gonnae be where I was gonnae be working. But it turned out I 
spent a year working in the print room, which involved printing drawings for the 
factory floor and, ehm, filing all the different, you know like draughtsman’s 
drawings and things, so I spent a year doing that ‘til I was 16. And then when I 
was 16 I got moved to the planning office which it was all a part of the same 
planning office, like the jig and tool, the print room, the estimating department, 
they were all under the same heading. So, I moved to the office when I was 16 as 
an office junior and then when I was 17 they opened up a training centre and we 
went twice a week and we were taught typing and shorthand, and we had a teacher 
called Mrs Bowman, that was for the girls and the apprentices had Mr Duncan, he 
was the training officer, and there was another man but I just can’t recall his name 
at the moment. And the boys all went to the apprentice training centre and the 
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girls went to the typing and shorthand class, and that’s where we were taught 
typing, touch typing and shorthand, and we all sat our exams.
31
 
The craft and technical apprenticeship programme had begun slightly earlier, in 1964, and, like 
the training offered to some of the plant’s first workers, suffered initially from a lack of suitable 
facilities. John Weir was among the first cohort of engineering apprentices, and describes the 
compound created for them in B Block. 
As I say the factory wasnae really ready for us at the time, because it was very 
basic inside this big compound. We had a couple ae old production machines 
right, Ward 7DS capstan lines right, which really were production machines, and 
they were actually still doing production in our compound while we were serving 
time. Eventually they got the work rerouted, but to start with they were still 
making bits inside oor compound.
32
  
The company was working closely with the new Bathgate College to design and run the 
apprenticeships. 
Again that wasn’t really ready for us by the time we started. Because the 
apprenticeships started and the college was just opening. It wasn’t really, ‘cos 
there were, I mean there were wires hanging out ae sockets and there were earthen 
floors hadnae been laid wi’ concrete and things, and machines hadnae been 
delivered.
33
 
While this does perhaps raise questions about the preparedness of the BMC and its attitude to its 
Bathgate branch plant, it also suggests the impact of the plant in terms of bringing new skills to 
the area and creating new training and employment opportunities for its young people. Weir is 
keen to emphasise the role played by the company in developing the college, donating 
equipment, tools, and even a Triumph Herald for the craft apprentices to learn on, and is also 
very complimentary about the apprentice instructor at the plant; an engineer with a background in 
shipbuilding, and ‘letters after his name that you widnae believe’.34 The size of the plant and the 
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range of engineering trades it employed meant that apprentices were able to gain experience of a 
variety of different skills. Alan Marr joined the company as an apprentice at the age of 16. His 
first impressions of the plant were marked by its size and ‘all the different types of things they 
were doing’, and he remembers thinking ‘this will be a good grounding for me. If I can learn 
good skills here I’ll no have a problem later on in life.’35 Graham Bennie similarly describes the 
plant as ‘one of the best places to get an apprenticeship’, as he was trained in all aspects of 
engineering work on equipment that was ‘second to none’.36 
Vince Moore started as a craft apprentice in 1979. He spent much of his time in a series of 
temporary cabins as the apprentice compound was still under construction in B Block, 
presumably by this time as part of a redevelopment or modernisation programme, but he too feels 
that he received an ‘excellent’ apprenticeship from instructors who were ‘so passionate about 
what they did’.37 Furthermore, Moore remembers his intake of apprentices including, for the first 
time, a number of female technical apprentices. Among them was Elaine Harvey, the daughter of 
the convenor of the JSSC, Jim Swan, who describes the reaction of one of the apprentice trainers 
to the first intake of female apprentices.  
My daughter followed me into the plant and so did my oldest son. My daughter 
was one of the first [female] engineering apprentices in British Leyland, in BMC, 
as far as we know, and her and her friend started at the same time. And eh, it was 
funny because one of the trainers said to me, eh, no long after she’d started, that 
he didn’t think that was a place for a woman to work, and I said well I disagree 
with you I think it’s time we recognised that if women could work in factories 
during the war then they can work in factories now, and I always remember him 
coming back to me after the first year and saying I’m gonnae apologise to you, 
she’s one of the best apprentices we’ve got, her and her colleague are very very 
good at what they do, and they’re very good at learning as well. And that was it, 
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she went through most of her apprenticeship there at the BMC, and it was a good 
apprenticeship she got.
38
 
Moore describes the shopfloor response to the female apprentices, and similarly suggests that 
their presence in the plant contributed to the beginning of a change in attitudes towards the 
company’s female workers by the late 1970s. 
I think they could, I certainly, you know they were just kindae learning like the 
rest of us, and I think there was a notion, they got some kindae, but you know, 
some kindae looks when they were walking to, we used to have to pick up our 
overalls, you know they would clean them and you had to walk through the 
factory to this cleaning area to pick them up, and undoubtedly they got some 
kindae looks, no doubt some noises from the staff. But I think we got quite 
protective of them, there was that notion of, we were, you know, together, and 
pretty soon it was fine, I thought it was quite interesting actually you know, it 
prevented me being part of that whole thing and I think it was, it was certainly 
kindae, the whole kinda equalities thing, it was an early introduction to it, quite 
healthy I think in the long term.
39
 
Furthermore, it is notable that Elaine Harvey’s own testimony is marked by her emphasis on the 
quality of her training rather than of her treatment by her colleagues. 
The apprenticeship at Leyland was absolutely second to none, in my opinion. 
Having spoken to people who have completed apprenticeships with other 
companies, I don’t think I’ve come across anyone tell me of a more 
comprehensive and thorough training programme than the one we experienced in 
our factory. When the plant closed, the Company made every effort to ensure that 
we could complete our apprenticeships. They found placements for us with 
various companies in and around central Scotland. I left Leyland in May 1985, 3 
months short of the requirement for a 4 year apprenticeship, and so was fortunate 
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to be offered a position with Terex Equipment Ltd. in Newhouse, and was able to 
complete my qualification as a jig and tool design engineer.
40
 
This also highlights the extent to which the plant, in spite of the semi-skilled nature of much of 
the assembly work it provided and the historiographical link between this aspect of ‘branch plant 
syndrome’ and the deskilling of the Scottish industrial workforce, was able to contribute to the 
longer-term development of engineering skills in the Bathgate area which would continue to 
benefit local workers even following its eventual closure in 1986. Moreover, while Harvey’s 
experience reflects wider changes in the role of women in the workplace, the quality of the 
apprenticeship she received and the apparent improvement in the apprenticeship programme 
since its slightly ramshackle beginnings in 1964 demonstrate the importance of BMC and then 
BL as an employer, and provide a further qualification of the branch plant analysis. The role of 
the company in terms of providing wider opportunities for Bathgate’s workers, and its shop 
stewards in particular, will be considered further in Chapter Four, but here it should be noted that 
as a state-controlled company often characterised as the ‘national champion’, it is likely that the 
British Leyland of the later 1970s had both a greater sense of its obligations to its workers and 
apprentices, and a greater appreciation of the potential benefits of effective recruitment and 
training, than the BMC had had as a private company. 
 
‘It wasn’t o’er the top dangerous’: health and safety at work
41
 
The evidence suggests, then, that the type of work carried out at Bathgate, the skills it required, 
and the training it necessitated, were largely in line with broader industry-wide trends, rather 
than a reflection of the factory’s status as a distant and under-resourced branch plant. 
Furthermore, and in spite of the limited ‘on the job’ training available to most of the factory’s 
workforce, there are indications of the extent to which the plant’s presence in West Lothian 
contributed to the development of new skills and the creation of new opportunities for the 
county’s young people in particular. In terms of health and safety, too, the oral history testimony 
of the plant’s former workers highlights the relative modernity of the plant, of the working 
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practices it employed, and of the working conditions which consequently prevailed. Lenny 
Walker, for example, grew up in Gartcosh in Lanarkshire and moved to Bathgate in 1964 to 
work as a semi-skilled driller in the gears section of the BMC. For him, lay-offs and short time 
working resulting from shortages of components represented ‘the only problem’ with this job, 
which was better paid than his previous position with the US-owned Burroughs Machines in 
Cumbernauld, and he felt that ‘compared with other places the working conditions were pretty 
good.’42 This is a view shared and expressed by many former Bathgate workers, including John 
Weir who describes the modern facilities available to the workforce. 
The facilities were very very good you know, we had a terrific canteen, eh, for the 
workers’ lunchtime, and there were cigarette machines and coffee machines 
throughout the factory, and there were lovely toilets all there and eh, the facilities 
were good you know. I don’t think they could complain, it was a new factory and 
it had all the latest mod cons at that time.
43
 
Harry Bradley moved to the BMC in 1972, and similarly describes the working conditions at the 
factory as ‘a hundred per cent better’ than those he had been used to in his previous job at 
Menzies’s steel foundry.44 Bradley’s comparison between the conditions at the BMC and those 
he had formerly experienced as an apprentice steel moulder is telling, and reflects a recurring 
theme in depictions of working conditions and especially health and safety in the plant; an area 
in which it seems clear that the factory was perceived to be a significant improvement on what 
had been common in the area previously.  
Some important details in this connection are outlined by Alex Moffat, who contrasts the 
working environment and the safety equipment provided by the company with the conditions he 
had experienced while working at a brickworks in Armadale.  
It was really good. Completely different from the brickworks and places like that. 
Unless you worked in a brickwork people don’t realise how it was. You were 
working under tremendous heat, you weren’t allowed to strip to the waist. You 
had to wear a blue vest but the heat in the kiln was horrific. You went into the 
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kilns in the morning with a navy blue vest and when you came out at night it was 
pure white just with the salt and sweat out your body. All you had was a wee billy 
can sitting outside the kiln with salt water because you had to drink plenty salt 
water for the heat. So the Leyland was a completely different situation. You were 
reasonably well attired, your footwear was fine, you werenae working in the heat, 
it was all air conditioned. And, I suppose for the people in the pits it was a 
completely different situation as well, not having to go down mines.
45
 
As Moffat indicates, conditions in the BMC also represented an apparent improvement on those 
which had been experienced by West Lothian’s coal and shale miners. The local MP Tam 
Dalyell describes in his memoirs the degree to which his ambivalence to the rundown of the 
local shale industry was shaped by his own formative experience of the conditions underground. 
Although in retrospect it was against the economic interest of Britain that the 
shale oil industry should be forced to close down, I confess I was not angry. As a 
teenager, I had been taken down the Whitequarries Pit and had to crawl through a 
long passage, which the miners were obliged to negotiate every working day. By 
its nature, shale is a very jagged mineral and serious cuts to the skin and knees 
could be debilitating in the long term – industrial injury was common.46 
Dalyell’s account in particular highlights the visibility of the hazards associated with manual 
work in the heavy industries. In their work on asbestosis and miners’ lung, Arthur McIvor and 
Ronald Johnston have identified the tension between the prevention of easily observable 
accidents and injuries, and concerns over ‘invisible’ occupational diseases, which has marked 
debates over health and safety issues and is consequently reflected in the historiography. General 
histories of coal mining, for example, have tended to include discussions of the obvious dangers 
of mining work, but very little reference to the impact of dust inhalation; to some extent a result 
of the relatively recent acknowledgment of the dangers of coal dust.
47
 However, it has been 
acknowledged even by the Health and Safety Executive, established by the 1974 Health and 
Safety at Work Act, that too much emphasis has been placed on workers’ safety at the expense 
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of workers’ health, and McIvor and Johnston note that the number of deaths caused by traumatic 
injury at work fell between 1945 and 1980, while rates of industrial disease remained stable.
48
 
This is important when contemplating the health and safety dimensions of a modern motor 
industry plant such as Bathgate, particularly as perceptions of motor industry work as clean and 
safe were conditioned by workers’ previous experiences of the more obvious dangers of 
brickworks, mines, and foundries, and the apparent absence of any comparable, visible risks. 
That is not to say, however, that working with high-speed machinery and heavy vehicles did not 
carry some risk of injury. John Hastings worked as a ‘slip man’ on the tractor assembly line, 
which meant that he would ‘slip in’ and take over from any worker who needed to leave the line 
in order to go to the toilet or have a cup of tea, for example. He had followed his father, who 
died young from silicosis, into Menzies’s steel works, before moving to the BMC in 1973, and 
his impression of his new job was that ‘coming fae a foundry I widnae say it was dangerous’.49 
However, although he describes the tractor line as ‘not o’er the top dangerous’, he goes on to 
mention a number of incidents which occurred on the line when tractors had not been fixed 
securely and subsequently fell off when they reached the end of the line. Similarly, Lenny 
Walker remembers his fellow gear grinders having accidents with the machinery they were 
using, the effects of which were often compounded by the management’s reluctance to let them 
wear protective gloves, which it was felt would restrict their dexterity.
50
  
Many of the issues which did exist at the plant were not, however, as visible as the more 
immediate risks presented by foundry or mining work, and in some cases did not become 
apparent for some time. Alan Marr began as a mechanical apprentice at the plant before working 
as a maintenance engineer, and describes his impression of the working conditions he 
experienced. 
The working conditions were, on the whole, very good. You werenae asked to do 
anything that was dangerous, although you mebbe crossed the line a couple of 
times. They could have had better facilities for noise I think, because I do suffer 
from tinnitus and I believe that’s where I got it. There was a bit of dust, carbon 
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and stuff like that, from cast iron and that was never deemed a problem, but you 
must have breathed tons of that stuff over your life.
51
 
A number of former workers have similarly described developing tinnitus and other hearing 
problems which they believe to have resulted from their time working at the plant. John Moore’s 
job as an inspector in the truck and tractor detail section involved listening to engines to detect 
‘noisy gears’ or any other potential problems; a job which could not be done effectively while 
wearing ear defenders.
52
 Ear defenders, safety goggles, and gloves were all available, but, as both 
Moore and Lenny Walker’s experiences demonstrate, they were not always practical, and the fact 
that in some cases they had to be requested specifically by individual workers meant that they 
were perhaps underutilised.
53
 Furthermore, during the plant’s initial build up, the lack of training 
facilities was, as John Cooper remembers, reflected in a lack of such equipment.  
Well as far as I was concerned, at the start they had, with the test beds, they 
didnae have right ear muffs, things like that, but it was all new so we didnae, you 
didnae expect people to have these things. ‘Cos I don’t know, when they were 
introduced to the working environment, I suppose it was the same everywhere. 
But as far as the working conditions were concerned, the toilets, facilities for 
washing, everything was first class. ‘Cos everything was new, it was spic new.54 
John Moore states that health and safety at the plant was ‘as good as could be expected at that 
point in time’, similarly reflecting both the challenges of developing a new factory site and the 
limited contemporary understandings of such issues. It should be emphasised, however, that 
working conditions varied widely across the plant and that workers’ experiences of safety issues 
depended very much on the type of work in which they were engaged.
55
  
The most serious concerns were in the heat treatment section, where components were heated in 
ovens in order to harden them up. As a welder in the maintenance department and a senior shop 
steward in what was then the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Blacksmiths, Shipbuilders 
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and Structural Workers, Kenny Paton had considerable experience of work in various 
departments across the factory. He describes the work he carried out in the heat treatment plant.  
There were certain areas in the plant where we had, as maintenance welders we 
had probably one of the worst roles we had to go into an environment that was 
very unhealthy. We had, basically the heat treatment plant had these, chrome, 
aluminium, stainless steel type pipes that heated up to heat the various engine 
components to get them to certain temperatures so as they would be hard, you 
know it was heat treatment so as they would become hard. And within these ovens 
as they were called, and the only way I can describe these ovens is if you’ve seen 
a cremation and when the body goes in to be cremated, that’s basically the same 
sort of size of it, the same sort of location that we used to put components. Well 
there was times when these stainless steel pipes had to be renewed or had, the 
welds in them had broke, so therefore we were actually put on a trolley, on a 
roller, and we used to have to lie flat, we had to lie and go in there and weld these 
chrome aluminium pipes that were really, and it was really, it was still like an 
oven when you were in there and the heat that was there, and then when you were 
welding them you were generating the heat.
56
  
In health and safety terms, however, it was not the heat itself that posed the greatest risk to the 
maintenance workers, but rather the safety measures taken to protect them, as Paton goes on to 
explain: 
One of the major issues that I found in the plant was that eh, when we were doing 
this at the time in the early, well mid ‘70s to late ‘70s, it was custom and practice 
that whenever you were going round to these furnaces and wherever we were 
getting sent to within the plant to do anything, you used to get one of the fire 
department to make sure, because we were using burning equipment and welding 
equipment, you always had a fireman with you. And they brought with them an 
asbestos blanket, for you to either lie on, so you werenae touching the bottom of 
it, or they would hold it over you, in case something went on fire, and that was 
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one of the major things that I felt when I was in the plant that I was instrumental 
in helping to stop them use asbestos in this sort of environment.
57
  
Asbestos was also common in the engine test area, and as a shop steward Paton was involved in 
a wider campaign against its use across the factory. However, in spite of seeking expert advice 
from an Edinburgh University scientist, their campaign encountered opposition from both the 
management, who were unable to take any action without the guidance of the Leyland group’s 
own analysts, and from within the shop stewards movement itself. Paton describes the views 
expressed by some shop stewards ahead of a meeting arranged with management to discuss the 
problem.  
One of the things that I always remember, there was 13 convenors there fae the 
various unions within the plant, and one of the things I found was very difficult 
was, prior to the management coming in to discuss this, there was convenors 
turning round and saying you’re talking a load of, I’ve worked with that for thirty 
forty years, never done me any harm, you know, I’m a pipe fitter, I’ve lagged 
pipes with asbestos and all the problems, and I’m fine. And little did they 
understand that one particle can come back thirty forty years later and can kill 
you. And you know, I’m looking back here and it’s thirty odd years ago that I 
used it, and you’re almost – it’s the sword of Damocles, you never know when 
one of these particles, you never know what’s gonnae happen to you.58 
Paton’s experience reflects a broader struggle over the use of asbestos, the dangers of which were 
discovered by a Factory Inspector as early as 1898, and over the recognition of asbestos-related 
disease.
59
 The word ‘asbestosis’ first appeared in British medical literature in 1927, and by the 
1940s it was known within the medical community, if not by the wider public, that exposure to 
the substance could cause lung cancer even in the absence of scarring on the lungs.
60
 In spite of 
this, its use in industry continued to grow, and its prevalence in shipbuilding in particular 
contributed to Clydebank – home to an asbestos cement company as well as John Brown’s 
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shipyard and the Singer sewing machine works – having one of the highest rates of asbestos-
related disease in Western Europe by the 1980s.
61
 A detailed discussion of attempts to limit or 
regulate the use of asbestos is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it should be noted that the 
historiography of what McIvor and Johnston call ‘the asbestos tragedy’ condemns both the 
industry and the government for their inaction on the issue, as well as the trade unions for their 
failure to protect workers from the threat posed by asbestos.
62
 McIvor and Johnston write that the 
emergence of pressure groups such as Clydeside Action on Asbestos was in part a response to the 
failure of the STUC which, even by the 1970s, was showing little interest in the issue. This, they 
argue, can be seen as a result of a high acceptance of risk among Scottish workers, particularly 
with regards to occupational health and illness rather than more visible safety concerns. 
Certainly, Kenny Paton’s testimony, and the attitudes he encountered among his fellow shop 
stewards, indicates the pervasiveness of the ‘machismo’ work culture which McIvor and Johnston 
argue had shaped the industrial workforces of Clydeside, socialising workers into accepting risk 
in their work and creating an environment in which to raise concerns over health and safety 
issues would be taken as a sign of weakness and ‘an affront to their masculinity’.63   
McIvor and Johnston discuss the asbestos disaster in the context of a longer British and Scottish 
tradition ‘in which workers’ health consistently ran a poor second to workers’ output.’64 While 
asbestos provided the worst example of an occupational health disaster, invisible issues such as 
fatigue, exhaustion, and ‘overstrain’ resulting from long working hours and the intensification of 
work also demonstrated the extent to which the health of workers was shaped by the demands of 
capital. Harry McKay’s oral history testimony suggests a lack of understanding of such issues at 
Bathgate, as well as their potential to result in death or serious illness.
65
 When McKay was 
promoted into senior management in production control he found he was having to work for up to 
80 or 90 hours a week, and he had to be on call in case of any problems which might arise during 
the night shift. His immediate boss was taken ill, apparently as a result of such pressures, and 
McKay describes the treatment of one of his workers who was suffering from similar problems. 
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You know how people, they say that today is a stressful world, well there were 
people under stress in those days and there were people went off ill. They called it 
more nerves in those days, almost like a nervous breakdown, unfortunately most 
of those people were either demoted, sacked, or moved, because of that, and 
replaced. No-one gave any indication of empathy, sympathy, or help, or retraining 
for people like that, which I thought was absolutely awful. I had one particular 
foreman that went down that route, and I told the trade union six months prior to 
that I wanted to demote him and change his job, but no deduction in salary, and 
the trade union wouldn’t allow me. That man died of a major heart attack six 
months later. I saw something that no-one else saw, I thought I was handling it the 
correct way I was protecting him, protecting him in remuneration and protecting 
him in stress, and that’s still living with me yet, about that poor – and he was a 
nice guy, a lovely guy, and I remember at the funeral looking at the trade union of 
ASTMS (Association of Scientific, Technical, and Managerial Staffs), looking at 
the faces across the cemetery where they were burying the poor guy, and I got eye 
contact from them and I almost called out to them, looks what’s happening here 
today, if you’d only listened to me. That’s the sadder side of the factory, the 
sadder side.
66
 
There are, however, some indications that by the late 1970s, the company’s attitude to health and 
safety was markedly more advanced than that of other employers in the area, and that 
understanding of even the less conspicuous health and safety risks posed by work at the plant was 
beginning to spread amongst the workforce. Kenny Paton had previously worked for a local 
haulage contractor, and his memories of his first day at the plant in 1975 show that, in spite of the 
continued use of asbestos in the heat treatment section, BL’s approach to health and safety was 
relatively progressive.  
Well the first day you go in on a day’s induction course when they tell you all 
about the plant and what they were doing, and health and safety aspects. And even 
then, it was quite, quite a large, I mean there was about six hours of telling you all 
the various aspects of health and safety, which was excellent because a lot of the 
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companies I’d worked with previously health and safety wasn’t an issue, it was – 
you were employed, but British Leyland, they had a structure and a set up there 
that they actually told you the problems and what you had to make sure you done, 
safety shoes and various areas and various things like that.
67
 
This reflects both the impact of the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act, introduced by Harold 
Wilson’s Labour government, and the role of BL as a large firm, state-owned and controlled from 
1975, with developed health and safety practices. Using evidence primarily from the nationalised 
coal industry, McIvor and Johnston have found that standards of occupational health and safety 
have tended to be higher in state-owned companies than in private enterprise, but it is important 
also to recognise the importance of union representation at Bathgate and across BL as a factor in 
the increased recognition of even invisible health concerns.
68
 The shop stewards at Bathgate 
were, for example, involved closely in negotiations with the company over the introduction of a 
health and safety policy following the 1974 Act; an indication, perhaps, of the limits to McIvor 
and Johnston’s ‘machismo’ thesis in the new industries. As convenor of the AEU at the plant, Jim 
Swan purchased a hundred copies of a manual entitled Health and Safety at Work which were 
distributed among shop stewards in the hopes of ‘demystifying’ health and safety issues and 
raising awareness of the dangers of asbestos and of the damage that could be done to workers’ 
hearing by noise levels in areas such as engine testing.
69
 Swan was also involved in negotiating a 
progressive policy on alcohol, the consumption of which in nearby pubs and hotels during lunch 
breaks was a recognised problem described by Swan as ‘the scourge of the factory’. Under the 
policy he promoted, which was unpopular with some workers who believed it to be ‘too soft’ on 
those struggling with alcoholism, those returning to the factory drunk as a result of drinking at 
lunch time would be sacked immediately, but anyone missing work or injuring themselves as a 
result of a known drink problem would instead be offered counselling.
70
 Laterally, in 1978, the 
company implemented its first health and safety policy, and the unions were able to appoint their 
first safety representatives. These representatives were offered training by the TUC and had 
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considerable influence on the shopfloor. In Jim Swan’s words, ‘the management were even more 
scared of the safety reps than they were of the shop stewards.’71 
 
Responses to motor industry work 
While many of the oral testimonies of the plant’s former workers are marked by depictions of its 
cleanliness and modernity, it is notable that, in an area with no history of mass assembly 
production, this could be negated to some degree by the tightly regulated nature of the work 
itself. This was especially the case for those working on the main truck and tractor assembly 
lines. Andy Hunter, for example, worked on the truck line in A Block, and his testimony implies 
that the way in which his work was controlled by the speed of the track was the only downside to 
the working conditions he experienced. 
A Block on the whole I would say was quite a clean block. Ehm, obviously you 
were, the conditions were that you were, you were managed by a moving track, 
eh, which several places in the plant were. But other than the moving track, the A 
Block was a great place to work, conditions were really good I would say.
72
 
Harry McKay worked in CKD before moving into production planning, and his description of 
the excellent facilities provided in the factory is similarly tempered by his experience of long 
working hours and tight discipline. 
The conditions were excellent. The factory was clean, the factory was tidy, the 
toilets were very very modern, washing facilities very very modern, you didn’t get 
that in foundries I can assure you. And eh, clocking in, clocking out, was entirely 
different. The only thing was you never got a break between half past seven and 
half past twelve, you never got a break. You could eat something and drink 
something, but move at the same time. That was the only thing I found unusual, 
‘til you got a properly agreed break, you know, and lots of people used to sit down 
and they were disciplined for sitting down in the early days, you weren’t allowed 
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to sit and have a cuppa tea during working hours, you had to wait for your proper 
break, and that was only one a day from half past twelve ‘til quarter past one.73 
It is notable in this context that former assembly line workers account for a disproportionately 
small number of those involved in the WEA Bathgate Once More project, which has provided 
much of the oral history testimony used in this dissertation. The over-representation of skilled 
workers and former apprentices among those who volunteered to be interviewed by the WEA, as 
well as those who contributed to the project in other ways such as providing personal 
memorabilia and photographs, signifies the extent to which they engaged with and were invested 
in their work. Conversely, the relative absence of semi-skilled assembly workers from the project  
suggests a degree of alienation engendered by the monotony of assembly line work, or at the 
very least a lack of job satisfaction. Beynon gives the following description of assembly work at 
Ford Dagenham. 
If you stand on the catwalk at the end of the plant you can look down over the 
whole assembly floor. Few people do, for to stand there and look at the endless, 
perpetual, tedium of it all is to be threatened by the overwhelming insanity of it. 
The sheer audacious madness of a system based upon men like those wishing their 
lives away.
74
 
He found in his interviews with these men that many used ‘mental blackouts’ as a ‘solution’ to 
this tedium, and were keen to move away from the assembly line and into more skilled, or at 
least more autonomous, work whenever possible.
75
 One man told him ‘I’d prefer to be on sub-
assembly really. You can make your own time there.’ Another described his relief at being able 
to move into a different job away from the track. 
It’s a relief when you get off the moving line. It’s such a tremendous relief. I can’t 
put it into words. When you’re on the line it’s on top of you all the time. You may 
feel ill, not one hundred per cent but that line will be one hundred per cent. Being 
on sub-assembly is like getting off the roundabout. Y’know...day in day 
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out...never stopping. I still have nightmares about it. I couldn’t go back on that 
line. Not for anything.
76
 
Goldthorpe and his colleagues found similar attitudes to the assembly line among the affluent 
workers of Luton. Of the 299 workers interviewed for the Affluent Worker studies, 56 were 
classed as highly skilled, 23 as ‘relatively skilled’, and 86 as semi-skilled. Job satisfaction was 
found to be highest amongst those who retained a degree of autonomy and variation within their 
work. As one relatively skilled worker said, ‘you have to use your mind more and it [the job] is 
more responsible. You feel as if you are somebody.’77 Moreover, when asked if they would 
rather be doing any other job on the shopfloor, the semi-skilled assembly line workers 
overwhelmingly desired to be taken off the track altogether, and given a supervisory or 
maintenance role, as ‘there’s more to it’, ‘you get the variety in jobs’, and ‘it’s a better grade of 
job’. In Marxist terms, these roles were attractive because they allowed the worker a greater 
capacity for creative labour.
78
 Such ideas are reflected in the testimony of a number of former 
Bathgate workers, although they are qualified by the relative variety, even of assembly line 
work, in a factory producing commercial vehicles in comparatively small volumes, rather than 
cars. Andy Hunter, for example, worked at a car dealership and then as a maintenance welder in 
a brickworks before moving in 1972 to what was by then the BLMC, and describes a typical day 
on the truck line in A Block. 
The truck you finished on the day before was sitting waiting on you the next 
morning, so you’d just go and get the parts from the bin or the trolly that was 
supplying your parts that you were fitting on the line, go and pick them up, pick 
your wee toolbox up, and I done some work externally on the cab and I done some 
work internally on the cab. Now you would work away, move from let’s say it 
was a Terrier at that point in time I was working on, you might come off and it’d 
be an FG you’d be going on to, so obviously you had different parts to pick up to 
go on to the FG, and then you could mebbe go on to a Boxer, different types of 
trucks. You never, it was very very rarely unless there was a big big order for 
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mebbe Terriers or Boxers or that kindae thing, they usually just staggered them so 
you werenae, it wasn’t totally repetitive work that you were doing.79 
Although Hunter enjoyed assembly work and considered A Block ‘a great place to work’, he 
nevertheless looked forward to moving off the track and into a more skilled trade. 
I enjoyed my time on the big track, eh, at its peak we were building 74 trucks a day, 
nine point something an hour kind of thing, and I really liked it but obviously I 
wanted, my main ambition was to get on to my trade when I went into the plant.
80
 
Harry Bradley was a semi-skilled machinist in the flywheel production department before 
moving to a new job in stores, which he ‘absolutely loved’. Although he did not work on a 
moving track, his description of the pressures associated with production work, and his resulting 
eagerness to move into another area, also echo the experience of the Ford workers recorded by 
Beynon.  
When you’re, when you’re on the machines you’ve got a tally tae do, and this, if 
you’re on the day shift you’ve got to work 528 minutes on the 8-hour shift to gie 
you the 110 per cent, but if you’re night shift it’s 660 minutes. In the stores you’ve 
nothing like that, so the pressure’s off you right away. So you’ve nothing like, 
you’ve no got to, when you get into your work at night go ‘oh what have I got on 
my wee machine’, get your tally done.81 
At the end of each shift, Bradley would fill in a worksheet declaring the number of parts he had 
machined that day and the number of minutes he had worked for, which would then be checked 
by both his foreman and ‘the office staff’. He goes on to describe the pressure which he felt to 
ensure he completed exactly the right amount of work during each shift. 
I think me myself, I think you tend to put pressure on yourself. I’m not saying 
pressure’s the right word, but you know you’ve got to do these minutes eh, and 
you always wanted to make sure you’d done exactly what you had tae do because 
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the old saying was, if you do a few minutes extra you don’t get paid for it but the 
Leyland gets the benefit, you know that sort of thing.
82
 
This indicates both what Beynon has described as a lack of ‘moral involvement’ in the firm, and 
the extent to which semi-skilled assembly workers responded to the monotony of their work by 
seeking to exercise a degree of control over the time and effort they expended.
83
 In their study of 
‘life on the line’ at Peugeot’s plant at Sochaux in France, Jean-Pierre Durand and Nicolas 
Hatzfeld have found that monotony would only set in once assembly workers had ‘mastered’ 
their work on the line, and that this would be reflected in two particular work behaviours: 
attempts, like Bradley’s, to economise on the effort required of the worker; and to find ‘self-
affirmation’ in the work itself.84 
In Durand and Haztfeld’s analysis, this was enabled by the very ‘vacuity’ of monotonous 
assembly work which encouraged what they describe as a ‘freeing of the mind’, and allowed 
workers to occupy themselves by talking to their neighbours and ‘having a laugh’.  
‘You shout,’ says one worker of 43 years of age, ‘you talk to pass the time. I can’t 
be on the line without talking. I joke with the lad and when... You have to be 
careful when you’re making jokes, it can be misunderstood, but it’s quite a laugh 
here, just the same.’85   
In this context, conversation and ‘having a laugh’ becomes one more element of the work itself, 
‘just like the repetitivity and fatigue, filling the interstices of time on the line, a reconstructed 
pleasure in company.’86 This is certainly reflected in the testimony of John Hastings, one of very 
few former Bathgate workers interviewed by the WEA who had worked on an assembly track for 
the duration of his time at the plant. It is worth noting, however, that as a ‘slip man’, who 
temporarily relieved workers on the tractor line, his work involved more variety than that of 
most assembly workers.  
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We had many a good laugh. And it’s because the job’s monotonous, you’ve got 
tae. To say you do it without thinking’s not true, it becomes natural for you to do 
it, so you sortae could chat while you were doing it.
87
 
Harry Bradley has similarly described his happiest memories of his time at the plant as ‘the 
companionship with a lot of the guys that I worked with, the camaraderie, aye the laughs we 
used to have.’88 The evidence suggests, however, that the way in which camaraderie and ‘having 
a laugh’ was experienced could vary, and was shaped by factors such as the character of an 
individual worker, or their gender. Joyce Brogan, for example, worked in offices within the main 
factory building, and remembers enjoying the ‘social part’ of work within the plant. When asked 
about her happiest memories of her time at the BMC, she gave the following response. 
Everybody was so friendly, and – I think the sortae social part of it as well was 
good, we had a good social thing, and I always remember when I was young, and 
this is just, I don’t know if this will go down well, obviously because we were 
young, ehm, they had the stationery department right, and to get to the stationery 
department you had to go down the stairs and you had to go on to the factory floor 
right, and walk by, and that day it was the day of the mini-skirts and everything, 
right, and so the men, on the production line used to have boards with numbers on 
it, so each time a girl went by they used to haud up a number out ae ten [laughter] 
and they used to roar. They were the kinda things, the laughing things you used to 
have.
89
 
Bradley’s description of the working environment in the fly wheel machining section similarly 
highlights what he perceived to be the friendly atmosphere in the plant, but also suggests the 
limits to this friendliness, and the extent to which some workers may have had a very different 
experience.  
I felt I liked the spirit of the workers round about me, you werenae – you werenae 
tied to the one wee bit all the time, you were moving and you were doing different 
things, which other - eh some machines you were fast at, others you werenae so 
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fast, so obviously you wanted to do the ones you were a wee bit quicker at 
because you got finished that wee bit early. But no I liked the, I liked the section 
spirit of all the other men, there were some guys you didnae get on with 
obviously, you cannae get on with everybody, you always had the fly guys, but eh 
I think Leyland on the whole it let you stand up for yourself, not to be a sorta lone 
individual because a lone individual was sorta just, they just made a fool of them 
sort of thing you know. But no I found it fine. I was an outgoing guy anyway, I 
liked to talk all the time so I got along with most of the guys.
90
 
It is likely that such ‘lone individuals’, and those who did not enjoy their work, are 
underrepresented in the WEA project. Durand and Hatzfeld have drawn attention to some of the 
problems which could result for such people in an industry in which assembly workers were 
generally organised in ‘teams’ or ‘gangs’ who would ‘shuffle operations about between 
themselves’ for convenience.91 Andy Hunter’s experience of working with his workmates on the 
truck line in Bathgate’s A Block was ‘like bees, working about the nest kindae thing’, but for 
Durand and Hatzfeld, it must be recognised that the monotony of assembly line work, and the 
camaraderie and conversation which it enabled, were only a feature of work for those with 
sufficient skill and experience to complete their work without difficulty. Those who struggled 
could experience a different range of emotions; frustration with themselves, as well as anger with 
the line, their supervisors, and their apparently more successful workmates.
92
  
Durand and Hatzfeld argue, however, that an acceptance of the work process and any satisfaction 
consequently found in assembly work could only result from what they term a ‘downgrading of 
one’s own aspirations’, and is therefore an indication of the alienation engendered by the 
assembly line amongst workers who must suppress a part of their own character in order to find 
their work acceptable.
93
 Turner, Clack and Roberts, in Labour Relations in the Motor Industry, 
describe the track as ‘the symbol of car plants’, and the idea of the mechanised assembly track 
imposing discipline and dictating the working patterns of an alienated workforce is central to 
many analyses of work and industrial relations in the motor industry. Turner et al. write that 
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‘moving tracks enforce their own supervision’, while Durand and Hatzfeld emphasise that the 
speed and repetitiveness of assembly line work could lead to both ‘physical fear’ of injury or 
fatigue, and ‘moral fear’: the worker might not be able to keep up with the speed of the line, or 
make mistakes which would cause defects and lead to the whole work team being penalised. 
This moral fear exerts pressure on the whole line, acting as a tool to ensure that each worker 
maintains vigilance in order to avoid mistakes, and creating tension particularly for those having 
any difficulty with their work.
94
 Moreover, the track is often characterised in the literature as a 
focus for tensions between workers and their employers, and a key consideration here is the 
extent to which ‘having a laugh’ at work on the line not only reflected boredom and alienation, 
but also represented a challenge to its control of the work process. The Ford workers interviewed 
by Beynon describe a variety of approaches which were taken in order to test the discipline 
imposed by the track, and to create space for autonomy and creativity. This could take the form 
of sabotage or rebellion, in terms of simply refusing to work at the speed dictated by the track.
95
 
In other cases, however, it could revolve around what Beynon terms ‘horseplay’. 
Ford class you more as machines than men. They’re on top of you all the time. 
They expect you to work every minute of the day. The atmosphere you get in here 
is so completely false. Everyone is downcast and fed up. You can’t even talk 
about football. You end up doing stupid things. Childish things – playing tricks on 
one another.
96
 
Beynon goes on to describe the example of ‘bombs’ made of adhesive and used to cause 
explosions in rubbish containers at Ford Halewood.
97
 It should be noted that there is no evidence 
in the oral history testimony of former Bathgate workers of any incidence of sabotage, although 
it is possible that this is either a result of the self-selecting nature of the WEA sample and the 
consequent disproportionate under-representation of assembly line workers, or of an 
unwillingness to discuss what could be perceived as a sensitive subject.
98
 The lunchtime drinking 
described by Jim Swan, which were also a serious problem at Linwood, could, however, be seen 
as a response to the discipline of motor industry work, and there are indications of the ways in 
                                                          
94
 Turner et al., Labour Relations, p.40; Durand and Hatzfeld, Life on the Line, pp.46-47. 
95
 Beynon, Working for Ford, p.137. 
96
 Beynon, Working for Ford, p.118. 
97
 Ibid, p.139. 
98
 Portelli, ‘What makes oral history different?’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History Reader, p.38. 
150 
 
which workers would organise themselves and their work in order to challenge the line and 
demonstrate their autonomy.
99
 A number of former workers have mentioned, for example, that it 
was well-known that men on the night shift would arrange a schedule to allow them each in turn 
to get some sleep, and that some would watch pornographic films while they worked; a practice 
which, according to former AEU convenor Chris Bett, was eventually stopped by management 
on the grounds that the workers were ‘stealing’ the company’s electricity to power their video 
player.
100
 This arguably reflects what has been termed the ‘remasculinization of the shop floor’ 
seen in the US motor industry, where the loss of the ‘respectable’ masculine culture associated 
with the craft tradition, and the elimination of brawn and strength from unskilled work, led to the 
emergence of new identities which shaped the behaviour of shop floor workers. In this context, 
the ‘boylike playfulness’ of drinking and ‘having a laugh’ represents a reconstruction of 
traditional masculinity in response to the automation of ‘unmanly’ production work and the 
increasing presence of women in the workplace, which could take on explicitly sexual 
connotations.
101
 This could be in the form of sexual boasting or ‘shared sexual activities’ or, as 
Joyce Brogan’s experience at Bathgate demonstrates, the harassment of female workers. As 
Stephen Meyer writes, ‘the remasculinization of the shop floor often resulted in the general 
degradation and dehumanization of all women.’ 102  Furthermore, assembly line production 
processes have been associated with industrial relations problems, and the idea that short strikes 
in particular represented a response to the discipline of the line is central to number of studies of 
motor industry work.
103
 The extent to which the evidence from Bathgate supports this analysis 
will be considered in Chapter Four. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the type of work offered by the BMC and British Leyland at 
Bathgate, while largely semi-skilled, was typical of work across the motor industry. Indeed, there 
is some evidence to suggest that, as a commercial vehicle plant, work at Bathgate was less 
automated and less monotonous than in car plants equipped for standardised mass production. 
The responses of former Bathgate workers to their experiences of motor industry work again 
largely reflect industry-wide trends, although it is important to note the underrepresentation of 
assembly line workers in the WEA’s sample. While bearing in mind both the limited nature of 
the training offered to such workers and the possible implications of their absence from the WEA 
project, it is nevertheless clear that the plant provided good opportunities for some of its workers, 
and particularly those school-leavers taken on as apprentices. The development of the 
apprenticeship programme, and the improvement in the health and safety of the work 
environment, suggest both the importance of BL as a large and eventually nationalised company, 
and the extent to which the culture of work which prevailed at the plant evolved over its lifetime. 
The remaining chapters will consider how far this was reflected in its industrial relations, an area 
which attracted considerable attention in its first five years especially, and in which the validity 
of the branch plant analysis seems most apparent. As will be shown in Chapter Four, Bathgate 
was again in line with broader trends in terms of union organisation and the nature of much of its 
strike action, and only in its strike causation and high rate of labour turnover does its experience 
seem exceptional. This will be explored further in Chapter Five, which will consider the extent to 
which the development of a typically ‘affluent’ motor industry workforce at Bathgate was 
undermined by local labour market conditions, and the factory’s position as a branch plant 
established in Scotland with considerable reluctance on the part of the BMC. 
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Chapter Four 
Union Representation and Shopfloor Organisation 
 
The industrial relations of motor manufacturing have been central to many declinist accounts of 
Britain’s economic and industrial development since the Second World War, reflecting 
contemporary concerns with the industry’s performance and the potentially damaging effects of 
strike action in a highly integrated and nationally important export sector. In his recent history of 
Britain in the 1970s, for example, Dominic Sandbrook writes that ‘the death of British car-
making was one of the great industrial tragedies of the century’, and describes labour relations at 
BL in particular as ‘ludicrously bad’, while studies of the industry itself such as Timothy 
Whisler’s The British Motor Industry, 1945-94: A Case Study in Industrial Decline have 
characterised its industrial relations as ‘particularly debilitating’ by international standards.1 The 
company, and the industry more widely, did see a marked deterioration in its industrial relations 
over this period: between 1945 and 1979, motor manufacturing became the UK’s third most 
strike-prone sector, accounting for five per cent of stoppages and 13 per cent of working days 
lost across British industry and losing up to ten times as many working days to strike action as its 
German counterpart.
2
 Moreover, the unofficial nature of much of this strike action attracted 
particular concern as it was perceived to represent a serious threat to the stability of a system of 
industrial relations built on voluntarist collective bargaining.
3
 While Britain’s strike record 
during the 1960s was unremarkable in comparison to other major industrial countries, fewer than 
a hundred of the 2,000 or so strikes which took place across industry between 1964 and 1966 had 
official trade union sanction.
4
 The concentration of unofficial stoppages in motor manufacturing, 
and the industry’s increasing importance to the wider British economy, attracted considerable 
media interest, which frequently focused on the alleged role of supposedly ‘militant’ shop 
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stewards in propagating unofficial strike action.
5
 As Tim Claydon writes in his study of media 
representations of motor industry workers, ‘if industrial relations were one of the defining 
images of British society, the motor industry was the lens through which this image was 
projected and, arguably, distorted.’6 
The link between industrial unrest and the industry’s poor productivity is, however, unclear. 
Major contemporary studies by Turner, Clack, and Roberts in 1967 and Durcan, McCarthy, and 
Redman in 1983 suggested that strike activity and working days lost peaked when demand fell, 
as management allowed stoppages to drag on in order to avoid redundancies, while the work of 
Jones and Prais found that the direct effect of strikes in terms of lost production was marginal.
7
 It 
is likely that the industry’s relatively high incidence of strike activity did damage the industry’s 
performance in other ways, for example by absorbing management time and deflecting attention 
from other problems, and figures which show that BL lost 250,000 vehicles to 700 disputes in 
1977 alone indicate the extent to which the situation at BL in particular deteriorated during the 
latter part of the 1970s.
8
 As discussed in Chapter Two, however, the historiography of the motor 
industry itself, while recognising the challenges posed by what Prais describes as ‘continuous 
disruption’, has also emphasised both the importance of considering other factors in the 
industry’s 1970s ‘malaise’, including, but by no means limited to, the problems arising from its 
structure and longer-term development, and the extent to which the nature of motor industry 
work influenced the character of its industrial relations.
9
 Such considerations are particularly 
important in the context of regional policy, as the industry’s concentration in the West Midlands 
and its continued reliance on a large network of independent component suppliers had significant 
ramifications for workers in its branch plants. Analyses of the impact of regional policy in 
Scotland have, for example, stressed the poor industrial relations which ‘dogged’ Linwood and, 
to a lesser extent, Bathgate, with some writers including Christopher Harvie and Ewen Cameron 
suggesting that this was a problem which arose from, or was at least closely linked to, the 
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weaknesses of regional policy and the plants’ location in areas with little tradition of light 
engineering, and no pre-existing supply network.
10
 
Chapter Three has suggested some limits to this branch plant analysis. The work carried out at 
Bathgate and the skills required of its workforce were largely in line with motor industry-wide 
trends, and there is evidence to suggest that the plant’s industrial relations were similarly 
unexceptional. This chapter therefore begins with a discussion of some of the structural features 
of industrial relations in the British motor industry, and an examination of how far Bathgate 
conformed to general trends in terms of union representation and its incidence of strike action. 
Highlighting the extent to which the importance of the motor industry shop steward grew out of 
the multi-unionism characteristic of British motor plants, it will then go on to discuss the nature 
of Bathgate’s Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee and its role in fostering a sense of the factory as a 
‘community’, helping to embed it in the social as well as the economic life of West Lothian. The 
chapter will conclude by considering the changing industrial climate of the late 1970s and the 
impact of BL’s restructuring on its industrial relations, introducing the idea of the shop stewards 
as community as well as workplace activists, and highlighting the limits to the power of 
organised labour in the context of industrial closure and widespread unemployment. The 
peculiarities of Bathgate’s industrial relations, and the extent to which the plant’s position as a 
branch plant can be said to have exacerbated the tensions implicit in assembly production, are 
considered separately, in the analysis of the Scottish ‘Affluent Worker’ that follows in Chapter 
Five.  
 
Structural features of industrial relations 
Christopher Harvie writes that in 1970, Bathgate and Linwood were both operating at ‘barely 50 
per cent capacity’, and is among those who have suggested that the production problems 
experienced at Linwood in particular resulted primarily from ‘bad industrial relations’ which can 
be understood in terms of the difficulties associated with ‘adapting a hitherto skilled workforce 
to the numbing discipline of the assembly line.’11 This returns to the idea, introduced in Chapter 
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Three, of a traditional Scottish industrial culture fundamentally different to that of the Midlands 
and South-East of England and unsuited to motor industry production, and rests on the 
assumption, highlighted by Jim Phillips, that the workers employed in Scotland’s motor plants 
had previously experienced more skilled or varied work in the docks, shipbuilding, and 
engineering.
12
 Yet Scottish exceptionalism may have been exaggerated. Turner, Clack, and 
Roberts have drawn attention to the tendency for car firms across Britain – not only in Scotland – 
to employ adult labour from a variety of other, possibly more skilled and certainly less 
automated occupations, and so it is likely that most motor assembly plants employed workers 
with no previous experience of ‘the limitations of mass assembly work,’ and that Linwood and 
Bathgate were unexceptional in this respect.
13
 Furthermore, it is important to reemphasise Turner 
et al.’s rejection of ‘green labour’ as a factor in strike-propensity in the regional policy plants 
especially, and to note their description of strike action at the ‘new car plants’ in the 
Development Areas as ‘small but fairly frequent’, and broadly in line with industry-wide norms 
in terms of their causation.
14
 Indeed, it is arguable that much of the unofficial strike action which 
occurred throughout the motor industry, and attracted government concern and employer 
condemnation during the 1960s and 1970s, can be interpreted as a further response by workers to 
the discipline of the assembly line. Jack Scamp was among contemporary commentators who 
suggested that the monotony of track assembly work was partly responsible for the high level of 
disruption in the motor industry as ‘short strikes broke the tedium of the day’, while Dave 
Lyddon contends that the frequent and often very short nature of strike action demonstrates the 
limits to either managerial or shop steward control over individual assembly line workers who 
realised the power that they had to stop production by withholding their labour even for a very 
short time.
15
 Lyddon emphasises just how short many unofficial strikes were. Exactly 100 of the 
297 stoppages which took place at Morris Motors in 1965, for example, lasted for 30 minutes or 
less, while 20 per cent of 104 strikes recorded at Rover Solihull in the same year could be 
accounted for by lunchtime meetings running over.
16
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Evidence from the oral history testimony suggests that much of the strike activity seen at 
Bathgate fitted into this template. Jim McCulloch worked at the plant from 1961 until 1968, 
when he left to take up a job at the Ravenscraig steelworks because ‘every week there was a 
stoppage of some kind,’ either due to lay-off or strike action.17 He describes the difference he 
noticed between industrial relations at Bathgate and at Ravenscraig.  
But at Ravenscraig, as I say that was a different – There were strong unions in 
there too but there weren’t so many strikes. There weren’t these spasmodic 
strikes. When they were striking at Ravenscraig they would strike for days on end, 
whereas in the BMC you would strike for a day, you would strike for half a day.
18
 
Indeed, the testimony of many former Bathgate workers and their memories of industrial 
relations at the plant are shaped not by large disputes, such as a nine week strike over the issue of 
pay parity which took place in 1972 and is discussed here in Chapter Five, but by apparently 
minor antagonisms between unions and what Andy Hunter describes as the ‘silly wee strikes 
here and there’ which could result.19 John Hastings, for example, has no memory of the parity 
strike in spite of starting at the factory in 1971, but does comment on the ‘stories’ he was told 
about sectional disputes which had apparently been a particular problem in the plant’s early 
years. 
Some of the stories, well, the stupidest one that I ever got told, was – a person was 
sent to B Block, because obviously - in the early days they had problems keeping 
everything going ‘cos of the distance, the supplies up fae England, so from time to 
time they didnae have such and such, so they couldnae, they couldnae run the 
build. So they used to get sent to different bits, and there was a guy sittin’ havin’ a 
cup ae tea one day, and somebody came by, he says what are you doin’? He says 
I’m having a tea, he says aye but you’re having a piece o’ bread wi’ it, he says 
that’s right, he says but you’re no’ entitled to that, you’re entitled to a biscuit – 
and yet in C Block if you sat doon you could have – how true that is I don’t know, 
but I got told that that is the standard that was right across the whole, it was like 
                                                          
17
Jim McCulloch, interview with the author, 2nd February 2012.  
18
 Ibid. 
19
 WEA, interview with Andy Hunter. 
157 
 
the A Block, B Block, and C Block, and it was like three different interpretations 
of what everybody was entitled to.
20
 
This reflects the tone of much contemporary newspaper reportage of industrial relations in the 
motor industry which frequently focused on the apparent trivialities underlying unofficial strike 
action. Indeed it is possible that Hastings’ story originated from a report in The Scotsman in June 
1962 describing a ‘tea-break strike’ at Bathgate which lasted for one hour and involved just 80 
workers.
21
  
Negative press coverage and ‘stories’ have apparently had some impact in terms of shaping the 
memories of some former Bathgate workers with regards to the plant’s industrial relations, 
reflecting the idea seen in the oral history literature that interviewees draw on public discourses 
in constructing their personal narratives.
22
 In 1972, for example, The Times reported on the 
introduction of a new range of trucks, and claimed that ‘it is a matter of growing concern [to 
British Leyland] that the backbone of this effort is Bathgate.’ As  mentioned in Chapter Two, this 
report described the factory as a ‘consistent loser’, and a ‘doubtful quantity’, whose future ‘must 
remain in doubt’ due to labour relations troubles which it claimed had ‘plagued’ the plant ever 
since it opened.
23
 Similar views have been expressed by some of the plant’s former workers, 
including Bill Raine, who had worked in the gears section at Longbridge prior to moving to 
Bathgate where he became a superintendent in the machine shop. His testimony is marked by 
anti-trade union rhetoric and strong criticism of the factory’s shop stewards, who he believed 
were disruptive and responsible for low levels of productivity at the plant. He describes a strike 
which he was involved in as a superintendent on the cab assembly line in E Block. 
It was the most stupid thing I’ve ever met. When you’re welding steel sheets 
there’s slightly oil on them to stop them going rusty, it creates smoke. I’ve seen 
more smoke in the pub in Bathgate, but they complained. So I found a firm that 
had got an extractor, you put it on the gun and it took the smoke up to the roof, 
and I managed to get one, and everybody was pleased to death with it... But I 
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couldn’t get any more for the time being because of their programme, and they 
asked for more, and I said as soon as I get them you’ll have ‘em. They wouldn’t 
wait, they just walked off out. Now I think they were out for a week. And when 
they came back, I’d managed to get some by then – a week after they came back 
I’m walking round and there’s this one lad who’d got it lying on the floor, he’d 
took it off. I said why isn’t that on the machine being used, I don’t like it he said. 
So I says you took the factory out for a week for something I’ve put in for you, 
and you’ve just thrown it out like that. So I brought the main shop stewards in, 
and I said that’s the attitude of your people. There’s nothing you can do about it is 
there, they’ve lost a week’s wages.24 
It should be noted, however, that in spite of his claim that ‘they had a hundred-odd strikes in that 
factory’, and in spite of working in the plant for over twenty years, this was the only instance of 
industrial action in which Raine was involved personally. Chris Bett was a senior shop steward 
in the AEU, and describes his frustration at much of the press coverage of what was often small-
scale strike action which he saw as resulting primarily from the fast-paced and highly integrated 
nature of work in the motor industry. 
One of the things I object to, and I object to it yet, and I’ve run into it one or two 
times wi’ people, one of the key problems was because of the very nature of the 
industry, it’s volatile, and when you’re talking about the peak of the place, 
between five and six thousand workers there, and it’s volatile in the sense that 
companies are pushing for production, changes taking place, and all sorts of issues 
arise, and you get a situation where guys say I’m standing back, you know. And 
you learn how to deal with a lot of these kinds of problems, and you could get 
people on strike, short strikes, that kindae thing, always headline news in the 
papers and that.
25
 
Moreover, Bett’s reference to the sheer scale of the factory and the number of workers it 
employed is important, and highlights the structural foundations of many of the characteristics of 
industrial relations in the motor industry, and the extent to which the system of industrial 
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relations which prevailed in British motor plants reflected the industry’s longer-term 
development in Britain as well as the nature of the work itself. 
Lyddon argues that the changing patterns of ownership in the British motor industry during the 
1950s and 1960s especially complicated the existing ‘British system’ of industrial relations based 
on piecework bargaining, particularly as factories themselves became ever larger as a 
consequence.
26
 The proportion of the motor industry workforce employed in factories of over 
5,000 workers grew from 27.5 per cent in 1951 to 51.3 per cent by 1972 and, as Lyddon writes, 
‘the greater range of activities carried on in the big factories increased the consequent scope for 
fragmented bargaining.’27 The variety of work carried out in these large plants was reflected in 
the range of trade unions representing their workers; the majority of the motor industry’s semi-
skilled workers were members of the TGWU, AEU, or National Union of Vehicle Builders 
(NUVB, which merged with the TGWU in 1972), but several skilled unions and staff 
associations were also present in most factories.
28
 This ‘multi-unionism’ had been a feature of 
the industry since the 1930s, when skilled craftsmen began to be replaced with machinery which 
could be operated by semi-skilled workers ineligible for membership of the craft unions and 
discouraged from joining the AEU or NUVB by those unions’ resentment of their ‘dilution’ of 
the skilled workforce.
29
 Multi-unionism placed great importance on shop steward organisation 
within the individual plant as stewards found themselves, rather than full time union officials, 
charged with handling many of the concerns affecting the everyday running of their plant such as 
discipline, the pace of work, introduction of new machinery and distribution of overtime; issues 
which were rarely covered by national agreements.
30
 Turner, Clack, and Roberts write that ‘even 
were a significant part of the efforts of the unions’ full-time officials not wasted in the 
duplication and other inefficiencies attending multiple unionism, there would be too few of them 
for the responsibilities thrust upon them’, and so for many workers it was the shop stewards’ 
organisation rather than the ‘union proper’ that represented the ‘real union’.31  This system, 
termed ‘parallel unionism’ by Turner et al., emerged as a key finding of the Donovan 
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Commission, or Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, which was 
set up by the Wilson government in 1965 in response to concerns about the level of unofficial 
strike action across industry and the perceived need for greater legal regulation of the trade 
unions.
32
 Donovan reported in 1968, emphasising the importance of the informal customs and 
practices which existed in many workplaces and contributed to high levels of unofficial and 
unconstitutional strike action, and was notable for its description of motor industry shop stewards 
as ‘generally more of a lubricant than an irritant’.33 This was a sharp contrast with the depictions 
of militant ‘wreckers’ or ‘extremists’ which featured prominently in newspaper reports of an 
industry apparently ‘not far from anarchy’.34 
The character of the Bathgate shop stewards’ movement and its relationship with the wider 
workforce will be considered in the latter sections of this chapter, but here it is important to note 
the extent to which the plant conformed to industry-wide trends in terms of multi-unionism, and 
of the nature of some of the strike action which resulted. John Cooper was a member of the AEU 
at the plant, before joining the Association of Scientific, Technical, and Managerial Staffs 
(ASTMS) when he was promoted to the role of foreman in engine rectification. He was not 
active in either union, and describes what he perceived to be the problem of multi-unionism in 
the plant. 
At Bathgate, B Block which was mainly machine shop, and ehm, the engine lines, 
were nearly all AEU members, but B Block, which was, sorry A Block, which 
was the truck assembly, was nearly all Transport and General Workers. So you 
had various – and then you had maintenance staff, you had the electricians’ union, 
you had different unions. I think this was the biggest bugbear in the plant, there 
were too many unions in it.
35
 
At the time of the Scamp inquiry, workers at Bathgate were represented by ten different trade 
unions; the majority, in line with industry wide trends, by the AEU, TGWU and NUVB, with 
some skilled workers in craft unions such as the Electrical Trades’ Union (ETU) and Plumbing 
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Trades’ Union (PTU). Table 4:1 shows their relative size within the plant, by the number of shop 
stewards representing each. 
 
Table 4:1 – Shop steward representation at BMC Bathgate, 1966 
 
Trade Union No. of shop stewards 
Amalgamated Engineering Union 70 
National Union of Vehicle Builders 33 
Transport and General Workers' Union 25 
Clerical and Supervisory Staff 11 
Draughtsmen 6 
Electrical Trades' Union 5 
Plumbing Trades' Union 2 
Boilermakers 1 
Woodworkers 1 
Sheet Metal Workers and Coppersmiths 1 
(Source: MRC, MSS.178/15, dossier of information submitted to inquiry.) 
Andy Hunter’s experience of moving from the truck assembly line into a more skilled job as a 
panel beater highlights the kind of difficulties that could arise from this multi-unionism, 
particularly in a plant in which the majority of labour was semi-skilled and therefore highly 
mobile.  
I started on the big track on A Block. I’d be on the big track for about maybe 6 
months. Then the EA van was transferred from Willenhall to Bathgate so a 
vacancy arose for a panel beater and [the] Block Manager at that point in time 
knew that I was a panel beater. He says ‘Andy, do you fancy going on to panel 
beating on the EA vans?’ which I did do… I went to the Tool Stores, got my tools 
wi’ a line off o’ [the Block Manager], and started repairing dents in vans but I 
hadnae transferred my union. I was still in the NUVB. So I’m knocking away at 
an EA van and the Convenor of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Union at that point in 
time came and tapped me on the shoulder. He says ‘haw, what dae ye think you’re 
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daein’. Of course I say, ‘well, I’m sortin’ the van.’ He said, ‘that’s a Sheet Metal 
Worker’s job.’ He was very nice about it. He says ‘put your tools doon, you’ll 
need to sign a form and join the Sheet Metal Workers’ Union’, which I did do and 
then that was me free to carry on repairing vehicles… There were a lot of 
demarcation lines within the plant.
36
 
These demarcation lines could prove restrictive, and represented the only downside to a job 
which Bruce Davies, a graduate engineer at the plant and a member of the Draughtsmen and 
Allied Technicians’ Association (DATA), otherwise enjoyed very much. 
The most irritating thing at the time was there were very very strict demarcation 
rules, and at five o’clock when the drawing office closed you had to stop, literally 
in the middle of whatever you were doing, if you, I just tried to finish off a 
document sort of five past five, and somebody would be in telling you come on, 
we either all work for an hour or we all stop. And I thought at the time that it 
wasn’t a good idea, and I think historically it wasn’t a good idea, because we 
could have done a lot of little extra things which wouldn’t have – anyway. So not 
withstanding that minor irritation I thoroughly enjoyed it. 
Furthermore, demarcation could lead to sectional disputes between unions, and especially 
between the craft unions and those representing semi-skilled workers. Alan Marr was a member 
of the AEU and, although never a shop steward and not particularly active in the union, 
remembers being involved in disputes with the ETU. 
We mebbe had a bit of a spat now and again with the Electricians. We tended to, 
we didn’t quite crossover but there were certain things that we’d do every day that 
we shouldn’t have been doing, and things that they did that they shouldnae have 
been doing. And if they were on strike, we’d be doing these things and they 
wouldnae be too happy about them, and probably the same the other way. But I 
think we got on alright.
37
 
                                                          
36
 Bryan, Bathgate Once More, p.40. 
37
 WEA, interview with Alan Marr. 
163 
 
Andy Hunter also refers to the Electricians, who he claims ‘thought themselves a better person 
than anybody else’, and who, at one point in the late 1970s, reportedly tried to break away from 
the JSSC in order to establish their own negotiating rights with management.
38
 Such problems 
were exacerbated by the company’s introduction of Measured Day Work (MDW) across the 
factory, which entailed the regrading of the workforce, and caused the following difficulties 
described by AEU shop steward Harry Bradley.  
See I’ll let you understand, everybody was sort of on the same level to start with 
for wages, and the management were fed up wi’ this one strike against that one 
strike, different sections for different reasons for more money, so they put the 
suggestion to the shop stewards that they should have a grading of workers within 
the factory. For instance, labourers, toilet cleaners maybe number 1, eh number 2 
grades would be labourers, just say labourers, number 3 was progress workers, 
number 4 was machine operators and suchlike, number 5 was the track, people 
who worked on the track, moving track because it didn’t stop, number 6 was the 
setters, number 7 was the tradesmen, so that was about 8 at least. But human 
nature being human nature, when shop stewards went in to decide this, they were 
all wanting the same, they were all wanting to be the higher grade. Now they 
couldae made it that everybody got a good grade, but no they put it all on to these 
different grades, I’m gonnae get paid mair than you sortae thing, which, in my 
view they couldae given everybody a good wage, but for whatever reason the 
shop stewards went for these gradings. So, it didnae work out as well as I thought 
it should have at that time.
39
 
Lyddon describes the grading of car workers as ‘fraught with difficulty’, particularly as car 
makers moved towards MDW, which meant that, for the first time, skilled non-production 
workers who had previously been on piecework were able to compare their wages with their 
hourly-paid, semi-skilled counterparts on the production lines.
40
 In many cases the differential 
between skilled and non-skilled work was found to be minimal, and at BL this led to a month-
long strike by most of the company’s toolmakers who sought bargaining rights for the newly-
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formed BL Toolroom Committee in 1977.
41
 Alan Marr was a skilled member of the AEU at 
Bathgate, and describes the impact of ‘across the board’ pay increases such as that resulting from 
the 1972 nine week strike on pay differentials at the plant. 
It never did the skilled guys a lot of favours because what they used to get, they 
went for what they called a cross the board increase, which was everybody got ten 
pounds say, which meant the differential between the skilled, semi-skilled and 
unskilled was gonnae decrease, if you see what I mean, and that was never 
addressed. So sometimes it seemed as though you’d be knocking your pan in for 
less, there wasnae that much of a point learning to be a skilled guy. So that’s, I 
never thought the unions did their job very well in that aspect.
42
 
Jack Scamp bemoaned the relentless ‘jacking up’ of earnings in car plants as a result of constant 
sectional disputes engendered by the complex pay structures that resulted from multi-unionism 
and the informal system of industrial relations.
43
 Indeed, Turner, Clack, and Roberts estimate that 
over a quarter of all officially recorded strikes in the motor industry between 1949 and 1969 
arose from disputes related directly to wages, and that this could in part be explained by 
anomalies in wage differentials.
44
 Chris Wrigley puts the proportion of strikes during the 1960s 
attributable to wage disputes at 55 per cent, and, notably, the regional policy plants were 
generally no different in this respect.
45
 Turner et al. write that the ‘bulk’ of strikes which took 
place at the new plants between 1961 and 1964 concerned wages, which draws attention to the 
exceptionality of the situation at Bathgate where just one of 117 unofficial stoppages between 
1961 and 1966 was directly related to pay, while 82 arose from working hours and conditions. 
This discrepancy is central to the analysis in Chapter Five.
46
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‘A rational group of people that one can take problems to’: the Joint 
Shop Stewards’ Committee
47
 
Bathgate was also notable for its unusually high levels of both absenteeism and labour turnover; 
related issues included by Turner et al. in their discussion of ‘withdrawals from the work 
situation’ which, they argue, constitute alternative expressions of industrial discontent.48 The 
1964 MoL report, for example, found that, even in 1964 when the plant was fully operational and 
employing 4,579 people, levels of both lateness and absenteeism remained ‘excessive’, while it 
was recognised by both MoL and BMC delegates to the Scamp inquiry in 1966 that the 
recruitment and retention of labour remained particular problems.
49
 Indeed, management 
representatives told the inquiry that one of the greatest challenges facing them in maintaining the 
smooth running of the plant was the unusually high level of labour turnover which, according to 
one union estimate, was as high as 16.75 per cent.
50
 Some possible explanations for this anomaly 
will be considered in Chapter Five, but here it is important to note its implications for industrial 
relations at Bathgate more broadly. Turner et al. find no evidence of any direct connection 
between rates of withdrawal from the work situation and strike-propensity, and suggest instead 
that absenteeism and labour turnover, as dispersed and often individual expressions of 
discontent, are more likely to occur where collective action is suppressed or otherwise 
problematic. They cite the case of an unnamed car firm which, during the 1961-1962 recession 
dismissed workers deemed to be ‘ringleaders’ in industrial disputes, and consequently saw 
absenteeism increase ‘significantly’, the amount of time lost due to accidents rise by 40 per cent, 
and the rate of labour turnover almost double.
51
 The evidence from the Scamp inquiry indicates a 
complex relationship between labour turnover in particular and the trade union movement at 
Bathgate, as it was felt that industrial relations difficulties had been exacerbated by the 
resignation of 46 shop stewards in 1965 alone.
52
 This was perceived to have contributed to 
problems in forming a stable system of industrial relations within the plant, summarised by the 
experience of one delegate from the NUVB who claimed that, ‘in the first twelve months I 
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visited this area on each occasion I discovered we had a new convenor.’53 It can perhaps be 
inferred, then, that the labour turnover and absenteeism seen at Bathgate both reflected and 
contributed to the initial weakness of its shop stewards’ movement. The idea that a high 
incidence of withdrawal from the work situation tended to reflect the relative difficulty of 
engaging in more collective forms of action does, however, require considerable qualification in 
light of the claim in a 1964 MoL briefing that the BMC had been ‘plagued by irresponsible 
stoppages’ at Bathgate, and that the factory had experienced 69 strikes in its first 28 months.54  
The Scamp inquiry resulted initially from concerns over the frequency of unofficial stoppages, 
and during an initial visit to the plant by a MoL representative in 1965, works manager H. Rudd 
bemoaned the ‘one out, all out’ attitude which reportedly prevailed at the plant and which he felt 
‘the Scottish worker is more prone to’ than his Midland counterpart.55 It is notable, then, that 
during the proceedings of the court of inquiry, both management and trade union representatives 
acknowledge a marked improvement in industrial relations, and that Rudd himself praised the 
plant’s shop stewards movement for their part in that improvement. 
I must say specifically and repeat, I think in the last 10, 12, 15 months the rational 
thinking of this group of people has been of great assistance to us as management 
in getting implemented common sense in this factory.
56
 
The inquiry was, of course, an open, public forum, and it is possible that Rudd deliberately 
tempered his remarks in comparison to those made in private conversation with the MoL 
employee. However, it is also likely that he distinguished between the rational organisation of 
the shop stewards and the irrationally solidaristic generality of the wider workforce. The role of 
the shop steward has been central to both contemporary media portrayals of industrial relations 
in the British motor industry since 1945 and to much of its historical literature, but it is important 
to reiterate the sharp contrast that exists between the depictions of militant ‘wreckers’ which 
characterised newspaper reports of the industry, and the perhaps more realistic picture described 
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in the historiography, and often drawing on the findings of the Donovan Commission.
57
 
Donovan’s conclusions went some way towards rehabilitating the motor industry shop steward, 
drawing on the work of Turner et al. and rejecting what they term the ‘agitator theory’ of strike 
causation, by which much of the strike action in the industry was propagated by stewards who 
were either political activists or ‘generally inflammatory’. 58  However, as Tim Claydon has 
shown in his discussion of the ‘Images of Disorder’ which frequently dominated reportage of the 
industry, the figure of the militant Communist or Trotskyist shop steward remained a popular 
media trope throughout the 1970s which arguably drove the ‘public obsession with car industry 
disputes’.59 Claydon contends that the media’s focus on the motor industry and on individual 
shop stewards such as Dick Etheridge, Communist convenor of shop stewards at Longbridge 
and, perhaps most notably, his successor Derek Robinson, lay behind the enduring but false 
belief that Britain was unusually and damagingly strike-prone, and prepared the ground for 
legislative attacks on the power of organised labour in the 1970s and 1980s, by which time 
Arthur Scargill had replaced ‘Red Robbo’ as the country’s most prominent left-wing 
‘bogeyman’.60 In January 1975, ITV’s Midlands News programme interviewed Etheridge on the 
occasion of his retirement, and he claimed that it had long been the deliberate intention of the 
media to create an image of him as a trouble maker. 
They [the media] depicted me as a trouble maker and a trouble rouser and a 
violent man, but this isn’t the truth I don’t think…I only reacted to the violence in 
the motor industry by the people who run it. Last year for instance there were 
1,200 meetings in this office, and these were held not on the basis of causing 
trouble, but of resolving it.
61
 
The idea, common in the media at the time, of Etheridge and BL chairman Donald Stokes as 
locked in ‘constant struggle’ was, he claims, ‘a million miles from the truth’. Indeed, Etheridge 
is at pains to point out that Stokes, frequently portrayed as his ‘arch enemy’, in fact gave a dinner 
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in his honour to mark his retirement.
62
 Claydon frames his discussion in terms of what he calls a 
‘meta-narrative of disorder’ which used specific events, notably a series of disputes at Ford’s 
Briggs Bodies plant in Dagenham in the 1950s where the Communist Party (CP) was reported to 
have significant influence on the shop stewards’ movement, in order to define a more general 
malaise in British industrial relations which in turn set the parameters in which debates over 
industry, the economy, and the state could take place.
63
 The idea of press reportage simply 
reflecting public opinion is, as Claydon states, too naïve an analysis, but the imagery which was 
used to depict figures such as Etheridge and which therefore shaped this meta-narrative does 
seem to have been pervasive, and there is evidence from the oral history testimony of former 
Bathgate workers of how far it influenced the views of workers even within the motor industry 
itself. 
This can be seen in the ‘stories’ of the trivialities apparently underpinning unofficial strike action 
discussed above, but is perhaps most evident in the testimony of Bill Raine, a foreman at 
Longbridge before moving to Bathgate in 1962. Raine’s views of the shop stewards at Bathgate 
are clearly informed by television coverage of their Longbridge counterparts, and he draws a 
parallel between the convenor of shop stewards at Bathgate in the 1960s who, Raine claims, 
would ‘march around saying he was the general, he ran Bathgate’, and Derek Robinson, who he 
remembers encountering in a Birmingham pub not long after he was sacked for resisting the 
reforms introduced by Michael Edwardes in 1979. It is worth pointing out, however, that the 
veracity of Raine’s story is called into question by his reference to the Daily Worker, which had 
changed its name to the Morning Star in 1966, and by his contention that ‘there isn’t a brick 
standing there now’ at Longbridge, a portion of which is still in operation, assembling small 
volumes of MG sports cars imported from China in semi-knocked down form.
64
 
A man called Red Robbo had took over, he used to march about, everybody out, 
everybody out. And one night I was sitting watching the television and there was 
a big union meeting in the Town Hall in Birmingham, and this Red Robbo was the 
chairman, and he said “I was sitting at home reading me Mail last night when the 
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phone went, and I said hello who’s that, and a voice said Musgrove. Never heard 
of ya. I’m the new boss.” He said “naaooo you can’t be, I’m the boss of the 
Austin.” I said to Joan...three months, that bloke’ll be out on his neck and he’ll 
never get another job in England. And he [Robinson] didn’t. He was out. And I 
was down, he got a job with the Daily Worker, that was this Communist 
newspaper, for about a month, and I went down to see one of Joan’s family, we 
went for a pint and sitting in the corner of the room on his own was Red Robbo, 
absolutely demoralised. Nobody was speaking to him and he never worked again. 
And he used to march about the Austin, he was the general, he decided what. 
There isn’t a brick standing there now and that was the biggest factory in Europe, 
where we lived.
65
 
Whether or not this account is factually accurate, it highlights the importance of what Alessandro 
Portelli describes as the ‘psychological truth’ of oral history testimonies. Portelli contends that 
there are no ‘false’ oral sources, and that apparent factual inaccuracies in oral testimonies such as 
Raine’s can reveal a great deal about the subject’s relationship with and understanding of their 
own personal history.
66
 Raine’s story seems a clear example of Portelli’s description of the value 
of oral testimony: ‘oral sources tell us not what people did, but what they wanted to do, what 
they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did.’ 67  Furthermore, it 
demonstrates the validity of Clayton’s meta-narrative as a tool for understanding contemporary 
debates over the economy and the role of industrial relations in its alleged decline, as Raine 
implies a link between Robinson and his political views, and the eventual closure and demolition 
of the main Longbridge works over two decades later.  
Similar views of ‘the general’, however, are also central to John Duncan’s memories of trade 
unionism during his time at Bathgate.  
Well perhaps I shouldna say that, but the union, to my way of thinking, were too 
powerful, and the least thing seemed to create a problem, and there was, I don’t 
know if they were ‘reds’ or no, but they seemed to sorta gather round the union 
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man, thought he was John the Baptist or something you know. I thought he was, I 
thought they were too strong, and perhaps management werenae strong enough, I 
don’t know.68 
Duncan was an ironmonger from Aberdeenshire who had moved to Bathgate to work as a buyer 
in the tool store, and was eventually promoted to chief store keeper and had around 35 men 
working for him. He was not an active union member but joined what he thinks was ‘the 
foremen’s union’ because ‘oh, everybody had to be a member,’ and describes his memories of 
strike action in the plant.
69
 
I don’t know that there were particular ones, but there were disputes where the, 
the various unions, not necessarily all at once, but in separate groups, had a 
problem and we had to join in and I just had to follow the leader, because I 
couldn’t afford to fall out with the union, and I just had to do what the union told 
me more or less.
70
 
Duncan’s testimony is valuable as he is one of the few former workers interviewed for the 
‘Bathgate Once More’ project who was not involved, or at least interested, in trade union activity 
at the plant. Former shop stewards were represented disproportionately in the project, perhaps 
because it was arranged by the Workers’ Educational Association in conjunction with labour-
movement groups including the STUC and the West Lothian Trade Union Council and with the 
prominent participation of former convenor of shop stewards Jim Swan, now a well-known local 
councillor. Their greater involvement in their work and the broader life of the plant may have 
been an additional factor, yet the testimony of the minority of former workers involved in the 
project who were not stewards suggests that the role of the JSSC and the work that they did at 
the plant was not always clear to those they represented. Bill Raine’s description of the 
Committee is typically unequivocal, and reflects the marked anti-trade union rhetoric which 
pervades his testimony. 
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There was seven or eight of them sat in a room in the training centre, doing sweet 
nothing but smoke and drink tea.
71
 
This draws on the idea, described by Huw Beynon in his study of work and industrial relations at 
Ford, that senior stewards acting as full-time negotiators, and often doing very little work as 
production workers, could be perceived as out of touch with their membership, and echoes a 
description given by one Ford worker of Dagenham’s ‘armchair generals’: ‘They’ve been 
convenors for so long they don’t know what the shop floor looks like.’ Beynon emphasises the 
complexities of a steward-member relationship often marked by this sense of division between 
production workers and the shop stewards’ committee, and by the committee’s autonomy from 
the shopfloor.
72
 Alan Marr’s testimony gives a similar sense of the Bathgate JSSC as a body 
somehow apart from the majority of the workforce. 
I don’t really know much about the Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee, I know that 
it was a big sort of club that they had and they would go and discuss things and 
formulate plans for doing this and doing that, and when the next strike was going 
to be happening. But I remember coming out on strike sometimes, and you’d be 
away working away somewhere, and “right that’s it, we’re going home”, and 
that’d be that, that was you on strike, and you didnae really know why you were 
going on strike.
73
 
In spite of this separation from the shopfloor, Beynon is keen to stress that Ford’s shop stewards 
saw themselves as ‘of the men’: ‘They weren’t phonies. They were the representatives of the lads 
– that was the basis of their position.’74 In her work on Linwood, Alison Gilmour has echoed 
Dave Lyddon’s emphasis on the essential ‘bottom up’ nature of shop steward organisation in the 
motor industry, writing that the unofficial strike action seen at the plant grew out of a shopfloor 
organisation which ‘responded to the immediate needs, grievances and day-to-day concerns of 
the workforce with low worker interest in branch affairs rather than a unionism driven by the 
objectives of a left wing labour organisation.’ 75  Chapter Five will consider the Bathgate 
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workforce’s relationship with and orientation to trade unionism in more detail, but there is 
evidence to suggest that the situation with regards to the position and perceived role of the 
plant’s shop stewards was broadly in line with this analysis. While some Bathgate workers 
apparently lacked awareness of the work of their shop stewards and sometimes of the reasons 
behind strike action, even those who have had misgivings about the character of the JSSC have 
expressed some appreciation of their achievements in securing wage increases and improved 
working conditions for the workers they represented. John Duncan, for example, felt that the 
shop stewards had too much power in the plant and was suspicious of ‘reds’, but concedes that 
the JSSC did win some benefits for the wider workforce.  
And really, it was, I would say it was a union orientated factory pretty much, and 
eh, they each had their own convenors and things like, and there was a, obviously 
there was a group that formed the factory trade union group as well, and eh, they 
did a lot of good work for the workforce, yeah.
76
 
Even Bill Raine, while bemoaning the ‘anarchy’ created across British industry by figures such 
as Arthur Scargill and Derek Robinson, concedes that the Bathgate shop stewards ‘did get better 
things, they did get benefits and that’ for their workers.77 
Furthermore, the testimony of former stewards themselves suggests that their work was largely 
in line with the Donovan analysis of shop stewards functioning as the mouthpiece of their 
workmates and occasionally having trouble ‘thrust upon them’, and echoes Dick Etheridge’s 
claim that the shop steward’s role was concerned not with causing trouble, but with resolving 
it.
78
 Tommy Morrison describes his experience as a TGWU shop steward in the cab trim section. 
What was the good thing about the shop steward was you werenae just tied to the 
one place all the time, you could move aboot a wee bit you know, and there were 
always people with complaints, different things. But one thing I will say, and 
whether you accept it or anybody else accepts it I don’t know, I’ve always classed 
myself as being fair. I felt that some people who played on it would go doon the 
road of saying well I’m going to get the union to you, or I’m kinda threatening the 
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sorta foreman or superintendent or that, I was always fair there and says excuse 
me a minute, on numerous occasions, you know you’ve not got a case here, 
you’ve not got a claim. They’ve not done anything wrong. I would try and explain 
that to them, and it did eventually quite a lot it got through to them. And they 
knew they werenae just going to use me for the sake of using me. Eventually the 
next thing, I was picked to be a vice convenor, I was vice convenor then, and I 
remained the vice convenor, and that was for many many years.
79
 
Kenny Paton started at the factory in 1975 and represented the Boilermakers on the JSSC, and 
also saw it as his job as a shop steward to solve any problems which emerged on the shopfloor 
before they could escalate or reach the level of management. 
One of the most important things I learned in there as a shop steward was shop 
stewards werenae instrumental in saying right, we’re no getting that, let’s go oot 
on strike. There was, I would say nine oot ae ten of the times that people 
approached me wi’ a complaint or a grievance then I would turn round and say 
now what is the problem, and I would try and sit and try and analyse what the 
problem was and say look you’re no’ going to do yersel’ any good wanting to go 
out on strike, you’ll need to be constructive, positive on how you’re gonnae apply 
yourself and what you’re gonnae do. And, as a shop steward and a trade unionist 
we prevented more trouble within the plant through members wanting tae walk 
oot and various things, and that’s a lot ae the times, you had a lot of people who 
were hot heads just wanting to fly oot the plant, wanting tae just walk oot, 
sometimes at the Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee meetings that’s what it’d be, 
we’re goin’ oot on strike, we’re goin’ oot on strike, but you’d tae sit doon and try 
and analyse the situation and say that’s not gonnae be positive for you or your 
members wi’ doin’ that. ‘Cos what a lot ae the time, various, mebbe one union 
would have a grievance with the plant and them walking oot would cause, the 
maintenance, if the maintenance werenae workin’ then the plant shut, 
basically…so therefore you had to sit with the Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee 
and try and iron out any problems tae stop strikes which basically I would say, I 
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think a lot of the times it was exaggerated that British Leyland were always on 
strike. I mean I was there I think it was 11 years and I think I was only on strike 
for I think it was about three weeks in total. It wasnae a matter of we go on strike 
every time we down tools, we’d a lot of short-time working when obviously the 
miners’ strike and things like that that affected every industry in the country. But 
the Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee meetings were very positive and constructive 
in stopping a lot of the trouble within the plant ‘cos we used to try and sort it out 
before it went to the management level, goin’ in and discussing it with 
management. Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee used to solve the problem before it 
got, escalated.
80
  
Paton states that he became a shop steward due to his ‘socialist background’ which had taught 
him the importance of the trade union movement in representing and educating working people. 
However, he also remembers there being ‘a lot of heated discussions and arguments – there was 
a lot of right wing/left wing elements in that Joint Shop Stewards’, and it is important to note in 
the context particularly of the media emphasis on shop stewards as extremist ‘wreckers’ that, in a 
further reflection of the situation at Linwood, there is very little suggestion in any of the oral 
history of strike action as politically motivated.
81
 The only example of any such situation is in 
the testimony of Chris Bett, who describes a strike in response to his sacking for campaigning on 
behalf of the CP during a general election. 
I remember, I got the sack. For, it was during the course of a general election. And 
eh, I got called in, and said ehm, you’re getting the sack. I says what for. Says, 
you were handing out political literature on company premises. I says that was on 
the car park. Company premises. I says but, I wasnae the only one. Labour party’s 
there, SNP’s there, the shop stewards – eh, you’re all commies, you see. Huh. So 
they were taking the opportunity. And, fortunately, as I said to you the clout I had, 
they, ma boys said well, the place’ll no go ‘til he’s back. So that was that. But I 
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can remember banner headlines in the Scottish national press, about reds and all 
this carry on. Pathetic.
82
 
This incident is not mentioned by any other former worker, suggesting that its wider significance 
was limited. No data appears to be available on either the number or causes of strikes at Bathgate 
after the 1966 Scamp inquiry, but the evidence from the oral history testimony and from BMC 
and BL corporate records suggests that for much of its lifecycle, and with the notable exception 
of the nine week parity strike, industrial relations at the plant were generally stable by motor 
industry standards. Throughout the 1960s, for example, board meetings of BMC Scotland and 
then Leyland Motors (Scotland) concentrated on the plant’s continuing supply problems while 
variously describing its labour relations as ‘reasonably healthy’, ‘reasonably stable’, and 
‘generally satisfactory’.83 A 1974 manufacturing review of the Leyland Bus and Truck division 
similarly identified Bathgate as one of its ‘well managed plants’ and absented it from discussions 
of the serious labour difficulties affecting Albion Motors in Glasgow, Scammell Trucks in 
Watford, and the company’s factory at Leyland in Lancashire in particular.84 It seems likely, 
then, that press descriptions of the plant as ‘plagued’ by strikes were largely a hangover from the 
stoppages which had occurred during its early years and had led to the Scamp inquiry, by which 
time the formation of a stable JSSC had already driven an improvement in its industrial relations. 
Moreover, those incidences of strike action described by former Bathgate workers imply that that 
action which did take place generally followed industry-wide trends and fitted into one of two 
categories: either short stoppages by small groups of workers, often without the endorsement of 
the shop stewards or trade union, and over apparently ‘trivial’ grievances; or larger-scale strikes 
which sought to secure wage increases and which, in the Bathgate context, were frequently 
framed in terms of achieving pay parity with the Midlands.   
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Community activists? The shop stewards’ movement and the 
politics of industrial closure 
This perhaps suggests an instrumental orientation to trade unionism at Bathgate, broadly in line 
with the Affluent Worker analysis of workers withholding their labour in order to assert their 
autonomy and demonstrate their power over the mechanised moving track, but viewing their 
membership of a union primarily as a means to an extrinsic end rather than an assertion of class 
identity. These are ideas which will be explored further in Chapter Five, but it should be noted 
that former shop stewards have emphasised the intrinsic benefits of their work, while the 
testimony of many former workers, including but not limited to shop stewards, emphasises the 
idea of the factory as a ‘community’, and the importance of the JSSC as community as well as 
labour activists. This can be seen in the committee’s work on issues such as health and safety and 
alcohol policy, introduced in Chapter Three, as well as in its role in the social life of the factory. 
Andy Hunter represented the NUVB on the JSSC and describes his first experience of strike 
action. 
Initially, my first dispute that I can remember would be in 1974, and it was for 
overalls basically, we were, it was the ’74 wage negotiations and obviously, well 
the unions all put in their different points for what they were wanting that kind of 
thing, and ours was basically for free, what is the correct now, PPP, free overalls 
basically, ‘cos you had to pay your own overalls, you had to launder your own 
overalls that kinda thing, and that was quite a big thing in the ’74, I mean it might 
sound very very trivial in this day, but I mean I’m sure at that point in time in ‘74 
we actually went on strike to get protective clothing.
85
 
As Hunter points out, this is the kind of strike action which could be characterised as ‘trivial’, 
but which was in fact very important in both improving health and safety conditions and raising 
real wages for the Bathgate workforce who, prior to 1974, had had to pay for their own overalls 
and safety shoes.
86
 It is notable that in his oral history testimony, Jim Swan, who was involved in 
the nine week strike of 1972 and convenor of shop stewards at the time of the plant’s closure, 
affords considerable priority to his discussion of health and safety and his role in negotiating 
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health and safety policy with the company management following the 1974 Health and Safety at 
Work Act. He highlights the help he received from the TUC who organised courses for 
Bathgate’s new health and safety representatives, and indeed the role of JSSC involvement in 
terms of providing education and valuable experience emerges as a theme from the testimony of 
several former shop stewards, including Andy Hunter. 
I was 24 when I went on the Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee, which was quite a 
big thing to go from basically working in small garages to basically sitting down 
along with the likes of Michael Edwardes and Donald Stokes and Pat Lowry these 
kind of guys, it was quite a, it was quite a big jump.
87
 
For Chris Bett, his experience as a shop steward was an important part of his political education 
and led to involvement in other forms of labour activism.  
I was a member of the AEU, which is now Unite, it’s now called, I was a member 
of the AEU, and I was always a representative on the Joint Shop Stewards’ 
Committee, that was about twelve senior shop stewards from all the various 
unions you know, Transport and General Workers, Plumbers, Electricians, and I 
was nearly always on that all through, right from near the beginning to the end, so 
in that sense I was involved in most things, ehm, right through the whole twenty 
five years, or most of it. It was a good education for me, and then it was the 
political thing and the outside trade union activities on the local engineering 
committee, that kindae thing you know. So it was, I don’t know how my wife put 
up with it you know [laughter].
88
 
An important aspect of this education was the opportunity provided by the JSSC to interact with 
colleagues across the BMC and BL organisations. Bett attended meetings of the BMCJSSC, and 
later its successor the British Leyland Trade Union Committee (BLTUC), along with Tommy 
Morrison, who describes their involvement. 
We were down in England quite a lot, as because we were one of the, well we 
were one of two, there was us here and Albion through in Glasgow, and to be in a 
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combine, and eh I felt quite strong about it, and Chris Bett also in the union also 
felt quite strong about it, that to be involved and no to be left out of things, we 
should go to meetings down in England, and listen – They were a combine there, 
where you had representatives from different kind of factories, and they met 
mostly, all the time in fact they met down in England. Leyland Lancs, 
Birmingham, Coventry, they kinda places.
89
  
The shop stewards also received formal training and education in industrial relations. Robert 
McAndrew was vice-convenor of the AEU during the 1960s, and remembers a series of lectures 
given at the factory by an academic from the University of Glasgow, which would later help him 
in his dealings with management. 
He came in, he came in on a couple of lectures. They were getting on, the 
company was trying to introduce Measured Day Work and job evaluation, you 
know, so, I learnt a lot about that as well. But eh, they used to think about that, 
what the hell do you know about job evaluation? And I says I’ve been taught by 
one of the finest professors in the country about job evaluation, and there was 
another one, a chap I can’t remember his first name. He was another professor as 
well, you know, so – You were taught by the best, you know.90 
Kenny Paton, who represented the plant’s 60 or so members of the National Union of General 
and Municipal Workers (GMB) on the JSSC during the 1970s attended trade union and health 
and safety courses organised by the STUC and designed to ‘help to educate you with regards to 
how to run, how to be as a shop steward and be positive and constructive.’91 Paton found that 
‘the trade union structure helped us a lot, and helped me, gave me an education more so than 
some of the schooling that I had.’92 
This stands in sharp contrast to the attitudes amongst workers at Ford’s regional policy plant at 
Halewood on Merseyside, where Huw Beynon found that ‘no steward mentioned the educative 
aspects of trade unionism.’ Beynon argues that this was due to the sheer amount of hard work 
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associated with being a motor industry shop steward, and ‘the day to day struggle with the 
foremen, the time study men, the superintendent, along the frontier of control.’93 This analysis 
implies that the nature of motor industry work, the alienation which could result from the 
monotony of the assembly line, and the concern with work primarily as a means to an extrinsic 
end, shaped the development of parallel unionism and contributed to the importance of the motor 
industry shop steward, while simultaneously placing limits on their role in what became a ‘much 
blunter’ form of trade unionism than that which prevailed in the heavy industries.94 For example, 
Beynon compares the Halewood shop stewards with their counterparts at a steelworks in South 
Wales, where he had previously found that stewards who ‘identified themselves with their work 
and their jobs’ also emphasised the economic, political, and technical education which they had 
derived from their trade union activity.
95
 The evidence from Bathgate, however, suggests that 
assembly line work did not necessarily breed a shop stewards’ movement concerned solely with 
‘looking after the interests of the men’, as the plant’s former shop stewards have highlighted the 
involvement of the JSSC in the broader social life of the factory, as well as the educative aspects 
of their trade union work. Kenny Paton is among those former workers who recall the JSSC’s 
participation in charity work within the plant, and in the wider community around Bathgate and 
Blackburn especially. He helped to organise a contribution scheme whereby every worker at the 
plant would donate five pence each week from their wages which would then be donated to 
various charities, and is particularly proud of a deal which the shop stewards made with the 
factory management to allow them to build trucks to be sent to charities overseas (in Paton’s 
testimony the trucks went to Uganda; in Elaine Harvey’s, to Cambodia).  
I think it was, it was something on Blue Peter about how, you know, they were 
talking about this, East African coast, and they were starving, and the people were 
badly needing all the help they could get, and us as a truck producer, we sat and 
we asked and we negotiated with the management in there to build a couple of 
trucks that we could send to Uganda, and the workers in there would give an hour 
of their time so as they were working for nothing for that hour, and this agreement 
was reached and we did send these trucks to Uganda which was a, a very positive 
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– because a lot of people forget the charitable organisation that the Joint Shop 
Stewards were instrumental in setting up, and it was the workers in the plant that 
put forward all the proposals at the various mass meetings.
96
  
Bathgate workers also raised money to purchase expensive equipment including foetal monitors 
and a coagulator for the local Bangour hospital by organising various sporting and social events. 
Before the construction of a purpose-built social club in Blackburn, these events centred initially 
around the factory canteen, at that time the largest hall in West Lothian, and helped to foster a 
sense of the plant as a ‘community’, which emerges from a number of oral testimonies. It is 
notable that Jim Swan’s ‘happiest memories’ of his time at the plant regard its social life, and in 
particular a lunchtime running club which he, as a keen marathon runner, helped to organise.
97
 
Sports clubs certainly played an important part in Bathgate’s social life, and Swan states that ‘it 
was said in that factory that it didnae matter what hobby you wanted to take part in, somebody 
would be able to start you off.’98 This included a weightlifting club, which put spare axles and 
flywheels to good use during its lunchtime training sessions.
99
 In their study of work at the large 
Peugeot factory at Sochaux in France, Jean-Pierre Durand and Nicolas Hatzfeld argue that the 
importance of the social life of the factory grew out of the monotony of assembly line work, 
writing that workers sought the ‘unity and complexity nowhere in evidence at work’ in their 
hobbies and social activities. They give the example of one Sochaux worker whose chairmanship 
of a Portuguese cultural association with 270 families as members allowed him to make use of 
his capacities for organisation, initiative, and public self-expression, and to demonstrate a ‘spirit 
of enterprise’ beyond what was required by his work.100 Moreover, the social events put on in the 
Bathgate canteen and later the social club, which included boxing and wrestling matches, variety 
nights, and folk music, provided a focus for the wider community, attracting some prestigious 
and well-known names to the town, and drawing audiences of over a thousand.
101
 The 
importance of the factory to the life of the area was further underlined by family events arranged 
by the JSSC. Tommy Morrison was instrumental in organising family days out, children’s trips 
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to the seaside, and sports days, which allowed workers and their families to socialise outwith 
working hours, while open days held within the factory itself allowed local children to see where 
their parents worked, and perhaps contributed to the sense of permanence lent to the plant by its 
scale and modernity.   
There is, perhaps, a conflict here between the idea of the shop stewards as community activists, 
and the extent to which the facilities available to the Bathgate workforce were provided by a 
typically paternalist employer seeking to control its workforce and constrain industrial militancy. 
Some strands of the historiography of work and labour in Scotland have stressed the role of 
company welfarism – providing ‘perks’ such as social and cultural space and activities, as well 
as tied company housing – in inducing loyalty to the firm amongst the workforce and 
undermining the position of the trade unions.
102
 There are, however, limits to this analysis, and 
certainly to its application in the case of Bathgate. McIvor has emphasised that only a minority 
of Scottish employers used welfarist strategies, even in the early years of the twentieth century, 
and evidence from the oral history suggests that the provision of facilities by the BMC and BL 
had little effect on trade union organisation at the plant.
103
 Indeed, the JSSC seems to have been 
heavily involved in promoting social activities, some of which – such as the weightlifting club 
discussed above – apparently developed informally and without company sanction or 
involvement. Furthermore, the idea of the factory at the centre of the community, and of its shop 
stewards as community activists, is demonstrated most clearly through the strength of the 
reaction to the announcement that it would close, and the subsequent trade union campaign 
against its closure. Chapter One discussed the concurrent campaign against the closure of the 
nearby Plessey works and the idea that the threat to both factories represented a much broader 
challenge to the future economic prospects of the area. Kenny Paton ‘fought tooth and nail’ 
against the closure, and joined pickets at Plessey as well as at Polkemmet pit in nearby Whitburn. 
He explains the JSSC’s involvement in the campaign at Plessey. 
We obviously, as trade unionists, you try to support your fellow trade union 
movements. We felt there was injustice being done in taking the jobs elsewhere 
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and just closing that plant so therefore it was, it was only right that anybody, trade 
unionists or not, wanted to make sure that there was gonnae be jobs for the people, 
a manufacturing base within West Lothian.
104
 
There is evidence of a certain hardening of industrial relations at the plant following the 
appointment of Michael Edwardes as Chairman of BL in 1977, and much of the shop steward 
testimony relating to this period, including the following extract from Paton’s testimony, is 
marked by anti-Edwardes and anti-Thatcher rhetoric, and draws on the idea that the policies of 
the Thatcher government represented a deliberate attack on state-owned industry not just in 
Bathgate or in Scotland, but throughout the UK.  
Obviously we felt strongly about the miners’ strike ‘cos, it wasnae just the miners, 
was only involved in it, every industry in the country was getting taken on by 
Thatcher, because they seen that as a positive way out of manufacturing. The steel 
industry, shipbuilding industry, a lot ae the industries were getting closed, and 
they were sacking thousands of people, and the mines were getting shut as well.
105
 
In this context, Edwardes and his plans for Bathgate and BL more widely forms part of a longer 
narrative, mentioned in Chapter Two and reflected in the testimony of a number of former 
workers, which includes the 1960s Beeching cuts to the railway network and Ian MacGregor’s 
management of the coal mining industry. It should be noted that the emphasis placed by some 
workers on Beeching, whose report, known officially as The Reshaping of British Railways, was 
published in 1963, is likely a result of the recent reopening of Bathgate’s direct rail link to 
Glasgow at a cost of £300 million, and with considerable press attention.
106
 In his study of the 
campaign to save Ravenscraig in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, David Stewart 
describes a similar tension between what he terms the ‘Scottish consensus’, emphasising 
Scotland’s history as an industrial, manufacturing economy, and the ‘uncaring’ and ‘anti-
Scottish’ Thatcher government. The Ravenscraig case attracted considerable media attention and 
was represented in the press as ‘the symbolic end of a whole industrial culture’, and it is 
certainly possible that this has had some influence on the ‘collective memory’ of Bathgate’s 
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former workers.
107
  Andy Hunter is among those whose testimony is shaped by this narrative, in 
which Edwardes himself functions, in Hunter’s terms, as ‘Thatcher’s puppet’. Hunter goes on: 
I think it was just a simple matter of fact that the Tories didnae want any 
nationalised industries so Michael Edwardes was basically put on board to, ehm –  
Donald Stokes was the chairman of British Leyland prior to Michael Edwardes, 
and I think mebbe Donald Stokes wasnae toeing the line as far as Maggie 
Thatcher was concerned and, eh, Donald Stokes was asked to move aside and let 
the little nippy sweetie Michael Edwardes come on board, which he did do and as 
we all know there’s no Bathgate, there’s no Leyland, there’s no Longbridge, 
there’s nowhere, and Michael Edwardes done a very very good job of sticking to 
the rules as far as Maggie Thatcher was concerned.
108
 
Some of the problems with this narrative – chiefly the fact that Edwardes was appointed two 
years before Thatcher was elected Prime Minister – have been discussed in Chapter Two. 
Furthermore, Edwardes’ plan for the future of BL was initially well received amongst the BL 
workforce nationally, and indeed, it was his attempt to organise opposition to Edwardes which 
led to Derek Robinson’s landmark dismissal from Longbridge in 1979.109 Robinson and his 
supporters in the AEU organised a strike for his reinstatement and assumed he would receive the 
full support of his union, but, in fear of losing their own jobs, the Longbridge workforce voted 
overwhelmingly against strike action.
110
 In his study of CP influence in British industry, John 
McIlroy describes Robinson’s dismissal and failure to win the support of his workers as a ‘dark 
narrative of defeat [that] tells us as much about the debilitation of workplace unionism,’ and 
coverage of the dispute on the local Midlands News highlighted the disharmony which it 
engendered, or perhaps exacerbated, amongst Longbridge workers.
111
 Robinson’s supporters 
were shown holding banners depicting him as Christ, nailed to the cross by Edwardes, while his 
opponents rallied around Ron Hill who had organised a previous ‘We Want to Work’ campaign 
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and gave anti-Robinson speeches in the factory grounds, stating ‘I shall keep coming here – as 
long as they keep finding me work I shall keep coming here’, and telling his supporters, ‘You 
keep coming and bloody working, alright?’112  
While the issue here was primarily Edwardes’ anti-unionism and his victimisation of the plant’s 
most prominent union representative, a CP member who he considered responsible for the loss of 
62,000 cars and 113,000 engines worth £200 million during a 30 month period in which he had 
kept Longbridge in ‘ferment and upheaval’, it is important to note that Robinson’s sacking took 
place in the context of the comprehensive restructuring of BL and the consequent decline in 
employment security in the West Midlands, as elsewhere.
113
 The failure of the Longbridge 
workforce to back Robinson and support calls for his reinstatement cannot, therefore, be taken 
simply as a sign of a broader failure of trade unionism, particularly as an estimated 5,000 trade 
unionists marched through the centre of Birmingham to hear Robinson and his supporters speak 
at a rally in the Town Hall.
114
 The plans put forward by Edwardes and opposed by Robinson, 
who described the way in which they were presented to the Longbridge workforce as ‘emotive’ 
and misleading, involved the closure of plants at Speke on Merseyside and Abingdon in 
Oxfordshire and led to a cut in the BL workforce of some 50,000 between 1977 and 1982.
115
 Roy 
Church writes that this was achievable precisely because Edwardes appealed to workers directly, 
explaining the company’s difficulties and asking them to accept the need for job losses and more 
stable industrial relations.
116
 That the BL workforce voted 87 per cent in favour of the Edwardes 
corporate plan demonstrates the effectiveness of his brinkmanship, also highlighted by Foreman-
Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay, who write that it was Edwardes’ use of the threat of closure and 
his bypassing of the company’s shop stewards which allowed him to restructure the company’s 
industrial relations and reassert ‘management’s right to manage’, indicating the limits to the 
power of organised labour in resisting redundancy and closure.
117
 Claydon cites a contemporary 
report in The Times which sums up the way in which the question was presented to the BL 
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workforce, asking of Robinson’s union, ‘will they opt to save one job – or 100,000?’118 Chris 
Bett’s memories of addressing the Bathgate workforce about the Edwardes plan suggests that the 
divisions between workforce and shop stewards which this caused at Longbridge were replicated 
throughout the company. 
The real problems came when they introduced, when they hired that Michael 
Edwardes. He was on the same line as Beeching with the railways and MacGregor 
with the pits, and I knew that’s what he was there for. He developed a corporate 
plan, and we searched for a while to find out what this corporate plan was, and eh, 
he put a series of documents and asked everybody to vote, whether they accepted 
his version of the development of Leyland or no. And eh, he won hands doon. 71 
[per cent] was the vote in favour of Michael Edwardes’ plan. That was right 
across Leyland. So after it was, the result came oot, the national shop stewards 
met to discuss it. And the conclusion was, that it was a scam, the intention was to 
close plants, curtail the operation, that’s what it was. So, delegated to go back and 
report back to your plant, the position of the national shop stewards to it that it 
should be opposed. I’ll never forget it. We organised, organised a meeting in the 
canteen, maybe about two and a half thousand of the workforce there that 
morning, argued the case that we should oppose Michael Edwardes. I nearly got 
thrown off the platform, because, I can understand the position of the lads, 
anyway “get off the platform, we voted, seven to one, to support the plan. What 
right have you got to come and change the plan”, you see. So that was the 
outcome of the Michael Edwardes plan.
119
 
At Bathgate, this was compounded by the sell-off of the tractor plant, which was announced in 
January 1982, and which, in Bett’s words, ‘split the whole place right doon the middle’.120 Andy 
Hunter describes his memories of a meeting held between the JSSC, the plant’s management, 
Edwardes, and Pat Lowry, BL’s personnel director, at which it was announced that the tractor 
plant would close.  
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Pat Lowry opened the meeting and was basically speaking regarding this that the 
next thing as far as Bathgate was concerned, and Michael Edwardes turned to his 
right, Pat Lowry was sitting on his right, and didn’t, didn’t even say a word but he 
turned to his right and Pat Lowry just acknowledged that he’d turned and he just 
shut up. And Michael Edwardes then went on in his wee South African brogue, if 
I can say I don’t like the man [laughter], but ehm, and I think it was a complete 
bombshell to everybody, I mean I don’t think the plant directors knew, maybe 
they did, maybe they didn’t, but to me it looked like a complete and utter 
bombshell to everybody sitting there who was representing Bathgate when he said 
that the tractors were being sold off to Marshall Fowler.
121
 
The news was slightly less of a bombshell for Jim Swan, who had discovered during his morning 
run to the factory that the Daily Express was carrying a headline announcing the closure, and 
remembers his reaction. 
I just went mental, that’s absolutely disgraceful, it’s shocking that you should treat 
people like that, and we went back in, and it was after that we decided that, rather 
than diving out on strike we needed to get the men’s, need to get their confidence 
back, because they’d been having such a hammering with the Michael Edwardes 
period.
122
 
Initially, the JSSC asked those working in dispatch not to allow any tractors or tractor 
components to leave the plant, and arranged a collection to pay their wages when the plant’s 
management declared them ‘off the clock’ and therefore refused to pay them.123 The factory then 
went into occupation, and was joined the following day by the workers at Plessey. However, 
support for the occupation was not universal, and, according to John Moore it caused a serious 
split in the trade union movement within the plant, as the workers affected in the tractor plant 
itself felt that it was up to them to decide on their future, and not the JSSC.
124
 In January 1982, 
the Financial Times reported that ‘virtually the entire 850 workforce involved in tractor 
production had volunteered for redundancy to take advantage of enhanced severance payments 
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of about £5,500’; a clear indication of the limits to JSSC influence across the factory in the 
context of industrial closure.
125
 Harry Bradley, an AEU shop steward, describes the impact of 
this decision, and it is notable that the tractor block shop steward who he mentions is the same 
man depicted by Bill Raine as the trouble-making ‘general’. 
The sad thing about C Block, that was the tractor block, was they voted to take 
their redundancy money, but it was only, now I think I’m right in saying, it was 
only the people in C Block that voted for what was to happen to C Block, the rest 
of the factory never got involved. I think I’m right in saying this, because I can 
remember the leader of C Block was a guy from Armadale, he was elderly looking 
for me at that time, he’d be in his 50s or something. Now they were getting 
offered five thousand pound I believe it was at that time, for voluntary 
redundancy, and he says that nobody was gonna tell him that he’s no taking his 
redundancy money. So that was, that was the first nail in the coffin, when C Block 
went.
126
 
This was not, however, the first instance of Bathgate workers voting in large numbers for 
redundancy, and two years previously in 1980, a delegate from West Lothian Trades’ Council 
had reported to the STUC that an accepted redundancy of 750 had had to be halted at the 
voluntary stage as more than 1,200 men had applied.
127
 This was taken as symptomatic of the 
lack of confidence in the future of the plant at Bathgate, and perhaps reflects its particularly 
vulnerable position as a branch plant, established relatively recently and remaining largely 
unassimilated into either the organisation or the wider motor industry.  
It is certainly an indication of wider concerns at the dearth of alternative work in an area which, 
by the time the closure of what remained of the factory was announced in 1984, had a reported 
rate of unemployment of 19.3 per cent.
128
 This emerges from the oral history testimony as an 
important motivating factor for those workers who chose to leave the plant before its closure. 
Alan Marr, for example, describes his decision to take redundancy not long after the sell-off of 
the tractor plant.   
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Numerous times they had said they were going to close the plant, but that 
particular time they started stripping stuff out and taking it away, and I just said, 
there’s gonna be another three thousand guys looking for work the same time as 
me, I’m off. I just went in one day and said I want to take voluntary redundancy, 
and I went home, and Jean wasn’t very happy about it right enough, but that’s just 
my decision and she accepted it, and I went straight out looking for something 
else the next day.
129
 
Andy Hunter’s experience was similar, and his testimony indicates both how much he had 
enjoyed and valued his work at the plant, and the extent to which the prospect of unemployment 
had to override any other concerns.   
Although I loved my job, I loved where I was, I loved where I worked, absolutely 
loved it, eh I decided let’s mebbe get out and try to get ma business up and 
running before somebody else decides to do it. But ehm, it was a big heart-wrench 
to leave to be quite honest with you, a big big heart-wrench.
130
 
In their study of the politics of closure, David Judge and Tony Dickson discuss the difficulties 
facing organised labour in resisting plant closures: ‘‘Fighting closure’ essentially means entering 
the ring after the bell has gone – after management has already decided upon closure.’131 In this 
context, they argue, capital defines the grounds on which labour can ‘do battle’, and its response 
is therefore necessarily limited to action which is essentially reactive and defensive. Attempts to 
formulate alternative plans and build trade union campaigns are reduced in this analysis to mere 
‘tokens of resistance’ and, while this does seem to underplay the courage, determination, and 
hard work of those at both BL and Plessey who occupied their factories and, in the case of 
Plessey, had some success in terms of keeping it open, it indicates the extent to which the 
effectiveness of such labour and indeed community solidarity is constrained by ‘the expansive 
and increasingly international orientation of capital’; an issue which goes far beyond the 
individual work community and cannot be confronted effectively through traditional modes of 
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collective organisation.
132
 In the context of BL, this coincided with what Claydon describes as 
‘the onset of a new phase of ‘macho management’ in British industry under the recently elected 
Thatcher government’, embodied by Michael Edwardes and his determination to overhaul the 
company’s working practices and industrial relations.133 The extent to which this undermined the 
security of BL’s workforce nationally contributed to the divisions which appeared throughout the 
company and which, at Bathgate, were exacerbated by the closure of the tractor plant. The 
pragmatic decision taken by men such as Andy Hunter and Alan Marr to leave the plant before 
its closure therefore demonstrates neither the weakness of Bathgate’s shop stewards’ movement 
nor the instrumentalism of its workers, but rather the extent to which the threat of closure and 
subsequent unemployment undermined the position of the motor industry’s workforce, 
particularly in Scotland, where a quarter of all manufacturing jobs were lost over the five years 
to 1984.
134
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has built on the analysis of Chapter Three, demonstrating the extent to which 
industrial relations at Bathgate were shaped by the same structural features of motor industry 
work which had informed the development of the system of industrial relations characteristic of 
British motor manufacturing. The multi-unionism typical of the industry was reflected in the 
presence of ten separate trade unions, although the majority of workers, in line with industry-
wide trends, were members of the semi-skilled TGWU, NUVB and AEU. While the nature of the 
WEA oral history project has meant that shop stewards have been disproportionately over-
represented in the testimony used in this chapter, it seems clear from evidence given to the 
Scamp inquiry, and from the company’s own internal papers, that the plant’s Joint Shop 
Stewards’ Committee was generally regarded as rational and responsible, and concerned more 
with resolving strike action than with propagating it. Most of the strike action which did occur at 
the plant seems to have been very short, and it is only in its causation that it differs from wider 
motor industry trends. Furthermore, the shop stewards played an important role as community 
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activists, helping to embed the factory in the social as well as economic life of West Lothian, and 
using the opportunities afforded by their trade union activities to improve the health and safety of 
the workplace, and to represent the interests of their workers at national level. While the reaction 
to the Edwardes plan, and to the sell-off of the tractor plant, arguably demonstrates the 
limitations of organised labour in confronting industrial closure, it does not necessarily signify 
the weakness of workplace unionism, but rather the nature of the challenge posed by the 
restructuring of BL and the loss of jobs that this would inevitably entail. This is particularly the 
case given both Bathgate’s position as a branch plant and the West Lothian area’s high levels of 
unemployment; a feature of the local economy which goes some way to explaining the 
peculiarities of the plant’s industrial relations in terms of strike causation and its exceptionally 
high level of labour turnover. These are issues which will be central to the analysis of Chapter 
Five. 
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Chapter Five 
The affluent motor worker in Scotland 
 
Chapters Three and Four have shown that, in terms of skill, training, and industrial relations, 
working life at Bathgate was, for much of the plant’s existence, largely in line with motor 
industry-wide trends. The shop stewards were generally regarded by their employer as rational 
and reasonable, and many of the strikes which did occur were very short. Only in terms of its 
strike causation and the high rate of withdrawal from the work situation recorded in its first five 
years does its experience seem exceptional. This is perhaps surprising, given Linwood’s 
reputation for militancy and the emphasis placed by branch plant analyses on the poor labour 
relations of Scotland’s motor plants resulting from the difficulties associated with adapting 
previously skilled workers to assembly line production.
1
 It should be noted, however, that in 
most cases such analyses focus overwhelmingly on Linwood, while any comment on the 
situation at Bathgate, often referred to erroneously as a car plant, tends to be based on either 
contemporary newspaper reportage, or an assumption that its work culture and industrial 
relations mirrored those seen at its better-known near-neighbour.
2
 Previous chapters have noted 
some limitations to such theses, arguing that to characterise Bathgate solely as a de-skilled 
branch plant, offering only low status work to a demoralised workforce, is unfair and inaccurate. 
Furthermore, these analyses carry the implication that the failure of Bathgate and the wider 
regional policy project was inevitable, and obfuscate the economic and social benefits that the 
plant provided for the West Lothian area. That is not to say, however, that the plant’s location 
did not cause difficulties in terms of production and labour relations. Productivity was initially 
low in comparison to the Midlands, and it is in the peculiarities of Bathgate’s industrial relations 
that the validity of the branch plant analysis seems most apparent, as its position as a ‘cathedral 
in the desert’ both exacerbated the tensions implicit in mechanised assembly work, and hindered 
the development of the ‘affluent’ workforce supposedly characteristic of the motor industry. 
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As discussed in Chapter Two, the plant’s location in Bathgate and its continued reliance on 
components sourced overwhelmingly from the Midlands led to failures in the supply chain which 
frequently resulted in workers being laid off or put on to short-time. Material shortage was, 
however, a problem endemic in the industry and so the degree of discontent caused by this issue 
at Bathgate and expressed in the high proportion of strikes related to ‘working hours and 
conditions’ suggests that the instability of work at the plant was exacerbated by other factors. A 
key consideration here is the local labour market. BMC’s development at Bathgate was directed 
to West Lothian primarily because, at 4.8 per cent, its rate of unemployment was among the 
highest of the areas under consideration and expected to rise further with the anticipated closure 
of five local shale mines and the loss of 3,000 jobs.
3
 This was to have significant implications for 
the terms on which labour was engaged, particularly as policy makers in Scotland acknowledged 
that its labour availability and consequently low production costs could be used to attract 
investment in the new industries. In 1963, the General Council of the STUC criticised a speech 
given by the Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Noble, during a recent visit to the United 
States, which had informed American businessmen that labour costs in Scotland were lower than 
the UK average and approximately only 50 per cent of those in America. According to one 
delegate, ‘this speech had not been selling Scotland; rather, it had amounted to a selling of the 
Scottish worker.’ 4  Conversely, the Scottish Engineering Employers’ Association (SEEA) 
expressed concerns about the potential for companies investing in Scotland to drive up wages 
across industry. In a circular sent to the members of the SEEA in 1952, its director Sir Ernest 
Field wrote that investor firms ‘are required to observe the wages and conditions of the district in 
which their works are situated’, and that any ‘efforts by their workers to obtain any more 
favourable conditions applicable elsewhere should be resisted.’5 
Chapter Three suggested the paradoxical situation of the affluent motor worker in Scotland, as 
the contemporary emphasis placed on attracting motor industry development failed to take 
account of the monotonous and overwhelmingly semi-skilled nature of motor industry work, and 
both led to contemporary concerns about the ‘right kind of work’, and shaped subsequent 
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historical analyses which have stressed the role of branch plant employment in the deskilling of 
the Scottish industrial workforce. This chapter will explore a further dimension to this paradox: 
the perceived importance of comparatively low labour costs as a factor which could be used to 
attract investment into Scotland, and the SEEA’s apparent determination to resist the 
introduction of any more favourable conditions, meant that the high wages paid by many motor 
industry employers, seen as the ‘pay-off’ for the monotony of assembly line work and the basis 
for the perception that the industry had driven the prosperity of the West Midlands, were not 
replicated at Bathgate. The conflict between a workforce expecting work in the new industries to 
be stable and relatively well-paid, and an employer for whom the chief attraction of the 
Development Areas was the availability of cheap labour, arguably explains the degree of 
discontent which resulted from the frequency of lay-offs and short-time, and which, in the 
plant’s first five years, was expressed both in strike action and in its exceptionally high level of 
labour turnover. The chapter continues with a discussion of the extent to which industrial 
relations and the culture of work prevailing at the plant were shaped by its position on the 
periphery of the industry, and by the BMC’s attitude to its enforced move to the Development 
Areas. The temper of industrial relations will be gauged by exploring the question of orientations 
to work at Bathgate. The Goldthorpe Affluent Worker analysis is utilised, establishing the extent 
to which Bathgate workers viewed their employment as an extrinsic means to an end. The 
prioritisation of money wages helps to clarify the nature of grievances at the plant. The final 
section of the chapter explores the issue of pay parity, suggesting that its importance during the 
1970s represented a shift in the plant’s industrial relations and the priorities of its workforce 
which brought it more in line with industry-wide trends in terms of strike causation. 
‘Are we to understand that we are country cousins?’
6
 Supply 
problems, instability, and shopfloor discontent 
The 1966 Inquiry of the MIJLC, or Scamp Inquiry, provides the most comprehensive record of 
strike activity at BMC Bathgate. The inquiry was established in response to concerns over the 
level of productivity 
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 at the plant, where output per worker stood at 60 per cent of the Midland level, and management 
held concerns about the attitude of the workforce and the level of unofficial strike action. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, its most notable finding was that, of the 117 unofficial strikes which 
had taken place between the plant’s establishment in 1961 and the inquiry in 1966, only one was 
related to pay, while 82 had arisen from concerns over working hours and conditions. This is in 
sharp contrast to the 55 per cent of all major strikes which took place during the 1960s 
attributable to wage disputes, particularly as Turner et al. stress that the ‘bulk’ of strikes in the 
new, regional policy plants similarly concerned wage demands.
7
 Furthermore, the majority of 
strikes over Bathgate’s working hours and conditions related primarily to the issues of lay-offs 
and short-time working; problems which were a common, structural feature of motor industry 
work resulting from the long-term growth of motor manufacturing in Britain and its reliance on a 
large and independent component sector, and which the BMC’s representatives at the Scamp 
inquiry were keen to stress were no worse at Bathgate than elsewhere in the organisation.
8
 The 
degree of discontent expressed by strike action, however, suggests that the way in which material 
shortages and the ensuing irregularity of work were experienced at Bathgate was qualitatively 
different. In this respect, the idea of Bathgate as an isolated branch plant seems central. For 
example, the oral history testimony of a number of the plant’s former workers is shaped by the 
idea that production could be problematised by its location over three hundred miles from the 
industry’s core in the Midlands. Jim McCulloch, a driver who was the first worker to be taken on 
at the plant, left his job in 1968 and claims that during his seven years at Bathgate he never 
received a full week’s pay. He blames this on poor management, as the factory only kept one 
day’s worth of supplies in hand. 
It was a very haphazard way of working, you wasn’t guaranteed any work. It only 
took a heavy snowfall to interrupt, if the lorries didn’t get through with the 
supplies that day it meant you weren’t working the next day, and that caused a lot 
of tension.
9
 
As McCulloch’s testimony implies, these problems were particularly acute in winter, and in 
1964, BMC management estimated that as many as fifty vehicles transporting parts to the plant 
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could be held up in transit because of adverse weather conditions every day.
10
 John Moore, a 
former inspector in the truck and tractor detail section and senior AEU shop steward, recalls the 
‘real, real problems’ caused by workers being laid off ‘willy-nilly’ as a result of supply 
shortages, which he similarly remembers being a particular problem in winter when, in the days 
before the construction of the M6 motorway, the northern sections of which were not completed 
until the early 1970s, trucks carrying components from factories in the Midlands struggled to 
cross the notorious Shap Summit in Cumbria.
11
  
The problem of crossing the Shap appears in the testimony of a number of former workers, 
including the former AEU vice-convenor Robert McAndrew, who tells the story of an incident 
which occurred during the famously harsh winter of 1963 when a truck carrying engine parts, 
one of the few to reach the factory at all, arrived four days late only to be sent back to the 
Midlands as the parts had begun to rust during the protracted journey.
12
 It is notable that in spite 
of evidence suggesting that this situation improved following the recommendations of the Scamp 
inquiry and, perhaps more importantly, the completion of the M6, the problem of crossing the 
Shap is an axiom which seems to have shaped the perceptions even of those who did not have 
any personal experience of such problems. The evidence presented to Scamp shows that the 
sections of the factory worst affected by material shortage and therefore most frequently 
involved in strike action were the truck and tractor assembly lines, as the variety and complexity 
of the vehicles produced at the factory meant that they relied on supplies of highly specialised 
components made on comparatively short runs of production.
13
 John Hastings, however, worked 
on the tractor line from 1973 until 1982 and states that there were ‘no major disputes’ during his 
time at the plant, and yet the difficulties associated with maintaining supply lines from England 
are among the ‘stories’ he remembers hearing about the factory’s poor industrial relations 
record.
14
 This highlights the extent to which the issue of supply shortages, and by extension the 
idea of the plant as an isolated ‘cathedral in the desert’, has become a dominant narrative 
amongst the plant’s former workers, and demonstrates the degree to which the work culture of 
the plant was shaped by its position as a branch plant on the periphery of the UK motor industry 
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and in an area in which, in the words of one management delegate to the Scamp inquiry, ‘there 
were not only green fields to be considered, but green labour’.15 Chapters Three and Four have, 
however, discussed the limited extent to which the plant’s problems resulted from the 
inexperienced ‘green labour’ it employed, and indeed it is worth reemphasising Turner, Clack, 
and Roberts’ explicit rejection of the green labour theory of strike causation in the regional 
policy plants especially. Nonetheless, while BMC representatives to Scamp stressed that material 
shortages and consequent lay-offs were a structural feature of motor industry work, experienced 
no more severely at Bathgate than in Birmingham or Coventry, their impact on the Bathgate 
workforce and the pervasiveness of the ‘cathedral in the desert’ narrative raises questions about 
the way in which motor manufacturing and its industrial relations were experienced in a branch 
plant, and the extent to which this branch plant status influenced the behaviour of its workers.  
This is reflected not only in Bathgate’s unusual record of strike causation, but also in its rate of 
withdrawals from the work situation. Levels of both absenteeism and labour turnover were 
notably high, and had attracted the attention of the Ministry of Labour two years prior to the 
Scamp inquiry, in 1964. The rate of turnover at the time of Scamp was estimated at 16.75 per 
cent – conspicuously high in a sector in which labour turnover was actually lower than in British 
industry as a whole, and in comparison to its continental European counterpart.
16
 At the most 
basic level, the evidence suggests that this anomaly, at least in terms of absenteeism, could be 
attributable to the very ‘newness’ of the factory in the West Lothian landscape and the extent to 
which this shaped the culture of work which prevailed at the plant from the outset. Robert 
McAndrew worked as a millwright in the maintenance department, and his description of a 
certain lack of discipline, apparently exacerbated by the piecemeal way in which the plant was 
constructed, indicates the extent to which Bathgate’s workers struggled to adapt to motor 
industry work. 
There wasn’t any fences round about the plant for a good two or three years and, 
eh, people were wandering off, you know! They would do their, they would do 
their amount of work that they had for the day, and if they finished early they just 
peeled off. You know! Because there wasn’t anything – On the night shift, well 
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we were starting roughly twenty minutes to eight in the morning on the day shift 
and, eh, the night shift, you were meeting them coming up on to the main road at 
Bathgate up at Kaim Park, people were going to get buses and things like that. 
They’d finished before they were due to finish.17  
The factory initially employed both piece-work and a form of MDW by which workers were 
given a schedule of work which they were expected to complete each day, and it seems that 
many workers were not required to clock in, at least during the plant’s build-up period. Bill 
Raine had worked at Longbridge before moving to Bathgate to be a superintendent in the B 
Block machine shop, although he had to work in A Block at first as the machine shop was not 
completed in time. He remembers his reaction to the apparently haphazard conditions he found 
in the newly opened factory. 
We were sending the parts up from Birmingham, and the Morris were sending 
engines up, and we got people assembling them. We thought we had anyway, ‘til 
we came up and found – well I came up and found, I couldn’t believe it. Nobody 
could - they were going home when they felt like it, nobody was recording 
anything had been done. And I’m looking and I’m absolutely amazed, and the 
Managing Director comes up, I was showing a chap how to use a drilling 
machine, and the Managing Director comes up and he says isn’t it wonderful, and 
I says well I think it’s a [pronounced sniff] disgrace. That people are allowed to 
act like this. They’re not interested, they’re gooin’ home when they feel like it, 
they don’t have to clock out, because you stopped the piecework system that we 
had in the Midlands that created the [motor] empires. You had what was called 
Measured Day Work. These guys are just laughing at you, all of ‘em. There are 
one or two good lads, but you’ll never run this factory like this.18 
This suggests, then, that much of the absenteeism reported by the Ministry of Labour in 1964 and 
by the Scamp inquiry in 1966 stemmed from the teething problems associated with establishing a 
new plant on a green field site, with a new workforce and an apparently inexperienced 
managerial staff. This analysis does little, however, to explain the number of workers leaving 
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their jobs at the plant; a demonstration, perhaps, of a more deep-seated discontent reflecting both 
the relationship between the workforce and the company, and the terms on which labour was 
engaged.   
As discussed in Chapter Two, the motor manufacturers had significant reservations about the 
regional policy project, and there seems to have been some awareness among the plant’s 
workforce of the BMC’s reluctance to move to what one member of its staff described in the 
Glasgow Herald as ‘the wastelands of West Lothian’.19 Jim McCulloch is among those former 
workers who have expressed their belief that this reluctance affected the way in which the plant 
was run.
20
 His testimony returns several times to what he perceived to be poor industrial relations 
resulting primarily from the company’s attitude to regional policy and the enforced move to its 
Bathgate branch plant. 
And as I say, as time went on, we found, as I say, industrial relations was never 
very good. Because politically, the government never ever wanted, or BMC never 
wanted to come to Scotland, that was a known fact. And the government made 
them come, because of the pits that were closing, both in the coal and the shale 
industry in this area. A lot of bings about here, you’ll have seen them, that’s the 
shale pits and they were shutting at the same time as the coal pits. So the factory 
was - BMC were told to open a factory here. They never ever wanted to be here. 
And the industrial relations were very poor, all the time.
21
 
While it should be noted that McCulloch’s testimony is shaped by both his personal political 
views and by his knowledge of the plant’s eventual closure, similar ideas have been expressed by 
a number of other former Bathgate workers, and the perception that the factory was established 
at Bathgate as a result of political or social engineering seems to have had some influence on the 
development of the culture of work within the plant. Alan Marr grew up locally and started an 
apprenticeship with the BMC after leaving school. His testimony echoes McCulloch’s 
description of the political decision behind the plant’s creation, and his contention that some of 
the strikes at the factory were manipulated or even created by management implies the level of 
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distrust between the company and its workers arguably engendered but certainly exacerbated by 
the BMC’s known unwillingness to move to Scotland. 
It was silly but, but I think some strikes were manufactured. And I always, I’ve 
always got the impression that bringing the plant up here was a social, eh, 
experiment and it didnae appear to be working, so they just closed it down. They 
thought they would have to bring some, a big industry up here, for to appease 
everybody and I think they did that, but then there’s been nothing big like that 
ever since.
22
 
This is another idea which features frequently in the oral history testimony and which is also 
supported in the literature. As noted in Chapter Four, Turner et al. suggest that it was a deliberate 
strategy adopted by management to allow strikes to drag on in times of weak demand in order to 
avoid redundancy, and strikes during slumps consequently tended to be fewer, but larger, and for 
longer, than in times of boom.
23
 McCulloch, who it should be noted was not an active trade 
unionist, describes one particular instance of a strike which he believes was coordinated by 
management working in collaboration with a particular shop steward and aimed at keeping the 
plant closed during a period in which work was slack and workers would otherwise have been 
laid off or put on short-time. 
One of the times they had us out on strike, and they had us out for about seven 
weeks, never went to work for seven weeks, and what has happened was that… 
they kept telling us that the order book was full, and that we would bring the 
company to their knees if we stayed on strike. We’d bring the company to their 
knees, they’d be begging us to come back. Which turned out to be a load of 
nonsense. There was a story in the Daily Express that the BMC had just won an 
order for overseas trucks. And, uh, the strike – And [a shop steward] said at a 
meeting at the football park, there were three thousand, four thousand all gathered 
on the football park, not to believe the Tory press, the order books were full and 
we’d bring them to their knees. But it didn’t work that way and he recommended 
that we go back to work, so we went back to work on the Monday morning and 
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[the shop steward], as I said he was trade union convenor, he didn’t come in, he 
walked into Personnel and sat down at a desk as a Personnel Officer. Having kept 
us out for seven weeks, he got his reward, and he only lasted about four month 
and then he went to pastures new.
24
 
This is a particularly colourful example, but comparable situations have been described by other 
former workers. John Moore, for example, alleges that there was often ‘an element of 
manipulating by the company’ in engineering strikes or walk-outs in order to avoid giving lay-
off pay or, in the case of what he terms ‘the big strike’, which lasted for nine weeks in 1972, to 
keep the factory closed during a period when production might otherwise have been disrupted by 
power cuts and the three-day working week resulting from the miners’ strike of that year.25  
Similar suspicions were also voiced during the Scamp inquiry. One representative of the AEU, 
for example, gave the following statement. 
We believe, gentlemen, that many of the strikes that the management referred to 
which were associated with lay-offs in fact, to some degree, were a convenience 
to management. We believe as Trade Unions, responsible Trade Unions, when 
management had men laid off they deliberately in some cases created the 
circumstances where a walk-out became a factor in the total picture.
26
 
The degree of suspicion and mistrust which this issue apparently engendered at Bathgate is again 
unusual, as Turner et al. contend that workers and unions alike were willing to collude with 
management in the hopes of postponing dismissals and lay-offs, and they suggest that this 
represented the industry’s ‘substitute for formally-agreed means of dealing with recurrent labour 
surplus’.27 This is perhaps symptomatic of a lack of communication between management and 
shopfloor. Indeed, it was the contention of the trade union delegation to the Scamp inquiry that 
the strike action that had taken place at Bathgate was as much a result of a lack of consultation 
over the issue of lay-offs and short-time working as it was a response to those problems 
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themselves.
28
 Shop stewards complained that communication with management was limited, that 
they were given insufficient notice when a lay-off was to take place, and that they were not 
allowed the opportunity to take, or even recommend, action which might avoid the need for a 
lay-off altogether.
29
 Furthermore, there was a feeling amongst the union delegates to the inquiry 
that the management’s reluctance or even refusal to engage with the plant’s shop stewards and 
communicate more effectively with its workers was indicative of a broader indifference which 
was also reflected in both the company’s allegedly weak management of its supply chain 
difficulties, and its lack of understanding of what its representatives variously described as its 
‘ignorant’ and ‘naive’ workforce.30 The AEU delegate, for example, described as ‘ridiculous’ the 
first instance of a lay-off at the plant, which resulted from the company forgetting, or perhaps not 
realising, that Scottish statutory holidays differed from English statutory holidays and therefore 
not ensuring that the factory held enough supplies to keep it running over an English holiday 
period.
31
 Such instances contributed to a sense that the BMC’s approach to the factory and its 
workforce was marked by a certain lack of commitment to its branch plant operation, reflected in 
the poor condition of the factory’s aging, second-hand equipment, much of which had been 
transferred from factories in the Midlands. A representative of the PTU, for example, drew 
attention to these issues, asking ‘are to understand that we are country cousins?’32 This was 
undoubtedly compounded by the factory’s continued reliance on components sourced from the 
Midlands and its consequent lack of embeddedness in the West Lothian economy, as the absence 
of ancillary industries contributed to fears over its longer-term stability. As one delegate to the 
STUC put it, as long as the motor industry remained unassimilated into the wider Scottish 
economy, it ‘could be lifted out of Scotland lock, stock and barrel’.33 
The testimony of a number of former workers suggests that the company’s reluctance to engage 
with those it employed at Bathgate manifested itself, at least in the plant’s early years, in a sharp 
distinction between shopfloor workers and staff. Jim McCulloch’s memories of his time at the 
plant are defined by what he terms an ‘unhappy atmosphere’ which he perceives to have resulted 
from the company’s resentment of regional policy and of its enforced move to Bathgate. For 
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McCulloch, the distinction between workforce and management was a product of this resentment 
and a resultant hostility towards the workforce which he feels formed the ‘underlying current’ of 
the plant’s industrial relations. He describes an incident which demonstrated to him the extent of 
this distinction. 
I think one of the things I should mention, in the BMC, there was a very big 
distinction between staff and workers, or between white collar and blue collar. I 
mean staff, if you were staff you were superior to the ones with the blue collar, the 
overalls. They got things done for them that the men in the shop weren’t getting. I 
remember the Managing Director – as I said I looked after the Managing 
Director’s car, just valeting and driving for him now and again, and his wife, and 
one of the times the staff had a car club and they decided they were going to do 
advanced driving courses, and the Managing Director’s wife decided she was 
going to, and she put my name down as well, so the two of us could go on it. But 
it was rejected by the car club because I wasn’t on the staff. I was lowly, I was 
hourly paid. But they said she was more than welcome, even though she wasn’t a 
member. Her reply to that, “well if I’m not a member then I can’t drive, and 
Jimmy can’t drive either” and she didn’t take a course. But that was just the sort 
of attitude they had. If you were staff you were somebody, if you were white 
collar you were superior to the blue collar, and that prevailed all the time. I think 
that caused an awful lot of friction.
34
 
Bruce Davies, a graduate mechanical engineer who took up a job as a trainee design engineer in 
the tractor plant, takes a slightly different view. For him, the distinction between blue collar and 
white collar workers was equally obvious, but resulted primarily from an out-dated management 
approach which was also reflected in the lack of vision and poor decision making discussed in 
Chapter Two.   
I’d been there about three months and they had a set of canteens, and the canteen I 
think was from, and this is a joke, was from none-paid, it started off from people 
who were paid by the minute, paid by the hour, paid by the week, paid by the 
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month, paid senior by the month, and management. So it was either six or seven 
canteens. And by this time, we started off on monthly staff, we were paid, it was 
just a function of how you got your pay, it put you in no position at all relative to 
anybody else, and if you went into the monthly staff canteen they had a sort of 
help yourself, whereas round the corner was the senior monthly staff canteen 
where you sat down and a waitress came and served you. Now I was completely 
unaware of all, I just thought these were canteens that you chose to go to as you 
felt like, so I’d been in the senior monthly staff canteen, going for months before 
anybody discovered I wasn’t part of senior monthly staff. I never did change, but 
as we came to one corner after this, there was another guy who was going into 
corporate staff, or management, and I said it’s alright, I know my place, I have to 
go into the other canteen now. And what astonished me is I thought we would 
have just laughed and carried on, well that’s the way it is. I had a ten minute 
lecture on the industrial importance of having a layered series of canteens, and we 
now know from Mark Zuckerman [sic] and Facebook what a real nonsense that 
was, and I didn’t say anything for once, I was so astonished that they would even 
try to justify something which I thought was patently ludicrous, or just a legacy of 
when Lord so-and-so came here and they gave a separate lunch or something, I 
didn’t want to comment on it. But I remember, it was one of those moments that 
fixed in my mind.
35
 
It is worth noting here that, although McCulloch left the plant in 1968, Davies started work with 
the BMC in that year and stayed until 1975. This perhaps suggests that, while a distinction 
between the factory’s shopfloor workforce and managerial staff remained, the perception that this 
resulted chiefly from the company’s initial reluctance to move to Bathgate receded as the plant 
became better established.   
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that this distinction could be exacerbated by the cultural 
differences which existed between the factory’s workforce and its largely English management 
team, as well as the sometimes difficult position of the supervisors and foreman brought from the 
Midlands to assist in the initial development of the factory and the on-the-job training of its 
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workforce. The proceedings of the Scamp inquiry include some heated exchanges between the 
largely English management team and trade union representatives, one of whom refers to the 
company as ‘Sassenachs’, whose reluctance to encourage local firms to manufacture components 
for the plant was, it is implied, born out of an inherent prejudice against ‘Scottish traditional 
employers’.36 There is also a suggestion that ‘the English people have lived a sheltered life’ and 
that the management therefore could not be expected to understand the extent to which the 
attitude and behaviour of its Bathgate workforce had been shaped by the experience of 
unemployment. This is an idea which seems to have had some influence in shaping the industrial 
relations of the plant in its early years, and which will be developed more fully later in this 
chapter, but here it is important to consider the testimony of Bill Raine, who was among the 
cohort of experienced Midland motor workers sent by the company to assist in the build-up of the 
plant. Raine claims that he’d ‘never heard of Bathgate, no, I didn’t even know which country it 
was in’, and his experiences demonstrate both the minor but telling cultural differences which 
existed across Britain at the time, and the resentment towards the plant and its workers which was 
expressed by some sections of the local population. Here he remembers his bewilderment on 
encountering Francie and Josie, a popular Scottish comedy duo of the 1960s whose fame had 
apparently not reached Longbridge. 
Woolworth’s opened that week, and Francie and Josie, do you remember them – 
well, we were walking up the precinct, well it’s the precinct now, me and Joan, 
and there was this crowd. Ah, I said, they’re opening Woolworth’s, and there’s 
this one guy in a red and one guy in a blue suit, with the sleeves rolled up and the 
legs – and this one says ‘Josie’, and everybody starts laughing, and he says 
‘Francie’, and everybody starts laughing, and I said is something wrong with us 
two, everybody’s laughing their socks off and I can’t see any reason for laughing. 
I’d never heard of Francie and Josie [laughter].37 
He goes on to describe initial impressions of the town, marked by cultural differences and his 
experience of alleged anti-English abuse. 
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I’ve never, ever experienced anything like it. The anti-English, you would not 
believe it. People shouting across the road at you, you know, English go home. 
Great big signs painted on the road bridges, English go home, and things like this. 
It was rife in this part when we came here. When we lived in Birmingham every 
brewery was building big nice hotels, so if you wanted a drink, I don’t drink by 
the way, if you wanted a drink you could take the family down on the weekend 
and the kids could play in the back, they got parks for them and swings, in the 
hotels. When we came to Scotland, you weren’t allowed. I brought my mother up 
once on a tour and she wanted a drink, a lemonade, and I said well, the shops are 
closed, I’ll pull up at the next pub, just nip in, there’s probably an outdoor - and 
they threw her out. They told her to goo and get lost, go back to England if she 
wanted anything. But she couldn’t believe it, that it actually happened.38 
It can perhaps be inferred from the fact that Raine stayed at the plant until its closure, and then 
continued to live in the town, that this situation also improved as the factory became established 
and its workforce more settled. However, his experience reflects the extent to which the factory, 
by providing relatively well-paid work in clean, safe surroundings which were visibly more 
modern and significantly more prominent than other employers in the area, created resentment 
among those local people and businesses who were not employed there and did not benefit 
directly from its presence. A relation of Chris Bett’s was Managing Director of Renton and 
Fisher’s steel foundry in Bathgate, and his reported attitude to the BMC reflects the concerns 
expressed by the SEEA over its potential to push up wages in the area. 
He came to me and he complained about it, that he had bother hiring engineers, 
skilled engineers obviously he was talking about it, he had bother hiring engineers 
because of the rates of pay we were talking about, so I said to him well pay the 
bloody rate and you’ll get all the engineers that you want.39 
Alan Marr grew up in Bathgate, and it was his perception that ‘[the BMC] sucked a lot of people 
in, and it may have had a derogatory effect on other, ehm, industries, in the area.’40 Jobs at the 
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plant were highly sought after, and Harry Bradley, who lived in Blackridge and worked at 
Menzies’s steel foundry in Armadale until he was able to get a job at the factory in 1972, recalls 
how difficult it was to find work at the plant initially as it was so over-subscribed. 
When Leyland came everybody tried to get into Leyland but, they were that, I’m 
saying they were slow but you just couldnae get an interview, it was hard tae get 
an interview, it was OK if you knew somebody who knew somebody tae help 
you.
41
 
Given the esteem apparently associated with work at the plant, the number of workers choosing 
to leave their jobs and reflected in its exceptionally high rate of labour turnover is, perhaps, 
surprising, and raises further questions about the way in which work was experienced on the 
shopfloor. This is particularly the case as the plant was also notable for its unusual record of 
strike causation, suggesting that the labour turnover seen at Bathgate represented a further 
reflection of the level of discontent that arose from the frequency of lay-offs and short-time, and 
was exacerbated by the lack of communication and the perceived divisions between workforce 
and management informed by the company’s known reluctance to move to Scotland.   
 
‘People come to work for one thing only. Money.’
42
  
Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay attribute the industry’s generally low levels of labour 
turnover partly to the British motor worker’s greater use of ‘voice’ than ‘exit’ in expressing 
dissatisfaction. They go on to write, however, that ‘low labour turnover suggests that, given the 
wages, conditions were acceptable.’43 This is a key point, and highlights the idea, central to the 
Affluent Worker thesis and many other characterisations of motor industry workers, that the high 
wages paid in the industry represented a ‘pay off’ for the loss of skill and autonomy associated 
with assembly line work. In her work on the experience of motor manufacturing employment in 
the United States, for example, Ruth Milkman describes auto workers as ‘prisoners of 
prosperity’, for whom the industry’s monotonous assembly line work provided ‘their only 
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opportunity to share in the unrivalled prosperity of the post-war boom years’. Milkman writes 
that car workers, in discussing their jobs, frequently likened the plant to a prison: ‘once they 
grew accustomed to the high pay and benefits, most began counting the years until their 
“sentences”...would be up.’44  As discussed in Chapter Three, Goldthorpe’s affluent workers 
valued intrinsic benefits such as autonomy and variety in their work, and many expressed their 
desire to move off the line and into a more skilled supervisory or maintenance roles. Their key 
concern, however, was with pay. Goldthorpe writes that this was of ‘extreme importance’, 
particularly to assembly workers, a third of whom claimed that it was the pay alone that kept 
them in their jobs.
45
 One worker characterised his reasons for working at Vauxhall as ‘money 
and again money – nothing else!’ while another claims ‘it’s money every time. I sell my labour 
to the highest bidder.’46 This concern with work as a means to an extrinsic end is central to the 
Affluent Worker analysis, and is reflected in the testimony of Bill Raine, who describes the 
attitude to work at the BMC’s Austin car plant at Longbridge, where he worked as a foreman 
before moving to Bathgate in 1962. 
In them days the motor empires were built on piece work. If you didn’t work you 
didn’t get paid. Everything you did had a price, a time. If you did it you got paid, 
if you didn’t you didn’t get paid. Everything was inspected and checked, and if 
the inspector said it was no good you didn’t get paid for it. Everybody was work 
mad in them particular days, they stood by their machines at eight o’clock waiting 
for the horn to start, and they started. It was a pressure, like. Everybody was the 
same, everybody went to work for one reason only – earn money, the more the 
better. To buy houses, to buy cars and things like that.
47
 
The evidence from the oral history interviews suggests that many of Bathgate’s ‘affluent 
workers’ shared this orientation to work, and took up jobs at the plant precisely because it was 
expected that they would be well paid. John Cooper, for example, was an apprentice baker 
before starting his national service. 
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After that, as I said, they started to build what do you call it, the BMC, which was 
terrific, because it made you, just married, put in an application for a job to earn 
more money. And that’s the reason I moved.48 
Cooper estimates that, including overtime, he was able to earn up to three pounds a week more at 
the BMC than he had done as a baker. Andy Hunter’s circumstances were similar when he 
decided to leave his job at a local clay pit in order to move to what was then British Leyland in 
1972, and it is notable that he had already left a more skilled job at a garage for higher wages at 
the mine.  
I think the wage was very fair. I obviously left my trade to go to Wallhouse Mine 
for more money, and I left Wallhouse Mine to go to British Leyland for money as 
well, as obviously I had a young family and I was just starting the way with my 
young family and eh, obviously money dictated how you got on in life. So when I 
left Wallhouse Mine, I probably just a wee bit less than doubled my money, going 
from Wallhouse Mine to British Leyland. It was a big big jump.
49
 
The factory developed a reputation for offering well-paid work, particularly for semi-skilled 
workers, and Guthrie Aiken remembers a newspaper report on the plant which presented the 
wages it paid as a notable advance in the area’s economy. 
“It’s a thousand pound Bathgate”. And that was the inspectors, that was the 
skilled people, were getting twenty pounds a week, and it was a thousand pounds 
a year, and that was a breaking point, you know. You know, it had got to that 
point where blue collar workers were earning more than a thousand pounds a year. 
Fantastic.
50
 
Joyce Brogan was offered two jobs on leaving school; one with the BMC, and one with a small 
local firm in her hometown of Armadale. She describes her reasons for taking the job with the 
BMC. 
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I think it was because it sortae held a lot of opportunities because it was a big 
concern, that my dad sort of influenced me in that decision. Also, the money I was 
offered at the time compared to the money I was offered at the other place was 
higher, so I remember my dad saying to me ‘take the job that pays the most 
money’, and I just took that job.51 
The sense that the BMC offered greater opportunities as well as higher wages is reflected in the 
testimony of a number of former Bathgate workers, and especially those who joined the firm 
either as apprentices or in more skilled occupations. Alan Marr started his apprenticeship in 
1969, and his testimony echoes Brogan’s in suggesting that the company was held in higher 
esteem than other local employers. 
The main three places I was thinking about were, eh, Renton and Fisher’s, which 
was a foundry, Plessey, and Leyland. They were the ones that were offering the 
best apprenticeships. So, I gave my dad my application for Plessey, and I hudnae 
heard anything for weeks and weeks and weeks, and he never said anything to me 
about anything, and then the one for Leyland came in and we went for the 
interview, he came with me, we met everybody at the time, and then ah asked him 
about the Plessey one and he says I didnae hand it in. He dusnae want me to work 
there he said. [Laughter] He must ha’ saw the writing on the wall and decided, 
well, that’s not the place for him.52 
The implication here is that by the late 1960s it was recognised that many local firms which had 
been important local employers were under threat, and that the plant was perceived to offer not 
only the highest pay and best apprenticeships, but also the safest prospect of secure, long-term 
employment in the West Lothian area. Chapter One considered the idea that the closure of a 
large, modern, and capital-intensive factory which its workers and the wider community had 
expected would exist to provide work for future generations in the area represented a challenge 
to the notion of ‘industrial permanence’, but here it is worth emphasising the extent to which the 
promise of stable and permanent  employment attracted workers to the plant, demonstrating the 
limits to the idea of Bathgate’s affluent workers as motivated primarily by money. 
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Kenny Paton, for example, grew up in the Gorbals and Garthamlock areas of Glasgow before 
moving to Whitburn to work for a haulage contractor. He describes his decision to apply for a 
job in BL’s maintenance department in 1975.  
Well a lot of the people that I worked, that I socialised with in Whitburn and West 
Lothian, quite a few of them worked in British Leyland. And I think the hourly 
rate was better, and it was – it was, we believed then it was giving you continuity 
of employment for the rest of your life, because of the scale and the nature of the 
factory ‘cos it was vast, I think at that time in ‘75 there was about 3,500 people 
were employed in British Leyland, I’m not sure exactly but round about that, and I 
think a lot of the people thought of it that look, this is a way that I’ll get an income 
for the rest of my adult life. And that was the reason I applied for a job in there.
53
 
It is important to note that ‘good security’ did also emerge as a key concern of Goldthorpe’s 
affluent workers, but that the reasons underlying its perceived importance, second only to the 
level of pay, were perhaps rather different in full-employment Luton than in Development 
District Bathgate. Goldthorpe writes that ‘typically with our respondents, ‘security’ seemed to be 
thought of far more in relation to long-run income maximisation than to the minimum 
requirement of having a job of some kind’, whereas its importance to the BMC’s workers at 
Bathgate seems to result primarily from the experience or threat of unemployment.
54
 As the data 
shown in Figure 5:1 shows, rates of unemployment remained consistently higher in Scotland 
than in more typically ‘affluent’ areas such as the West Midlands – included here for its 
pertinence to motor manufacturing – and in the UK overall throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Tommy Morrison’s description of finding work at the BMC after being made redundant from his 
job as a steel moulder at the West Lothian Foundry at Armadale underlines this point and 
demonstrates the centrality of ‘having a job of some kind’ to many of the Bathgate workforce for 
whom work within the plant was a necessity rather than a choice. 
[The foreman] come to me on, we’ll say a Wednesday, a Wednesday he come to 
me and he says do you know you’ve got to finish up this Friday, I says well that 
was kindae quick, but he says the reason I’m telling you, there’s a BMC opening 
up, I says where’s that about, he says at Bathgate. I says oh, he says there’s a 
BMC opening up, and I would like you to apply to get a start. Oh I says, that’d be 
good then. He says now what you’ve to do, I’ll send you to a doctor in Bathgate to 
get a medical, he says you won’t have a problem with your medical, but he says 
I’ve got to send you there, and so I got paid to the Friday, I got my medical on the 
Saturday morning, I got a telegram on Sunday, to start in British, BMC on the 
Monday. So I never lost a shift, it was that comical. So that’s how it’s went.55 
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The idea that the prevalence of unemployment represented a key motivating factor for Bathgate’s 
workers was also put forward during discussions of the impact of lay-offs and short-time at the 
1966 Scamp inquiry. The AEU delegate, for example, claimed that the BMC’s largely English 
management team were insensitive to the effects of both unemployment and the insecurity of 
work which had often resulted from the style of management which predominated in Scotland’s 
heavy industries, and argued that this inhibited their understanding and handling of lay-offs at 
the plant. 
We have a heritage in Scotland. To a certain extent the English people have lived 
a sheltered life. We were brought up in a period of unemployment where quite 
frankly the Labour Exchange was something we were brought up with and it is 
inherent in most of the workers’ minds that is instability of employment inside 
factories, and this is something we as the Shop Stewards Committee continually 
try to break down. We have to struggle to ensure we get the guaranteed 40 hour 
week inside the factory.
56
 
This reflects John Foster’s characterisation of Scotland as a ‘proletarian nation’, which draws on 
the legacy of this ‘authoritarian, hire and fire’ style of management in arguing that, in spite of an 
industrial structure becoming increasingly similar to that of England, Scots in the latter half of 
the twentieth century nevertheless saw themselves as ‘somehow more exploited, more embattled, 
and…more proletarian than…their English fellow citizens south of the border.’57 In this context, 
it needs to be emphasised that the problems of lay-offs and short-time were not exclusive to 
Bathgate or even to the motor industry’s regional policy plants, and that the security of work was 
considered important by both Goldthorpe’s affluent workers and by the Ford workers studied by 
Beynon. Furthermore, the issues of pay and working hours were not discrete, and indeed Turner, 
Clack, and Roberts include instability of earnings as a result of the irregularity of motor industry 
employment alongside wage differentials as a key factor in their discussion of the industry’s 
strike-proneness.
58
 In Beynon’s analysis, the incidence of the lay-off is another sign of the semi-
skilled worker’s loss of autonomy in a motor plant; in this case to the market forces which 
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dictate the demand for cars.
59
 However, just as Goldthorpe wrote that security was important 
primarily for its role in ‘income maximisation’, so Beynon found that the lay-offs experienced at 
Ford were resented by the company’s workers largely because they ‘had children, hire purchase 
debts and mortgage repayments to make’.60 He goes on to cite Turner et al., who discuss the 
paradox of the motor worker as the archetypal affluent worker, or ‘economic man’, in spite of his 
position in an industry which was marked by both instability of earnings and significant wage 
differentials.
61
 
Chapter Four showed that the sectionalism which frequently resulted from such differentials was 
a feature of industrial relations at Bathgate, but here it is important to note the qualitatively 
different way in which job insecurity was experienced by the plant’s workers when compared 
with motor workers in England. A second AEU delegate explained to the Scamp inquiry that it 
was his belief that levels of labour turnover experienced at the plant were unusually high because 
‘people were leaving in disgust because they regarded themselves as casual labour.’62 He goes on 
to develop this point: 
I think it can be said that the established industries in Scotland in the main have 
never been subject to the violent fluctuations of short time working that are 
prevalent in the car industry. As I said earlier many years ago I had an experience 
when they came along at four o’clock in the afternoon to say there are 2,000 
away. Even in the worst days of Scotland this has not taken place and even where 
we have industries today which are facing difficulties we would spread the load 
over a four day week for all the people which is difficult to do in a car factory but 
this type of thing cushioned any effect, but there is no cushioning here and as our 
colleagues have said this factory was encouraged by the Board of Trade and it was 
encouraged to come to give employment to people living in Scotland. When they 
talk about employment they talk about employment without casual labour and I 
can tell you quite definitely that many of the Scottish men have left because of 
that casual aspect even although at the end of the day they may have got slightly 
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more for their day’s earnings than they get elsewhere for their five days but the 
principle is still inherent that they want full employment and this is the important 
thing.
63
 
This analysis perhaps underplays the structural instability of work within Scotland’s heavy 
industries which, as Foster explains, relied on low wages, tight management control of workers, 
and the maintenance of a reserve of unemployed labour in order to allow Scottish industrialists to 
compete while investing considerably less in plant, equipment, research, and design, than those 
elsewhere in Britain, and which had considerable influence in shaping this aversion to apparently 
casual labour.
64
 It does, however, highlight both the problem of expectation which existed 
between an employer hoping that Scottish labour would be cheaper and more pliable than its 
Midland counterpart and a workforce which had been led to believe that the new industries 
would provide work which was stable as well as relatively well-paid, as well as the ‘newness’ 
and lack of understanding in Scotland of work in the notoriously unstable motor industry. 
Furthermore, it underlines the extent to which some Bathgate workers, conditioned in their 
approach to work by what could be termed the ‘culture of the labour exchange’, prioritised job 
stability even over pay. This is reflected in the oral history testimony of a number of former 
workers, including Harry Bradley who described his reason for taking a job with the BMC as 
‘mostly the security’.65 He goes on to describe a considerable drop in his earnings compared to 
his previous job at a local steel foundry, although it should be noted that the sums he gives are 
exaggerated, as £84 a week would be equivalent to more than £1,000 a week in today’s values. 
Well, I worked in Menzies’s the steel foundry at the time, and I was night shift as 
well, and everybody was saying how much money was supposed to be good in 
Leyland, I think I was on about, I think it was 84 pound a week on the nightshift, 
which was an awful lot for working four nights, I mean that was way back in the 
late ‘60s, and I went into Leyland, I’m no sure, I think the first pay was about 
seventy pound or something.
66
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Chris Bett similarly took a small pay cut in order to work at the BMC, in part because he was 
concerned about the future of his employment on the railways. 
Bearing in mind that the starting rate at that time in 1961, ‘62 for a semi-skilled 
worker was 25 pence an hour, that’s what it was. Ehm, and I worked on the 
railway at the time, I was just married, just had the first kid, and reductions on the 
railway, you know with the Beeching cutbacks and everything else, my wife and I 
discussed it and said, well, they’re asking people to apply for jobs at the BMC, do 
you think I should go in? Had a look at the wages and the wages were basically 
ten pound a week. But working on the railway, put back on the cleaning you were 
on three shifts, and with a wee bit shift allowance instead of ten pound a week I 
had ten pound ten shillings. So we sat and we talked about whether I should move 
or no, and anyway I decided to move and really, never looked back after that in 
that sense.
67
 
Pay was also of only secondary importance to many of those discussed in Chapter One who 
moved to Bathgate primarily because of the good, modern housing built for the plant’s incoming 
workers. John Moore had previously worked at the BMC’s Albion Motors truck plant in 
Glasgow, and was therefore one of the few at Bathgate with previous motor industry experience. 
Moore estimates that his wages fell by approximately 40 per cent, but states that this was 
acceptable because he was ‘desperate for the opportunity’ to move his family from a rundown 
room-and-kitchen flat in the Whiteinch area of Glasgow to a new house in Whitburn.
68
 
The significance of this housing to many of the plant’s workers, and the extent to which it acted 
as a pull-factor in attracting people from Glasgow in particular to work at the BMC raises further 
questions about the position of the affluent motor worker in Scotland. Luton was chosen as the 
location for the Affluent Worker studies in part because it was not an ‘old’ industrial town 
marked by traditional industries and long-established industrial relations practices, but rather a 
growing town attracting geographically mobile workers seeking both high wages in the new 
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industries and improved standards of living in new, private housing.
69
 This marks an important 
cultural difference with Bathgate, where the housing available to incoming workers was 
provided by the local authority, as home ownership and ‘privatism’ more broadly have been seen 
as key tenets in the development of a ‘new’ working-class culture based around the home and the 
family. This is an idea which is central to both the embourgeoisement thesis and to its revision in 
the Affluent Worker series, and which has longer roots in England, with inter-war antecedents 
explored by Peter Scott in his work on home ownership and consumer spending.
70
 In Scott’s 
analysis, the rapid spread of owner-occupation during the 1930s resulted in part from a 
marketing strategy ‘which portrayed the suburban semi as an essential component of a new, 
aspirational, form of working-class respectability’, demonstrating the affordability of new 
housing and overturning the traditional ‘respectable’ working-class aversion to debt.71 Moreover, 
the emphasis placed by building society advertising on the aspirational lifestyle associated with 
this new, suburban model of working-class life, contributed to the emergence of what have been 
termed ‘consumption communities’ defined by their shared material values.72 The concurrent 
development of hire purchase schemes, meanwhile, created a mass market for consumer durables 
and afforded working-class consumers greater access to such goods. Indeed, by 1938, the non-
agricultural working-class comprised the most important socio-economic group in terms of 
purchasing power, accounting for 54.18 per cent of the mass market in furniture, for example.
73
 
For Goldthorpe and his colleagues, the importance of work as a means to an extrinsic end in 
terms of income maximisation was driven not by a desire to challenge class status or emulate a 
typically middle class way of life through consumption, but rather to improve the individual 
family’s own standard of living within the ‘social horizons’ imposed by the class status of the 
manual wage labourer.
74
 In this context, geographical mobility and in particular the willingness 
to break family and community ties, is characterised as ‘following the money’ and taken as 
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evidence of the worker’s commitment to material advancement.75 Conversely, the 1966 Lothians 
Regional Survey and Plan posited that the production problems experience by the BMC in its 
first five years at Bathgate could be explained by the limited appeal to the Scottish worker of 
incentives aimed at increasing productivity and achieving higher earnings. 
Ambition to own his own house, for example, is a powerful incentive to the 
English wage-earner but has at the moment little effect on the Scottish wage-
earner, who has long been accustomed to expect and be satisfied with low rental, 
subsidized Council housing.
76
 
This depiction of Scottish motor workers contrasts with Bill Raine’s account of their Longbridge 
counterparts going to work to ‘earn money, the more the better. To buy houses, to buy cars and 
things like that.’ Furthermore, it is at odds with the findings of Daniel Wight’s anthropological 
study of an industrial Lowland village that he calls ‘Cauldmoss’, which demonstrates the 
centrality of money and consumption as reasons for working even in the absence of the 
‘privatism’ associated with the growth of affluence among the English working class.77 Wight 
describes the ‘employment ethic’ which he encountered particularly among the male population 
of Cauldmoss during the year he spent living there in the early 1980s, and which he differentiates 
from the more usual work ethic, which encompasses an ingrained willingness to engage in tasks, 
whether paid or unpaid. The employment ethic focused instead on the discipline of working life 
and the value of withstanding the discipline of waged labour over a long period, rather than 
productivity, industriousness, or the quality of work.
78
 He describes, for example, the esteem 
afforded to men who ‘worked all their days’, or ‘put a good shift in’, and the extent to which the 
idea of enduring hardship in order to earn money and provide for a family shaped perceptions of 
both masculinity and respectability. In this analysis, work is ‘arduous, monotonous and routine, 
offering no intrinsic satisfaction’, and the employment ethic, by attributing value to manual work 
                                                          
75
 Ibid, p.122. 
76
 Robertson, The Lothians Regional Survey and Plan, chapter 5, paragraph 28. 
77
 D. Wight, Workers not Wasters: Masculine Respectability, Consumption, and Employment in Central Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993) p.1; Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p.66. 
78
 Wight, Workers not Wasters, p.106. 
218 
 
as a means of earning money to enable consumption, allows the men of Cauldmoss to make 
sense of their employment and reassert their masculinity.
79
 
If employment could never be anything more than a means to the end of providing 
for oneself and one’s family, and if it was always going to be an unpleasant 
experience, then at least a virtue could be made of necessity.
80
 
As Wight makes clear, this suggests a degree of alienation in line with Marx’s characterisation of 
work as ‘not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means of satisfying other needs’, and indeed 
Wight found that the importance of maximising pay in order to pay the bills, buy a car, or go out 
several times a week was such that ‘almost any hardship or disruption was considered if the 
wage was right’.81 
It is also important to note in this context Garry McDonald’s depiction of migration to Scotland’s 
new towns as a ‘conscious and intended break from the past’. As discussed in Chapter One, the 
construction of housing for the BMC’s incoming workers in Blackburn in particular, and the 
accompanying change in the village’s demographics, reflected broader trends in Scottish new 
town development. McDonald emphasises the ‘very constrained housing situation’ for many 
working class families in Glasgow especially, where in 1970 there were 42,000 names on the 
Corporation housing waiting list, and highlights the degree of downward mobility seen amongst 
migrant manual workers for whom the lack of housing on Clydeside was the primary push 
factor, writing that ‘men anxious to qualify for Development Corporation housing will often 
accept less skilled, and often less rewarding, jobs in the new towns.’82 This contrasts sharply 
with the position of the migrant middle classes, many of whom moved to the new towns 
primarily because of the career opportunities provided by new industry, and consequently 
experienced a ‘substantial amount’ of upward social mobility. In spite of the limited availability 
of private housing, then, McDonald argues that working class migration to the Scottish new 
towns can be seen as broadly in line with the affluent worker analysis of manual workers seeing 
their work as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.
83
 There is evidence to suggest, 
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however, that the improved standard of living afforded by the new housing built by West 
Lothian County Council was often not enough in itself to keep incoming workers in their jobs at 
the BMC. One of the management representatives to the Scamp inquiry, for example, intimated 
that a considerable proportion of the plant’s high level of labour turnover was attributable to 
Glaswegian incoming workers choosing to leave their new, modern homes in Armadale, 
Blackburn, and Bathgate, and instead return to Glasgow. He put this down to the strength and 
importance of family ties, but the AEU delegates argued that it was rather an additional 
indication of the level of dissatisfaction with the instability of work within the factory, and read 
out an extract from a letter written to BMC management by the wife of a Bathgate worker. 
I am one of the many wives who moved here nearly four years ago and I am sorry 
I ever even heard of the Glasgow overspill plan. The houses we were allocated are 
satisfactory in every way but I am sick and tired of working conditions in the 
BMC Factory where we need to depend on our husband getting a full week’s 
work, not overtime, just a full working week. My husband was sent home today 
again, this time he is not on strike; I cannot think why he had to come home but 
one thing I do know we will be hard up again this week.
84
 
This is a further indication of the close link that existed between pay and stability, and implies 
that any curtailment in working hours was enough to threaten household budgets and cause 
concern for the families of Bathgate workers. The complexities in the relationship between pay 
levels, working hours, and living conditions are similarly illustrated in a summary of the trade 
unions’ position given by one of the AEU representatives to the inquiry. 
About a year or five years ago when people were coming from Glasgow, they 
were queuing up for houses: now they are queuing up to get back to Glasgow. It is 
the reverse. There are various reasons for that but if you talk in terms of wages 
you won’t be far wrong at all. It would also be true to say that instability and the 
question of the guarantee and 40 hour week and all the rest of it. You have people 
in here who came as Mr Rudd said from the mines and all the rest of it who 
actually have left here and have left for £2 and £3 less in their wages because it 
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was a guaranteed 40 hour week that is the reason why they left. That is a very 
serious point.
85
   
This demonstrates the extent to which Bathgate’s position as a branch plant situated on the 
periphery of the British motor industry contributed to the industrial relations difficulties which 
emerged in its first five years. The length of the supply line from the Midlands exacerbated the 
problem of material shortage implicit in an industry as tightly integrated as motor manufacturing, 
while the factory’s location in and exploitation of an area with high unemployment and relatively 
low wage rates meant that the high wages which compensated Midland motor workers for 
irregular working hours as well as the monotony of assembly work were not consistently 
available. While many Bathgate workers demonstrated some of the attributes of the affluent 
worker in terms of prioritising pay, which was high in comparison to most local employers, and 
new housing over any intrinsic benefits of the work itself, the wages they were paid were not 
comparable with those enjoyed by the typically affluent car workers of the Midlands and South 
East of England. 
 
Pay, Parity, and Insecurity   
In the Goldthorpe analysis, the concern with ‘income maximisation’ as a means for improving 
the individual or the individual family’s standard of living is perhaps manifested most clearly in 
the views shown towards trade unionism. The majority of workers involved in the Affluent 
Worker study became trade unionists simply out of a belief that ‘union membership pays’, rather 
than from any sense of moral conviction which, Goldthorpe writes, reflects the instrumental 
orientation taken by most of the workers towards their working lives in general.
86
 Meanwhile, 
the vast majority of semi-skilled workers attended branch meetings either ‘rarely’ or ‘never’, for 
reasons which arguably demonstrate the extent to which assembly line work alienated the 
individual from his fellow workers. One worker explained his lack of attendance saying ‘I’m not 
really interested as long as they look after me in here. I’m prepared to let the other people go’, 
while another stated explicitly that ‘the only aspect of the union I’m interested in is what goes on 
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in this factory - what concerns me.’87 Moreover, several workers gave ‘home commitments’ as 
the main reason why they were unable to attend branch meetings. Perhaps most notably, one 
stated that ‘I went before I was married. I don’t get time now, with the family – and the 
television.’88 It is worth reemphasising here that Turner, Clack, and Roberts’ estimate that over a 
quarter of all officially recorded strikes in the motor industry between 1949 and 1964 arose from 
disputes related to wages, while Chris Wrigley writes that 55 per cent of major strikes during the 
1960s resulted from wage disputes.
89
 Turner et al.’s contention that many of these pay demands 
resulted from the ‘very real expectation that wages should be fair in comparative terms’, and that 
the concept of ‘fair wages’ embodied a deeply held belief that work requiring equal effort should 
receive equal pay, forms the basis of Jon Murden’s study of ‘Demands for Fair Wages and Pay 
Parity in the British Motor Industry in the 1960s and 1970s’. 90  Murden writes that ‘wage 
comparability has a long historical pedigree as a common-place legitimatization of trade-union 
organization’, and goes on to describe the specific conditions which magnified its significance in 
the context of the motor industry. The prevalence of piecework in the industry is central to many 
studies of its industrial relations, including both Murden’s analysis and Dave Lyddon’s work on 
‘Shop Stewards and Workplace Unionism', and is closely linked to the development of multi-
unionism discussed in Chapter Four and the consequent strength of the industry’s shop stewards. 
Lyddon argues that the relatively harmonious industrial relations seen at Vauxhall and depicted 
by Goldthorpe were the exception to an industry-wide rule better represented by the ‘continuous 
challenge’ which characterised the situation at Ford. Lyddon cites Alan Fox’s analysis of this 
pattern of management-employee relations, with ‘periods of uneasy armed truce as each side 
licks its wounds and watches the enemy for a weak spot in its defences’, and contends that the 
decade from 1964 to 1973 represented the high point of workers’ bargaining power as the rising 
wages and full employment conditions of the period not only increased their expectations of 
work but also allowed shop stewards to challenge their employers and push back the ‘frontier of 
control’.91 Furthermore, he notes the link which existed between the parallel unionism which 
characterised the relationship between the ‘unions proper’ and the workplace representation 
provided by shop stewards, and what has been variously termed ‘workplace unionism’ or 
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‘factory patriotism’. 92  In this analysis, the strength and ‘bottom up’ nature of shopfloor 
organisation in the motor industry distanced shop stewards from the concerns of their trade 
unions nationally and contributed to a sense that the collective interest of motor industry workers 
was restricted to the level of the individual plant.
93
 Lyddon cites Huw Beynon, who portrays a 
‘factory class consciousness’ at Ford Halewood driven more by a desire to challenge the 
authority of management than by broader political interests.
94
 Turner et al. describe a similar 
phenomenon, arising from parallel unionism and informed by the ‘limited horizon of the 
workplace stewards’ committee’, which prioritised the issue of ‘fair pay’ over the national union 
leadership’s concern with the advance of wage-levels more generally.95  
Piecework rates were set on a factory-by-factory basis, with the result that wages for comparable 
work could vary widely between factories operated by the same company even within the tight 
labour market of the Midlands, where workers could expect to be paid between 25 per cent and 
50 per cent more than those doing equivalent work elsewhere. Worker awareness of such pay 
disparity was raised by the work of groups such as the BMCJSSC, who issued regular 
questionnaires to shop stewards across the organisation in order to collate information on pay 
rates.
96
 In 1958, workers at the Swindon factory of the Pressed Steel Company, who supplied 
body components to the BMC, responded to the knowledge that they were earning between £2 
and £3 less each week than their counterparts at the company’s plant at Cowley in Oxford by 
going on strike for a month to challenge this differential. Murden highlights the impact of 
regional policy and its attempted geographical dispersal of motor manufacturing in exacerbating 
this situation, as employers took advantage of depressed local earnings by offering lower rates in 
the Development Areas than at their existing plants.
97
 At Linwood, for example, Rootes signed 
the ‘Brabloch Agreement’, by which the company agreed to recognise five trade unions in the 
plant and, in return, would be able to negotiate wage rates locally, ‘having regard to the extra 
costs of manufacture and trading in Scotland and the rates and earnings already established in the 
district.’98 Using statistics from the Department of Employment’s Labour Cost Survey, Stephen 
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Rosevear has estimated that the labour cost savings made by motor manufacturers at their 
regional policy plants more than compensated them for the increase in transport costs associated 
with their relative geographical isolation.
99
 As the data in Table 5:1 illustrates, the plant at 
Bathgate saved the BMC over £1.2 million per year in labour costs over a Midland location. 
Table 5:1 - Annual labour cost differentials by plant, decentralised versus traditional areas 
(1972 prices, in pounds) 
 Number of workers Saving re. Midlands Saving re. South East 
Halewood 12,949 1,626,265 3,685,026 
Ellesmere Port 11,490 1,443,029 3,269,824 
Speke 4,000 502,360 1,138,320 
Linwood 8,000 2,151,360 3,423,360 
Bathgate 4,485 1,206,106 1,919,221 
(Source: S. Rosevear, ‘Regional policy and the British motor vehicle industry 1945-64: a study in selective 
intervention and the economics of industrial location’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Bristol, 1998, p.220) 
 
However, as Rosevear makes clear, the Labour Cost Survey figures do not take into account 
costs arising from stoppages, disruption, and lost production – issues of key concern to the motor 
firms – and nor do they allow for variations in labour productivity between plants.100 Rosevear 
writes that Rootes, the BMC and Vauxhall, all of whom reported difficulty in recruiting and 
training suitable labour, initially ‘traded-off labour inefficiency against lower wages’. 101  At 
Linwood, production operatives earned around 5s less per hour than their counterparts at Ryton 
outside Coventry, but were told by the company that they could expect their rates to rise as their 
productivity increased. This concern with relative productivity caused unrest among workers 
whose attitude was one of ‘money first, productivity later’, and led to 49 separate wage claims 
making comparison with the Coventry rates between the plant’s establishment in 1963 and 
March 1966.
102
 Evidence from the testimony of Jim McCulloch, a driver at Bathgate, suggests 
that BMC workers held similar views, and that the company initially took an innovative 
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approach to their emergent demands for pay parity with Birmingham, demonstrating the 
differences in skill and productivity between Midland workforces and their relatively 
inexperienced counterparts in the regional policy plants.  
It was only running for a few months and some of the workmen on the assembly 
line got it into their heads that they’re getting bigger money in Birmingham than 
we’re getting here, and that’s us now putting out twenty trucks a day, we should 
have more money. So they went outside and had a meeting, and said we’re 
wanting more money because we’ve proved that we’ve got the skills that they 
have in Birmingham, we’ve now got them. So they came back into the factory, on 
the assembly line, and the superintendent, very shrewd guy, so what he does is put 
left-hand drive vehicles on to the line, and it just ground to a halt, ‘cos they didn’t 
have the skills for left-hand drive, they hadn’t done them before. But they were 
getting into their head that because they were putting out twenty trucks a day they 
had the same skills as Birmingham. They didn’t, so he was just letting them know 
they hadn’t. Some of the things they did with the left-hand drive... As they came 
off the assembly line at the end, there was a big space to the wall and the door 
going out, and the lorries that came off, the accelerator pedal was in the middle, 
and the first two that came off hit the back wall. So again, [the superintendent] 
said to them, where’s your skills? And of course the first ten, they were sent down 
to Grangemouth docks, and they got to the bridge, I don’t know if you know the 
Avon bridge going down to Falkirk, you go down the hill, go round and there’s a 
narrow bridge, then back up.  They all came back up with the front ends damaged 
where they’d hit the, with the left-hand drive. So this was the argument between 
the workmen saying we’ve got the skills, and the management saying no you’ve 
not.
103
 
Harry Bradley remembers company management explaining the wage differential in terms of the 
costs associated with transporting components to Bathgate from the Midlands; a sign, perhaps, of 
the extent to which the BMC’s labour costs at Bathgate were shaped by the plant’s industrial 
relations and relatively low productivity.  
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I think the main thing was, because the Leyland workers in England were getting 
paid higher than what they were us up in Scotland, and the trade unions were 
fighting to get a parity with doon in England, but they, they kept getting the same 
story flown in their face, excuse me, we’ve to transport all the components up 
from England and youse have to build them, then we put the trucks back doon tae 
England again to put them abroad or sell them or whatever. So all this to-ing and 
fro-ing was always flung in the trade unions’ face.104  
Although this is not supported by Rosevear’s argument that labour cost savings in the regional 
policy plants more than off-set any additional transport costs, it is notable that in 1972 it was 
estimated by Lord Stokes, then Chairman of the BLMC, that the cost of transporting components 
to Bathgate added £18 to the cost of a BLMC truck.
105
 Furthermore, a year later in 1973, BLMC 
included in evidence submitted to parliament unaudited and unsubstantiated estimates of 
'manpower efficiency losses', according to which extra training and stoppages had together cost 
the company an additional £1.4 million each year both at Bathgate and on Merseyside.
106
  
 
The issue of pay parity was, however, of only minor importance to the 1966 Scamp inquiry into 
production at the plant. One trade union representative drew a link between the issue of parity 
and that of lay-offs and short-time, claiming that ‘if we enjoyed the wages they enjoy in the 
Midlands perhaps we would not take short time working so much to heart.’107 A second delegate, 
from the TGWU, also highlighted the question of parity and claimed that it was the source of 
considerable resentment, suggesting that, although there had at this stage been only one strike 
related to pay in the plant’s history, disquiet over the issue was beginning to emerge. 
Although it has been pointed out there has been very little dispute regarding 
wages, there is a tremendous amount of resentment in so far as the level of 
earnings are concerned. This is not just in the factory, this is in the public at large. 
It is of importance to know that we are all well below the levels of wage earnings 
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in factories where similar circumstances operate in the Midlands and the Welsh 
areas and this is one of the problems.
108
 
In Murden’s analysis, the formation of BL in 1968, and the sheer scale of the new organisation, 
‘immediately intensified the problem of regional differentials’.109 Chapter Two discussed the 
new imperative which the creation of BL placed on rationalisation of both assembly and the 
wider supply chain, but here it should be reemphasised that the new company had 80 separate 
factories, each with its own pay scale, and that, in the words of one union member cited by 
Murden, ‘the differential between factories in the group is as wide as it is between quite different 
companies.’110  
Table 5:2 Wage rates, in pounds and shillings, at factories of the BLMC and some of its 
subsidiaries, August 1970 
 Pressed 
Steel 
Fisher 
Standard 
Triumph 
Morris 
Engines 
Alvis Albion Crompton 
Leyland 
West 
Yorks. 
Foundries 
BMC 
 Cowley Coventry Coventry Coventry Glasgow Tredegar Leeds Bathgate 
Toolroom 30,15 39,00 37,00 37,16 31,00  24,50 15,80 
Fitters  37,10 26,70 44,00 28,00 24,00  14,90 
Skilled 
machinist 
30,13 37,10 34,00 39,00 28,14  30,00  
Semi-skilled 
machinist 
29,12 36,10 33,10 35,00   30,00 14,40 
Average 
piecework 
earnings 
40,00   42,00 29,14  34,00  
(Source: MRC, MSS.228/14, British Motor Corporation Wages and Conditions, 1968-1976) 
The British Leyland Trade Union Committee (BLTUC), which succeeded the BMCJSSC, 
continued to collect information about the wage rates offered across the organisation, and in 
1969 it was reported that BL’s workers in Coventry, Oxford, and Birmingham typically earned 
between £5 and £10 a week more than those at the truck and bus plant at Leyland in Lancashire, 
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and that a female toilet cleaner at the Castle Bromwich plant in Birmingham could expect to earn 
the same as a skilled male worker at Leyland.
111
 The data in Table 5:2 is taken from factory 
reports submitted to the BLTUC in 1970, and highlights the extent to which wage rates varied 
across the organisation, even for skilled production workers. Although it should be noted that the 
Bathgate rates were recorded in a document which also included slightly lower rates than those 
reported elsewhere for a number of other BLMC factories, the discrepancy between the rates 
paid in the Midlands and those paid at the company’s peripheral plants – in South Wales and 
Yorkshire as well as Scotland – was marked. This is particularly notable in the case of Bathgate 
where, not only were wage rates significantly lower than elsewhere, but productivity was, by this 
time, high. Workers at Bathgate received an incentive bonus on top of their rates which, at the 
time of the survey, amounted to an additional £2 11s, as productivity at the plant had reached 97 
per cent of the Midlands level; a notable increase from the 60 per cent reported by Scamp in 
1966.  
Ian Tennant, who worked in production planning at Bathgate and was a member of DATA, 
visited Longbridge regularly to participate in his union’s national wage negotiations. His 
description of these meetings is notable for highlighting the ‘factory patriotism’ engendered by 
the strength of shop steward organisation in the industry, and the extent to which the issue of pay 
parity could cause conflict between shop stewards operating at plant level, and national trade 
union policy. 
I cannae mind how I quite got involved, I think they were looking for a rep in the 
department, I got talked into it and then I finished off as what was called the 
corresponding member, so I was the guy who took the union dues and made sure 
they got sent down, and corresponded with the union. Part of that, ehm, you were 
involved in, I finished up involved in wage negotiations in Longbridge, I was 
flown down from Edinburgh airport into Birmingham at vast expense, and flown 
back again, and sat at the side of these meetings with all these big people from 
Personnel and higher, and that was really interesting. Went to a task meeting, and 
at that time the union was run by Ken Gill who was a Communist, and really 
draughtsmen are conservative with a small c, you know, engineers are fairly 
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conservative people and we could never understand how this Communist got to 
run it, and I remember being at a conference in Birmingham and asking why is the 
wages in Bathgate allowed to be different from everywhere else, and he didn’t 
like these questions you know, the union didn’t like these questions.112 
The issue was not, however, straightforward, and indeed the low wages paid at the peripheral 
plants exacerbated the concerns, discussed in Chapter Two, which had been expressed by shop 
stewards in the Midlands at the time of Bathgate’s establishment over the threat to their own job 
security posed by the regional policy plants undercutting their wages. This contributed to a wave 
of strike action across the BL organisation which began in 1969 when 8,500 workers in 
Lancashire went on strike demanding ‘parity with the Midlands’.113 This strike was supported by 
the BLTUC, who threatened further strike action in the Midlands if the parity issue was not 
settled, and ended after three weeks with an increase in piece rates which was taken by the shop 
stewards’ convenor at Leyland as a ‘foundation from which to achieve parity’.114 Murden writes 
that ‘this relative success by workers at Leyland encouraged other claims within the company’, 
with strikes taking place at the regional policy plant at Speke on Merseyside in August 1969, 
followed by Bathgate in January 1970. Shop stewards at Bathgate were claiming a £10 per week 
increase in order to bring their wages into line with the Midlands, but eventually settled on the 
same offer of £2 10s which had been accepted at Speke, with the prospect of future increases 
related to productivity.
115
 The issue of parity across the BL organisation was further complicated 
by the piecemeal introduction of a system of MDW in place of the piece rates which had 
traditionally predominated across the British motor industry. This had only limited direct impact 
at Bathgate, where 35 per cent of production workers had been on MDW since the plant’s 
establishment and demarcation lines were not as deeply entrenched as in the Midlands, but 
opposition to the new system and the consequently high wages which were the cost of ‘buying 
out’ piecework did provoke the longest strike in the plant’s history, referred to by one former 
shop steward as ‘the big strike’.116  
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The strike broke out in January 1972, when it was discovered through the work of the BLTUC 
that, while production workers at Bathgate were earning £5.76 for a day’s work, their 
counterparts at the company’s Morris car plant at Cowley in Oxford could earn £6.72 even when 
laid off.
117
 Bathgate’s shop stewards, recognising the unease in the Midlands over the potential 
for undercutting, argued that it was ‘in the interest of no one in the combine to have work done 
so cheaply at Bathgate’, and were given considerable support by the BLTUC who threatened 
action across the organisation should the company attempt to carry out its threat to close 
Bathgate if the strike continued.
118
 The strike ended after nine weeks and, largely as a result of 
the prospect of unrest spreading to other plants, resulted in a pay increase of £4 per week for all 
Bathgate workers. According to Chris Bett, a senior shop steward in the AEU at the plant, ‘[the 
workers] were delighted. They’d had it hard, had it hard – nine weeks.’119 For both Bett and Jim 
Swan, who went on to become convenor of shop stewards at the plant, the strike marked a real 
‘breakthrough’, and Swan remembers the impact that its success had in terms of encouraging 
trade union membership. 
Well, before I became a shop steward there was a big strike, 1972, that lasted 
something like eight weeks, and we, it was commonly known as the strike for 
parity, because the English people were getting paid a lot more than they were in 
Scotland, and eh, it’s probably the biggest percentage rise we ever got, that I ever 
got, it amounted to nearly, it must have been four pounds, and we were getting 
eighteen pounds, so about twenty five per cent an increase which was a huge jump, 
and everybody got, because it was across the board, so everybody on the shopfloor 
got a four pound rise, and it was a huge success, and it was during that strike that 
just about everybody was in the union by the end of it, although there was other 
strikes after that.
120
  
For John Moore, an AEU shop steward and night shift convenor, the strike marked a ‘real 
watershed’ in terms of both pay and conditions, as it moved the plant towards parity with the 
Midlands and secured a further annual increment in wages. Most importantly, it led to an 
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increase in lay-off pay from 70 per cent to nearly 100 per cent of earnings, which ‘helped for a 
better environment in the factory’, and marked the beginning of a period of improved industrial 
relations that was to last, in Moore’s view, until it became clear that the plant would close.121   
 
Furthermore, it is notable that the strike took place in the context of a general improvement in 
wages in Scotland relative to the rest of the UK. Figure 5:2 shows the average weekly earnings 
of male manual workers in the manufacturing industries in Scotland and the West Midlands – 
again included as a pertinent comparator due to the concentration of motor manufacturing in the 
region – as a percentage of the UK average, and illustrates the extent to which the position of 
Scotland’s manufacturing workers improved during the mid-1970s. The data presented in Table 
5:3 shows a similar improvement for workers in Scotland’s engineering and metal manufacturing 
industries: indeed, in 1975, the industry-wide average wage was higher in Scotland than the 
West Midlands for both pieceworkers and time-workers (i.e. those on MDW or similar systems). 
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Table 5:3 – Average weekly earnings of full-time male semi-skilled manual workers in 
engineering and metal-working industries, in Scotland and the West Midlands, 1970-1976 
 Scotland  West Midlands  
 Time-workers Pieceworkers Time-workers Pieceworkers 
1970 22.04 23.01 25.36 28.86 
1971 40.33 28.64 30.14 34.15 
1972 44.56 33.54 34.69 37.22 
1973 40.82 39.64 40.33 41.71 
1974 42.61 44.39 44.56 45.57 
1975 56.50 54.78 51.21 51.40 
1976 63.82 61.41 61.50 62.09 
(Source: HMSO, British Labour Statistics Year Book, Department of Employment, 1969-1976.) 
Given this marked improvement in relative rates of pay across Scottish industry, and the 
importance attributed separately by Murden and by senior shop stewards to the 1972 strike in 
securing increased wages and improved conditions at Bathgate, it is notable that the strike and its 
consequences do not feature prominently in many of the oral history testimonies. Indeed, a 
significant number of former workers don’t mention the strike at all, even when asked about 
their experiences of trade unionism and strike activity at the plant. Harry Bradley is one of the 
few who does refer to it explicitly, but for him its success was negated by the concurrent 
regrading of the workforce as part of the company’s introduction of MDW across the factory, 
examined in Chapter Four. The system of gradings that this entailed encouraged fragmented 
bargaining thereafter, heightening inter-union difficulties and sharpening differences between 
different occupational groups. Indeed it could be argued that both the long parity strike and the 
growing prominence of sectional disputes during the 1970s indicate that, by this time, the 
exceptionality of Bathgate’s industrial relations had receded somewhat, and the plant and its 
workforce had moved further in line with industry-wide trends. While evidence from company 
papers, discussed in Chapter Four, suggests that the plant’s industrial relations were relatively 
stable following the Scamp inquiry, both of these developments imply that what little strike 
activity did occur was increasingly concerned with wages, rather than with the instability of 
work. Furthermore, there is no mention of labour turnover after 1966, which can perhaps be 
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taken as a sign that the degree of discontent experienced by the workforce in the plant’s first five 
years resulted primarily from the unfamiliarity of motor industry working practice, possibly 
exacerbated by the attitude of the company to its new branch plant, and that this too receded as 
the factory became better established, and rates of pay gradually converged with Midland levels. 
Prior to the appointment of Michael Edwardes in 1977, investment in the Bathgate extension 
project and the expectation that new models would be introduced contributed to a sense of 
‘boom’ in the plant, and the increase in lay-off pay and move towards parity with the Midlands, 
secured by the 1972 strike, went some way to remove the sense that Bathgate workers were the 
ill-treated ‘country cousins’ of their Midland counterparts. In the latter part of the period, it is 
possible that deindustrialisation provided an additional factor in the increasing stability of the 
workforce, as labour turnover was positively affected by the gradual erosion of local labour 
market alternatives in the later 1970s and early 1980s. Conversely, however, it was the relative 
prosperity and stability of the mid-1970s which improved the bargaining position of the Bathgate 
workforce, even in the context of a persistently slack local labour market, and afforded its 
workers greater confidence in their own positions and in the future of motor manufacturing in 
West Lothian. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the paradox of the affluent motor worker in Scotland. Evidence from 
the 1966 Scamp inquiry suggests that the plant’s industrial relations in its first five years 
especially were notable for an exceptionally high rate of labour turnover, and for an unusual 
record of strike causation. These peculiarities reinforce the sense that a degree of unrest arose 
from the difficulties associated with establishing a new factory on a green field site. That is not 
to say, however, that these problems were the inevitable outcome of introducing semi-skilled 
assembly work to an area with a strong craft tradition and a history of employment in the heavy 
industries. Indeed, as Chapter Three shows, the work itself was not particularly problematic, and 
it seems that most strikes arose instead from the frequency of lay-offs and short-time working. 
Material shortage was a common, structural feature of motor industry work, the effects of which 
were magnified at Bathgate by the transport difficulties caused by the factory’s lack of 
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embeddedness in the local economy and its continued reliance on supplies transported by road 
from the Midlands. While the company itself insisted that supply shortages were no more 
common at Bathgate than elsewhere, the image of trucks stuck in snow and unable to reach the 
factory contributed to a narrative which seems to have informed the memories of a number of 
former workers, and which, perhaps, also exacerbated the idea of the plant as the isolated 
‘country cousin’ of the Midland motor industry, established only with great reluctance on the 
part of the BMC. Lay-offs and short-time working did, however, cause hardship for Bathgate’s 
workers, contributing to the number of workers choosing to leave the plant, including migrants 
from Glasgow, who returned to their native city. The relationship between pay, housing, and 
stability of employment is complex, and, while the experience of unemployment seems to have 
informed the importance placed by Bathgate’s workers on stability and security, the key 
consideration here was in fact pay parity. The company’s exploitation of West Lothian’s loose 
labour market meant that the wages paid at Bathgate were not sufficient compensation for 
unstable employment, leading to its high rate of labour turnover and, later, the major strike for 
parity with the Midlands. In this context, then, the location of the plant held back the wage rates 
paid to its workers and arguably hindered the development of a typically ‘affluent’ workforce, 
but the increasing concern with parity, and with sectional disputes, during the early 1970s 
suggests that the plant’s workers were taking a more instrumentalist approach to their 
employment, and in this respect its industrial relations were convergent with industry-wide 
trends. 
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Conclusion  
The announcement, in May 1984, that Leyland Bathgate was to close with the loss of all 
remaining 1,800 jobs, was reported in the FT under the headline ‘They’re not saving Leyland 
Vehicles at the expense of Bathgate’. This was a quotation from Jim Swan, the plant’s ‘affable’ 
trade union convenor, who went on to state that ‘the men are angry. They’ve nowhere else to 
go.’122 
Leyland Bathgate for sale following its closure, 1986 
 
©The Scotsman Publications Ltd. Licensor www.scran.ac.uk 
According to this article, unemployment in the Bathgate region, including the relatively 
prosperous new town of Livingston, stood at 19.3 per cent, and male unemployment would, 
following the closure, rise to nearly 50 per cent. Furthermore, it was predicted that the loss of an 
important customer would have a severely negative impact on the Ravenscraig steelworks, 
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particularly as the Linwood car plant had already closed, in 1981. Elsewhere, the newspaper 
reported on the ‘uproar in the Commons’ which had greeted Norman Tebbit, the Secretary of 
State for Industry, as he announced BL’s plans, and quoted Dr Gavin Strang, the Labour MP for 
Edinburgh East, who described the closure as ‘industrial sabotage’, and ‘a criminal and 
vindictive attack on Scotland’s industrial base’.123 Similar sentiments were expressed by the 
STUC, and the plant was the subject of an emergency motion at Congress calling for the trade 
union movement to ‘maximise support’ for the Bathgate workforce in its struggle against closure 
and a potential repeat of the ‘Linwood catastrophe’, whereby one year after the plant shut, fifty 
per cent of its former workforce remained unemployed.
124
 The political context of the miners’ 
strike, and fears over the ‘decimation of industry’ in Scotland strengthened the union response, 
with a National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) delegate promising to send pickets to Bathgate 
should the company attempt to move any plant or equipment away, and a member of the General 
Council, in summing up, stating that: 
The Secretary of State for Scotland does not seem to be interested in the future 
of a major industry in Scotland. But we have come to expect this from our 
Scottish Secretary. The Government and particularly the Prime Minister, has an 
apparent disregard for the people of Scotland as shown by their lack of effort in 
protecting basic industries since they came to power in 1979.
125
 
This was an articulation of the idea, discussed in Chapters Two and Four of this thesis, that the 
closure of the plant formed part of a wider attack by the Thatcher government on nationalised 
industry, and nationalised industry in Scotland in particular. For the FT, however, the closure of 
Bathgate was not a deliberate assault on Scottish manufacturing, but rather an example of ‘the sad 
fate of regional policy’ which, following so soon after the closure of Linwood, demonstrated the 
failure of government attempts to provide jobs and absorb unemployment in industrial 
Scotland.
126
 Certainly, the contrast between an unemployment rate of 19 per cent at the time of 
closure, and the seven per cent at the time of the plant’s establishment cited by the FT, is stark, 
and the article paints a bleak picture of life in a town suffering from a loss of employment and, 
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consequently, retail revenue. However, it also points to developments in Livingston, where two 
major electronics firms had recently opened, and in the Scottish economy more widely. 
According to the article, 40,000 jobs had been created by electronics firms in Scotland, and 64 
per cent of the Scottish workforce was employed in service industries, which had taken over from 
manufacturing and construction as the largest employment sector.
127
 While the closure of Leyland 
Bathgate undoubtedly had a devastating impact on its workers and on life in the town more 
generally, the context outlined in the FT was indicative of the continuous nature of economic 
development, and the extent to which electronics had come to replace motor manufacturing as the 
latest ‘panacea’ for the Scottish economy.128  
This was explored in Chapter One, which began with a discussion of the campaign against the 
closure of both Leyland Bathgate and the nearby Plessey engineering works, and the manner in 
which this campaign represented a community response to deindustrialisation. Emphasising the 
centrality of industrial employment to life in West Lothian, the analysis considered the impact of 
the regional policy intervention as a response to a previous wave of industrial closure which 
mitigated the effects of the rundown of heavy industries across Central Scotland, but had the 
effect of prolonging the area’s dependence on manufacturing employment. However, the scale 
and modernity of the BMC plant, and the opportunities expected of motor industry work, marked 
a new stage in the county’s development. This was reflected in the construction of new housing in 
Bathgate, and the old mining villages of Blackburn and Whitburn, which modernised the urban 
environment of West Lothian and acted as an important ‘pull factor’ for workers from Glasgow 
and its conurbation, attracted to the plant primarily by the opportunity it afforded them to move 
from cramped accommodation in city tenements to new, spacious houses. This contributed to an 
increase particularly in the population of young couples and families, creating a sense of Bathgate 
as a dynamic and relatively prosperous ‘boom town’. The growth from 1962 of Livingston 
arguably ‘crowded out’ West Lothian’s older industrial settlements, diverting investment away 
from the motor industry and into electronics in particular, placing limits on the development of 
Bathgate as a commercial and administrative centre. The contrasting experiences of Bathgate and 
Livingston perhaps encapsulate the competing and sometimes contradictory aims of post-war 
regional policy, which sought to provide jobs in areas of high unemployment while promoting the 
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development of New Towns as growth-points which could alleviate inflationary pressures in the 
congested South-East of England especially.
129
 BMC Bathgate was not, however, established 
solely as a short-term response to unemployment, and it had been envisaged that, alongside the 
concurrent developments at Ravenscraig and Linwood, it would provide an anchor for further 
motor industry development in Scotland. The assumption that the dispersal of motor 
manufacturing to the peripheral Development Areas (renamed Development Districts from 1960) 
would attract ancillary industries and encourage existing Scottish engineering firms to diversify 
into the manufacture of vehicle components was, however, incorrect,
130
 and the consequences of 
the subsequent isolation of Bathgate and Linwood have been central to analyses of regional 
policy in Scotland which have stressed its role in the development of what has been termed 
‘branch plant syndrome’.131 
Chapter Two, which discussed the establishment of Bathgate in the context of the longer-term 
development of motor manufacturing in Britain, considered the explanations for this apparent 
failure to develop a viable Scottish motor industry, and some of the implications of this for 
production at the plant. The company’s reluctance to move out of the Midlands was reflected in 
an unwillingness to engage effectively with Scottish engineering firms, while Midlands-based 
component makers, requiring no additional capacity in order to meet the supply demands of 
Bathgate and Linwood, had no reason to move production to Scotland. For motor manufacturers 
including Ford, Vauxhall, and Standard-Triumph, each of which intended to expand and would 
have to move to the Development Areas in order to do so, Merseyside offered a more 
economically viable alternative to Scotland, primarily because of its comparative ease of access 
to suppliers and markets in the Midlands and South-East of England. At Linwood, 78 per cent of 
total externally purchased parts were supplied by firms located 250 miles or more away from the 
plant, and in 1972 it was estimated by Lord Stokes, the Chairman of what was then the British 
Leyland Motor Corporation (BLMC), that the cost of transporting components to Bathgate added 
£18 to the cost of a BLMC truck.
132
 As 75 per cent of the plant’s output was sold in southern 
England, most trucks then incurred an additional transport cost of £40, making a total cost penalty 
of £58 per vehicle, or between three and four per cent of the normal selling price of an average 
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five-ton truck.
133
 As well as this apparent increase in production costs – which it should be noted 
has been qualified by Stephen Rosevear – the relative isolation in motor industry terms of both 
Bathgate and Linwood exacerbated the impact of the supply problems endemic in the British 
motor industry, and caused concern over the instability of motor industry work in Scotland. The 
length of the supply chain increased the potential for disruption, and frequent instances of lay-offs 
and short-time working as a result of supply shortages contributed to high levels of unofficial 
strike action in Bathgate’s first five years especially. While the evidence suggests that this 
situation improved with the opening of the M6 motorway and with the management decision, 
taken in the wake of the 1966 Scamp inquiry into the productivity and strike activity at the plant, 
to increase the level of supplies held on site, the image of truckloads of components struggling to 
reach an isolated factory has had some effect in terms of shaping the memories of the plant’s 
former workers. This has arguably been magnified by the attitude of the company, which made 
no secret of its reluctance to move to Scotland, and of those of their Midland colleagues who 
demonstrated their resentment of Bathgate’s relatively under-paid ‘tartan scabs’ by writing 
abusive graffiti on components sent to the plant for assembly.
134
  
The reaction of Midland motor workers to the regional policy plants reflects their own loss of 
security in what was, from the mid-1970s, an industry experiencing growing challenges, 
particularly as vehicle imports increased markedly following the UK’s accession to the EEC in 
1973. Indeed, the shift in the focus of regional policy priorities in Scotland from motor 
manufacturing to electronics reflected both the difficulties associated with attracting further 
motor industry investment, and a response to the emergent problems facing Britain’s motor 
manufacturers. While the imperative placed on motor industry development in Scotland had 
grown out of the success of the industry in driving the growth and affluence experienced in the 
Midlands especially, weaknesses in that region’s economy and its dependence on motor 
manufacturing were beginning to appear in a period which saw profound changes in the structure 
of the industry and its supply chain. The rationalisation of BL in particular accelerated following 
the 1977 appointment of Michael Edwardes as chairman and managing director, and indeed the 
Bathgate closure must be considered in the context of the restructuring of both BL and the British 
motor industry more broadly. The mid-1970s had, in fact, seen something of a boom in 
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production at Bathgate, and, following the Ryder Report in 1974, considerable investment was 
made in the construction of the B Block extension as part of a drive to increase production at both 
Bathgate and Albion Motors in Glasgow. However, Edwardes’ rejection of Ryder’s expansionist 
recommendations, and his insistence that the only way to save the company was ‘to restructure, 
de-man, modernise, and drive through the product plan’, implied that plant closures and 
redundancies would be necessary, while his belief that government intervention in the motor 
industry had contributed to its over-capacity threatened the future of the regional policy plants 
specifically. The evidence suggests that the performance of Bathgate was affected more by design 
and engineering problems than by strike action and other forms of worker protest, but Edwardes 
was able to draw on the prevailing narrative of low productivity and labour culpability in order to 
close first the regional policy plant at Speke on Merseyside – described by Edwardes as ‘a prime 
candidate for closure’ in part because of the transport costs conferred by its location – and then 
Bathgate.
135
  
Indeed, the plant’s industrial relations were, from the late 1960s until the appointment of 
Edwardes, apparently notably stable, and its Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee (JSSC) relatively 
moderate. In this respect the experience of the plant contrasts sharply with branch plant analyses 
which have emphasised Linwood’s reputation for militancy, and the labour difficulties associated 
with adapting previously skilled workers to assembly line production methods.
136
 This has been 
closely linked to the idea that branch plants, such as Bathgate, have provided only low level 
assembly work, and contributed to the deskilling of the Scottish industrial workforce. Chapter 
Three explored the nature of the work provided at Bathgate and, while it is certainly true that the 
majority of those employed at the plant were in semi-skilled roles, it is important to note that this 
reflected the nature of work in the motor industry more generally. Indeed, Chapter Three 
highlighted the paradoxical position of the affluent motor worker in Scotland and the unrealistic 
contemporary expectations of motor assembly work which, although relatively clean and well-
paid, was overwhelmingly semi-skilled, and renowned for its monotony. The STUC and SCDI 
had both stressed the importance to Scotland’s future prosperity of attracting motor industry 
development, in part because of the industry’s role in supporting the full employment and 
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increasing affluence seen in the Midlands and South-East, but the STUC in particular would later 
express concern over the nature of the work offered by the motor industry branch plants, and the 
lack of opportunity for young people especially to find more skilled work. These concerns 
anticipated later branch plant analyses, overlooking the nature of most motor industry work and 
the extent to which the high wages paid in the industry represented a ‘pay-off’ for the loss of 
autonomy associated with the moving assembly line. This idea is central to major contemporary 
studies of work in the industry, most notably the Goldthorpe Affluent Worker analysis, and Huw 
Beynon’s work on Ford, which also emphasises the contested nature of assembly line production 
and the ways in which workers responded to its monotony by seeking to alleviate their boredom, 
and control their time and effort. While former Bathgate assembly line workers are under-
represented in the WEA oral history testimony, there is evidence that the experience of work at 
the plant was shaped by these features of production on a moving track, and particularly the 
centrality of camaraderie and ‘having a laugh’ for those on the assembly line. 
It is clear, then, that the semi-skilled nature of most work at Bathgate resembled conditions in the 
motor industry more generally, and was not a function of its position as a peripheral branch plant. 
Peter Scott’s distinction between industrial policy in the Development Areas and that in the 
London New Towns (LNTs) does, though, seem relevant, emphasising the extent to which the 
decision to disperse motor manufacturing to the Development Areas grew out of the social 
imperative of providing jobs, rather than more economic concerns. In Scott’s analysis, labour 
intensive mass assembly industries were directed to areas of high unemployment and relatively 
low skill, whereas the more advantageous conditions of the South-East of England encouraged 
the growth of more high-tech, capital intensive firms in and around the LNTs.
137
 This reflects 
Scott’s contention that regional policy in the Development Areas was driven primarily by the 
need to create jobs in the short-term, and the perception of the peripheral regions as low-wage 
areas, ‘suitable mainly for labour-intensive or overspill branch-plant production’.138 As discussed 
above, however, Bathgate was not envisaged solely in terms of job creation, and was expected to 
function alongside Linwood and Ravenscraig in providing the foundation for a Scottish motor 
industry which would modernise the Scottish industrial base and provide what the STUC 
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described as ‘the right kind of work’ in a growing and prosperous industry. 139  While the 
overwhelmingly semi-skilled variety of motor industry work disappointed the STUC’s 
expectations, there are indications in the oral history testimony of the esteem in which work at the 
plant was held, and of the opportunities it provided for workers to gain additional skills and 
experience. Although the majority of training provided to its workers was on-the-job – a further 
reflection of industry-wide norms – the apprenticeship programme, run in conjunction with the 
newly established Bathgate College, provided local school leavers with the opportunity to 
develop engineering, technical, and secretarial skills, and, by the late 1970s, was available to both 
men and women. For those employed in semi-skilled roles on the assembly lines, work was well-
paid relative to other local employers and, certainly in comparison to the conditions in coal 
mines, shale pits, or iron foundries, clean and safe. Scott’s emphasis on the low pay, by South-
East standards, which prevailed in the Development Areas is, however, important, reflecting the 
extent to which companies investing in and moving production to these areas were able to take 
advantage of local labour market conditions in offering lower wages than were paid elsewhere. 
This had significant implications for Bathgate, particularly as the plant became better established 
and its industrial relations converged with industry-wide trends.    
Chapter Four considered union representation and shopfloor organisation at the plant, and 
suggested the limitations of branch plant analyses which stress the fractious industrial relations 
seen at Linwood in particular, and the extent to which such problems resulted from the plant’s 
position in an area with little experience of light engineering and a tradition of labour 
militancy.
140
 In fact, industrial relations at Bathgate were, for much of the plant’s lifetime, largely 
unremarkable. Structural features of motor industry trade unionism, including the presence of a 
number of unions and the strength of its shop steward organisation, were reflected at the plant, 
and evidence from the oral history testimony suggests that much of the strike action which did 
occur reflected the industry-wide trend for very short stoppages, often over relatively minor 
sectional disputes. Only in terms of its strike causation and high level of labour turnover does its 
experience seem exceptional, and these are both issues which seem to have receded following the 
Scamp inquiry of 1966. Scamp found that the majority of the unofficial strike action seen at the 
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plant in its first five years resulted primarily from discontent caused by the frequency of lay-offs 
and short-time working; issues which can be characterised as ‘teething troubles’, improving 
markedly as the factory, its workforce, and its supply lines, became more settled. It is notable that 
the inquiry praised the Bathgate shop stewards for their role in a marked improvement in the 
plant’s industrial relations, and the behaviour of the plant’s shop stewards both at the time of the 
inquiry and into the 1970s seems to have been in line with the Donovan Commission’s analysis 
of motor industry stewards as ‘more of a lubricant than an irritant’. 141  There is very little 
suggestion of any politically motivated strike action at the plant, and, while some former workers 
have expressed anti-trade union views and criticism of the behaviour of the stewards, former shop 
stewards themselves have stressed their role in resolving disputes before they could reach 
management level or result in strike action. The shop stewards played an important role also as 
community activists, arranging events and contributing to local fundraising efforts which helped 
to embed the factory in the wider social life of the town and its surrounding area, and were 
instrumental in tackling health and safety problems such as the use of asbestos and lunchtime 
drinking. Furthermore, even those former workers with little knowledge of or interest in its work, 
either in the factory or in the community, have acknowledged the success of the JSSC in 
improving pay and conditions for the Bathgate workforce.  
Chapter Five analysed the issue of pay parity, which emerged from an increasing awareness of 
the discrepancy between the wages paid at Bathgate and those which the company paid its 
workers in the Midlands and South-East, and contributed to a sense that the plant’s workers were 
the ‘country cousins’ of their Midland colleagues. The company’s attitude to its Bathgate branch 
plant, and its expectation that labour in the Development Areas would be cheaper than in the 
Midlands, had some effect in shaping the culture of work at the plant, and explains the frequency 
and character of discontent expressed during its first five years in both strike action and its 
exceptionally high level of labour turnover. As wages at Bathgate remained relatively low, its 
workers did not benefit from the ‘pay-off’ which ameliorated the monotony and instability of 
motor industry work for those in higher-wage areas. While the concern over the stability of 
working hours was reflected elsewhere in the industry, at Bathgate it was informed primarily by 
the experience of unemployment and continued scarcity of alternative work in the area rather than 
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the desire to maximise income seen amongst the Ford workers studied by Beynon, and 
Goldthorpe’s affluent workers in Luton. As the plant became better established, its working hours 
and conditions more stable, and its productivity closer to the company-wide level, the issue of 
parity grew in importance, demonstrating the extent to which the behaviour and attitudes of the 
Bathgate workforce were converging with motor industry-wide trends, as, during the 1970s, 
strike activity increasingly resulted from wage disputes rather than dissatisfaction with lay-offs 
and short-time working. While the ‘privatism’ which marked the development of the affluent 
working class in England remained notably absent, it is arguable that the attraction of the modern 
housing constructed for Bathgate’s incoming workers, as well as the growing visibility of pay 
disputes during the 1970s, reflected an increasing instrumentalism amongst the plant’s workers. 
The strength of its shop stewards movement, however, and the role of the shop stewards as 
community as well as workplace activists, suggests that, in spite of this shift in orientations to 
work, organised labour retained its importance and, it seems, its influence. This was most 
apparent during the campaign against closure in 1982, when the Leyland shop stewards, working 
alongside their counterparts at nearby Plessey, were able to build considerable community 
support for their respective occupations and, in the case of Plessey, had some success in 
extending the life of the plant. 
Shop stewards and skilled workers are over-represented in the WEA sample, reflecting their own 
positive experiences of work at the plant, and the extent of their engagement with industrial 
relations issues and the labour movement more broadly. The relative absence of assembly line 
workers is, perhaps, telling, and any future, independent oral history project might seek to 
overcome this limitation. This is particularly important as much of the branch plant literature 
concentrates on the ‘newness’ and unfamiliarity of mass production techniques in Scotland, and 
the difficulties associated with adapting a previously skilled workforce to monotonous assembly 
line processes. While the testimony of those assembly workers included in the sample, such as 
John Hastings and Tommy Morrison, suggests that the work was not considered particularly 
problematic and that the plant was generally a good place to work, the absence of assembly 
workers from the project and the initially high levels of labour turnover and absenteeism indicate 
considerable dissatisfaction and low morale amongst its semi-skilled workforce. Furthermore, 
although the community-based nature of the campaigns at Plessey and Leyland, and the press 
reaction to the announcement that the motor plant would close, demonstrate the social 
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embeddedness of each factory in the town, they also illustrate the continued centrality of 
industrial employment to the economy of West Lothian. Indeed, the establishment of the plant, in 
part a short-term response to high unemployment, actually magnified the effects of its eventual 
closure by reasserting the sense of ‘industrial permanence’ which surrounded manufacturing 
employment in Scotland during the twentieth century: the reindustrialisation of West Lothian 
during the 1960s meant that, by the 1980s, the area remained disproportionately reliant on 
manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, coal extraction. The real pain and distress which the loss of 
such an important employer caused for its workers should not be underestimated and, again, 
could be considered in more detail than the WEA sample of relatively highly skilled and therefore 
comparatively employable former workers allows. However, it should also be recognised that the 
closure of the plant, and its impact on the local economy, has shaped popular perceptions of its 
role over the previous quarter of a century and has undoubtedly influenced interpretations of 
regional policy in Scotland more generally.  
By considering the testimonies of some of the plant’s former workers, this thesis has contributed 
a new perspective to this literature, which has illuminated the way in which regional policy was 
experienced on the shopfloor, and engaged with a range of key debates in the historiography of 
Scotland and Britain since 1945. The role of regional policy in shaping broader economic and 
social development has emerged from the oral history testimonies of workers for whom the plant 
was an example of ‘social engineering done in the right way’ which brought significant benefits 
to the town of Bathgate and, for many, provided a very positive experience of work over a period 
of 25 years. This was not, however, universal, and it is important not to overlook the production 
and industrial relations difficulties which arose at the plant, and reflected the problems facing 
British motor manufacturing more generally. Indeed, many of these problems were experienced 
in exaggerated form at Bathgate, magnified by the length of the supply chain from the Midlands 
and the specialist skill and material requirements of commercial vehicle manufacturing. The 
location of the plant in an area of high unemployment on the periphery of the UK motor industry 
undoubtedly contributed to these difficulties, creating uncertainty over the stability of work and, 
in the plant’s first few years especially, holding back wages relative to the Midlands. However, 
the plant brought with it real social improvements in terms of new housing and relatively clean 
and safe work which, by the mid-1970s, was also well paid. This relative prosperity shaped the 
attitudes and behaviour of Bathgate workers, whose increasingly instrumentalist approach to 
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work was reflected in the growing prevalence of wage disputes throughout the 1970s. While this 
arguably signifies the development of a more typically ‘affluent’ workforce, it is the complexity 
of the relationship between pay, housing, and the security of employment which emerges from 
the testimony of former Bathgate workers. Wages between Bathgate and the West Midlands were 
converging in the 1970s, but employment insecurity remained a greater worry or preoccupation in 
Scotland. Recurrent threats to the survival of the plant; unemployment and under-employment; 
the general context of economic slowdown and deindustrialisation; the importance of collective 
action as a means to pursue individual goals; each of these factors, significant at Bathgate in the 
1960s and 1970s, highlights the limited salience of the affluent worker model in Scotland and, in 
turn, adds nuance to our understanding of motor workers in Britain as well as in Scotland since 
1945. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
246 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Oral history interviews 
McAndrew, Robert and Christine, interviewed by Catriona Macdonald at their home in 
Grangemouth, 5
th
 April 2011. Robert was a maintenance worker at the plant from 1961 
until 1970. Christine worked in the drawing office for around eighteen months. They 
moved to Bathgate from the Grangemouth area, and left following Robert’s decision to 
take redundancy from the plant. Robert was vice-convenor and social convenor of the AEU 
during his time at Bathgate. 
McCulloch, Jim, interviewed by Catriona Macdonald at his home in Whitburn, 2
nd
 February 
2012. Jim was a driver at the plant – the first hourly paid worker to be taken on. He lived in 
Fauldhouse, and worked at Bathgate until 1968 when he left to take up a job at 
Ravenscraig. He chose not to be involved in the trade union movement as he felt his father, 
a coal-miner and committed socialist, had been persecuted for his union activity. 
 
Workers’ Education Association ‘Bathgate Once More’ oral history project – 
recordings held at West Lothian Archives Service, Linlithgow 
Aitken, Guthrie, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan at Bathgate Volunteer Centre, 9
th
 November 
2010. Guthrie was born in Blackridge and started work at the BMC in 1962. He worked in 
the stores in the tractor plant, became a superintendent, and then moved into senior 
management. He was initially a member of the NUVB. He left the plant in 1973 when he 
was offered a job that would give him a company car. 
Bett, Chris, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan at the Bennie Museum, 26
th
 May 2011. Chris was a 
member of the AEU and vice-convenor of the shop stewards, and along with Tommy 
Morrison, represented the JSSC at national, company-wide meetings of shop stewards. He 
247 
 
was also an active member of the Communist Party, and was once sacked for campaigning 
on company premises. He stayed at the plant until closure. 
Bradley, Harry, interviewed by Harry Cartmill at the Bennie Museum, 12
th
 December 2011. 
Harry went to school in Blackridge and worked at a steel foundry before moving to the 
factory in 1972. He worked in fly wheel production, and then in the stores until he was 
made redundant in 1986. He was an AEU shop steward. 
Brogan (nee Love), Joyce, interviewed by Helen Jeffery at her home in Armadale, 15
th
 March 
2011. Joyce grew up in Armadale and worked in the planning office from 1967 until 
shortly before the closure. She was a member of a trade union and attended union 
meetings, but doesn’t remember which one. 
Cooper, John, interviewed by Helen Jeffery at the Bennie Museum, 24
th
 February 2011. John 
grew up in Longridge, near Whitburn. He joined the BMC in 1962 and worked on the 
engine assembly line until he was made redundant in 1984. He was a member of the AEU, 
and then ASTMS following his promotion to foreman, but was not involved with the JSSC. 
Davies, Bruce, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan at the Bennie Museum, 20
th
 December 2011. 
Bruce was born in Port Talbot and took a job with the company after graduating in 
mechanical engineering from the University of Manchester in 1969. He agreed to move to 
Bathgate, which he thought was a suburb of Birmingham, and worked as a design engineer 
at the plant until 1975. He was a member of DATA, and decided to leave the plant as he 
had concerns over the design of the tractors it was producing. 
Duncan, John, interviewed by Helen Jeffery at his home in Armadale, 24
th
 May 2011. John was 
born in Pittulie, Aberdeenshire, and worked initially as an ironmonger. He moved to 
Bathgate in 1961 and took a job in the BMC as a tool buyer. He was promoted to chief 
store keeper in the tool store, and was among the last to leave the plant as he was 
responsible for organising the transfer of tools to other BL factories in Coventry. He 
doesn’t remember which union he belonged to.   
Harvey (nee Swan), Elaine, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan at the Bennie Museum, 23
rd
 May 
2011. Elaine is the daughter of Jim Swan. She grew up in Whitburn and, in 1981, became 
248 
 
the first female engineering apprentice at the plant. She left in 1985, three months short of 
finishing her apprenticeship, but was able to qualify as a jig and tool designer with Terex 
Equipment in Newhouse, Lanarkshire.  
Hastings, John, interviewed by Helen Jeffery and Catriona Macdonald at the Bennie Museum, 
25
th
 February 2011. John grew up in Whitburn. He worked on the tractor assembly line 
from 1971 until 1982, when he was made redundant. He was a member of the TGWU, but 
was not involved with the JSSC. 
Hunter, Andy, interviewed by Harry Cartmill at the Bennie Museum, 13
th
 December 2011. Andy 
was born in Armadale and worked in a clay pit before moving to the factory in 1972. He 
worked on the main truck assembly line before taking redundancy in 1980. He was a shop 
steward in the NUVB and a member of the JSSC. 
Marr, Alan, interviewed by Helen Jeffery at his home in Livingston, 2
nd
 May 2011. Alan was 
born in Bathgate and joined the plant as an engineering apprentice, around 1970. He then 
worked in maintenance, until he left the plant in 1983 following the closure of the tractor 
plant. He was a member of the AEU but was not active in the union. 
McCulloch, Jim, interviewed by Helen Jeffery at his home in Whitburn, 23
rd
 May 2011. See 
above. 
McKay, Harry and Cecilia, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan at their home in Armadale, 17
th
 May 
2011. Harry grew up in Armadale and was an apprentice moulder in a steel foundry before 
moving to the BMC in 1961. He worked as a foreman in the pre-pack section, preparing 
KD and CKD kits for export, and was a member of ASTMS. He left the plant in 1981 
when he realised it would close, and emigrated to South Africa where he worked for 
Nissan.  
Miller, Dougie, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan and Catriona Macdonald at the Bennie Museum, 
27
th
 July 2011. Dougie was born in Cessnock, New South Wales, to parents who had 
emigrated from West Lothian. They moved back to Whitburn in 1946, and Dougie started 
work at the BMC in 1963. He was a pipe fitter and convenor of shop stewards in the PTU. 
He left the plant due to illness in 1983. 
249 
 
Mitchell, Hugh, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan at his home in Bathgate, 19
th
 May 2011. Hugh 
was born in the Dennistoun area of Glasgow. He worked as a grocer and a chimney sweep, 
before moving first to Honeywell Controls in Motherwell and then, in 1961, to the BMC. 
He worked as a tool setter in the milling section. 
Moore, John, interviewed by Helen Jeffery and Catriona Macdonald at the Bennie Museum, 
Bathgate, 10
th
 February 2011. John was born in the Gorbals area of Glasgow and moved to 
Whitburn with his family to take up a job with the BMC in 1965. He was an inspector in 
the truck and tractor detail section, and stayed at the plant until 1984. John was a shop 
steward in the AEU and then ASTMS, and was involved in the campaign against closure. 
Moore, Vince, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan and Catriona Macdonald at his workplace in 
Glasgow, 25
th
 July 2011. Vince was brought up in Armadale and joined BL as an 
engineering apprentice in 1979. He then worked in the tool room until 1984 when it 
became clear that the plant would close. He wasn’t involved with the shop stewards 
movement, but thinks he was a member of the GMB. 
Morrison, Tommy, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan at the Bennie Museum, 27
th
 May 2011. 
Tommy grew up in Armadale, where he worked initially in a steel foundry. He was made 
redundant in 1961, and started work on the cab assembly line at the BMC where he stayed 
until the plant closed. He was a shop steward in the TGWU and active member of the 
JSSC, and was involved in the campaign against closure. 
Paton, Kenny, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan and Catriona Macdonald at the Bennie Museum, 
28
th
 July 2011. Kenny was born in the Gorbals and moved to Whitburn in 1972. He started 
as an assembly worker at the BMC in 1975, and then became a welder in the maintenance 
department. He was vice-convenor of the Boilermakers’ union and was very active in the 
JSSC and the campaign against closure. He was made redundant in 1986. 
Raine, Bill, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan at his home in Westfield, 18
th
 November 2011. Bill 
was born in County Durham and grew up in Birmingham, where he worked for Austin at 
Longbridge. He moved to Bathgate in 1962 as a foreman, and worked as a superintendent 
in the machine shop until 1982. He was not involved with a trade union, and is critical of 
the JSSC. 
250 
 
Swan, Jim, interviewed by Harry Cartmill and Catriona Macdonald at his home in Whitburn, 8
th
 
June 2011. Jim grew up in Harthill and was in the merchant navy before joining the BMC 
in 1965 where he worked as a tool room fitter. He was an AEU shop steward, and became 
convenor of the JSSC. He was heavily involved in the campaign against closure, appearing 
on television news bulletins and in the newspapers, and is now well-known in West 
Lothian as a Labour councillor.  
Tennant, Ian, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan at the Bennie Museum, 12
th
 October 2011. Ian was 
born in Whitburn and did his apprenticeship with an engineering firm in Motherwell. He 
moved to the BMC in 1965 and worked in the planning department until he was made 
redundant in 1980. He was active in DATA and TASS. 
Walker, Lenny, interviewed by Helen Jeffery and Catriona Macdonald at his home in Bathgate, 
11
th
 February 2011. Lenny grew up in Gartcosh, Lanarkshire, and moved to Bathgate in 
1964. He began as an assembly line worker, and became a skilled grinder. He stayed at the 
plant until its closure. Lenny was a shop steward in the AEU, and was involved in the 
campaign against closure. 
Weir, John, interviewed by Elizabeth Bryan at the Bennie Museum, 30
th
 May 2011. John was 
born at Mosside Farm, Bathgate, where his parents worked as farm labourers, and the plant 
would later be built. He started as an engineering apprentice in 1964 and became a 
planning engineer. He was a member of TASS, and left the plant shortly before its closure. 
 
Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick 
MSS.101/M/3/9 – Papers of the National Society of Metal Manufacturers (NSMM) 
 
MSS.178/15 – Papers of Sir Jack Scamp, BMC [British Motor Corporation] (Scotland) Limited, 
Bathgate: cause and extent of lay-offs, 1966 
 
MSS.228/2 – Papers of the British Motor Corporation Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee 
(BMCJSSC), 1958-1969 
251 
 
 
MSS.228/3 – Papers of the BMCJSSC, 1970-1978 
 
MSS.338/ROD, Rubery Owen (Scotland) Ltd; Directors’ minute book 
 
 
British Motor Industry Heritage Trust, Heritage Motor Centre, Gaydon, 
Warwickshire 
80/98/1/75-BMC-1, BMC business records 
80/98/12/75-BMC-12, BMC personnel records 
80/98/20/75-BMC-20, BMC Scotland Ltd./Leyland Motors Scotland corporate records. 
80/152/1/75-BLT-1, British Leyland Truck and Bus Division corporate records 
80/109/1/75-GUY-1, Guy Motors (Europe) Ltd. business records 
95/115/1/76-ALB-1, Albion Motors corporate records 
 
The National Archives, Kew 
LAB 10/2261 – Ministry of Labour, Motor Industry, British Motor Corporation Ltd., Labour 
problems in Development Districts, 1964 
LAB 12/1544 – Ministry of Labour, Unemployment Benefit, Emergency Benefit Procedure, 
Short Time Working at BMC Factories, 1966 
LAB 18/1391 – Ministry of Labour, Retraining of Men Declared Redundant at BMC Bathgate – 
West Lothian. Meeting of Mr Tam Dalyell MP with the Minister 
 
 
252 
 
National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh 
SEP4/1658 – Scottish Development Department, Specific Industries – Motorengineering – 
General, 1959-1960 
SEP4/1660 – Scottish Development Department, Specific Industries – Motor Engineering, 
British Motor Corporation, 1960 
SEP4/1661 – Scottish Development Department, Specific Industries – Motor Engineering: 
British Motor Corporation, 1960-1964 
SEP4/1695 – Scottish Council (Devt. and Industry) Committee of Enquiry into Scottish 
Economy (Toothill), Papers Circulated 
SEP4/2400 – Scottish Development Department, Specific Industries, Motor Engineering – 
British Motor Corporation, 1966-1967 
SEP4/2401 – Scottish Development Department, Specific Industries – Motor Engineering, 
British Motor Corporation, 1969-1970 
 
Scottish Trades’ Union Congress archive, Glasgow Caledonian University 
Annual reports of the Scottish Trades’ Union Congress, 1959-1986 
Minutes of West Lothian Trades’ Council, 1967-1969 
Miscellaneous papers of West Lothian Trades’ Council, 1970-1976 
Minutes of West Lothian Trades’ Council, Bathgate Burgh Committee, 1967-1969 
Report of the Working Party on Economic Prospects and Employment in the Bathgate Area, 
1984 
 
 
253 
 
West Lothian County Council archive, Livingston 
Minutes of West Lothian County Council, 1958-1970 
 
Scottish Screen Archive 
County on the Move – Scottish Educational Films Agency, IFA (Scotland), directed by Laurence 
Henson, 1966. 
The New Scotland – Education Films of Scotland, Thames and Clyde, 1964. 
 
Young in Heart – Films of Scotland and the Rootes Group, Glasgow Films, 1963. 
 
Make Way for Steel – Films of Scotland and Colvilles Ltd., Templar Film Studios, 1966. 
 
The Big Mill – Films of Scotland and Colvilles Ltd., Templar Film Studios, directed by Laurence 
Henson, 1963. 
 
Media Archive for Central England, University of Lincoln 
Midlands News television reports: 
7
th
 January 1975, ‘Communist shop steward at Longbridge retires’ 
11
th
 June 1975, ‘Rover Solihull’ 
13
th
 June 1975, ‘Triumph Coventry’ 
29
th
 July 1975, ‘Foreign Cars’ 
4
th
 May 1976, ‘Foreign Cars’ 
10
th
 January 1977, interview with Eric Varley, Secretary of State for industry 
19
th
 August 1977, ‘BL problems with Lucas strike’ 
254 
 
25
th
 August 1977, ‘BL dispute’ 
26
th
 August 1977, ‘Longbridge workers hold protest meeting’ 
9
th
 January 1978, ‘BL reorganisation proposals’ 
5
th
 May 1978, ‘BL shop stewards attend meeting, AUEW, Birmingham’  
14
th
 February 1979, ‘BL dispute’ 
20
th
 November 1979, ‘Robinson sacking’ 
21
st
 November 1979, ‘Robinson’ 
21
st
 November 1979, unbroadcast trims 
26
th
 November 1979, ‘Robinson’  
27
th
 November 1979, ‘Robinson’ 
28
th
 November 1979, ‘Robinson’ 
5
th
 December 1979, ‘Robinson’ 
8
th
 Januar 1980, ‘Car sales’ 
6
th
 February 1980, ‘Robinson’ 
20
th
 February 1980, ‘Derek Robinson’ 
20
th
 February 1980, unbroadcast trims  
30
th
 April 1980, ‘Robbo - Derek Robinson industrial tribunal’ 
20
th
 August 1980, ‘Yanks’ 
20
th
 August 1980, unbroadcast trims 
15
th
 October 1980, ‘Motor show’ 
 
255 
 
Wolverhampton Archives and Local Studies  
D/S0/23/12-14 – Minutes of John Thompson Motor Pressings Shop Stewards’ Committee, 1953-
1982 
D/S0/23/16 – Minutes of John Thompson Group Shop Stewards’ Committee, March 1961-
November 1972 
 
Official Publications 
Census Small Area Statistics (London: HMSO, 1971-1981) 
Census vol.6, Occupation, Industry and Workplace (London: HMSO, 1961-1971)  
Central Statistical Office, Abstract of Regional Statistics (London: HMSO, 1960-1979) 
Committee of Inquiry appointed by the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) under the 
Chairmanship of J. N. Toothill, Report on the Scottish Economy (Edinburgh: HMSO, 
1961) 
Department of Employment, British Labour Statistics Yearbook (London: HMSO, 1967-1976) 
Employment Policy, 1944 (London: HMSO, 1944) 
Robertson, D. J. (ed.), The Lothians Regional Survey and Plan, Volume One: Economic and 
Social Aspects (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1966) 
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, June 1968 (London: HMSO, 
1968) 
Scottish Council (Development and Industry), Central Scotland: A Programme for Development 
and Growth (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1963) 
Scottish Government, Design at the Heart of House Building, (Edinburgh: 2008), Case Study 2: 
Taylor Woodrow Developments Ltd. – Wester Inch, Bathgate 
 
256 
 
Websites  
Wolverhampton Local History, ‘Meadows’, accessed 23rd July 2012: 
http://www.historywebsite.co.uk/Museum/Engineering/Meadows/HenryMeadows.htm 
BBC News, ‘New £5m MG design studio unveiled at Longbridge site’, 15th June 2010, accessed 
13
th
 January 2013:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10317764. 
 
BBC News, ‘Major rail link project approved’, 28th March 2007, accessed 12th December 2012: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/glasgow_and_west/6504201.stm 
British Pathe, The Truck in Front, 1966, accessed 22
nd
 July 2012: 
http://www.britishpathe.com/video/the-truck-in-front 
 
 
Secondary Literature 
Abrams, L., Oral History Theory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) 
Aldcroft, D., and M. Oliver, Trade Unions and the Economy: 1870-2000 (Aldershot: Ashcroft, 
2000) 
Amin, A., and I. Smith, ‘Decline and Restructuring in the UK Motor Vehicle Components 
Industry’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 37:3, 1990, pp.209-240 
Beckett, A., When the Lights Went Out: Britain in the Seventies (London: Faber and Faber, 
2009) 
Beynon, H., Working for Ford, (London: Allen Lane, 1973) 
Beynon, H., and R. M. Blackburn, Perceptions of Work: Variations within a Factory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) 
257 
 
Black, L., and H. Pemberton, ‘The Uses (and Abuses) of Affluence’, in L. Black and H. 
Pemberton (eds), An Affluent Society? Britain’s Post-War Golden Age Revisited 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) 
Blackwell, T., and J. Seabrook, A World Still to Win: The Reconstruction of the Post-War 
Working Class (London: Faber and Faber, 1985) 
Bluestone, B., and B. Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community 
Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982) 
Booth, A., British Economic Development since 1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1995) 
Booth, Alan, The British Economy in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2001) 
Booth, A., ‘The Manufacturing Failure Hypothesis and the Performance of British Industry 
during the Long Boom’, Economic History Review, 56:1, 2003, pp.1-33 
Broadberry, S., ‘The Performance of Manufacturing’, in R. Floud and R. Johnson, The 
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, volume 3: Structural Change and 
Growth, 1939-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
Broadberry, S., and N. Crafts, ‘UK Productivity Performance from 1950 to 1979: a Restatement 
of the Broadberry-Crafts View’, Economic History Review, 56:4, 2003, pp.718-735 
Bryan, E. (ed.), Bathgate Once More: The Story of the BMC/Leyland Truck and Tractor Plant, 
1961-86 (Edinburgh: Workers’ Educational Association, 2012) 
Budge, I., ‘Relative Decline as a Political Issue: Ideological Motivations of the Politico-
Economic Debate in Post-War Britain’, Contemporary British History, 7:1, 1993, pp.1-23 
Cameron, E., Impaled upon a Thistle: Scotland since 1880 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2010) 
Castle, B., The Castle Diaries, 1964-1976 (London: Papermac 1990) 
258 
 
Church, R., The Rise and Decline of the British Motor Industry (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994) 
Clack, G., Industrial Relations in a British Car Factory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967) 
Clapson, M., Invincible Green Suburbs, Brave New Towns (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1998) 
Claydon, T., ‘Tales of Disorder: The Press and the Narrative Construction of Industrial Relations 
in the British Motor Industry, 1950-79’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 9, 2000, 
pp.1-36 
Claydon, T., ‘Images of Disorder: Car Workers’ Militancy and the Representation of Industrial 
Relations in Britain, 1950-79’, in in D. Thoms, L. Holdon, and T. Claydon, (eds), The 
Motor Car and Popular Culture in the Twentieth Century (London: Ashgate, 1998) 
Clare, A., The Nuffield Tractor Story, Volume One (Ipswich: Old Pond, 2005) 
Coates, K., Work-ins, Sit-ins and Industrial Democracy: The Implications of Factory 
Occupations in Great Britain in the Early ‘Seventies (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1981)  
Cowie, J., and J. Heathcott (eds), Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003) 
Dalyell, T., The Importance of Being Awkward (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2011), Kindle edition  
Devine, F., Affluent Workers Revisited: Privatism and the Working Class (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1992) 
Dimitratos, P., I. Liouka, D. Ross, and S. Young, ‘The Multinational Enterprise and Subsidiary 
Evolution: Scotland since 1945’, Business History, 51:3, May 2009, pp.401-425 
Dunnett, P., The Decline of the British Motor Industry: The Effects of Government Policy, 1945-
1979 (London: Croom Helm, 1980) 
Durand, J, and N. Hatzfeld, translated by D. Roberts, Living Labour: Life on the Line at Peugeot 
France (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)  
259 
 
Edgerton, D., Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) 
Edwardes, M., Back From the Brink: An Apocalyptic Experience (London: Collins, 1983) 
Findlay, P., ‘Resistance, Restructuring and Gender: The Plessey Occupation’, in T. Dickson and 
D. Judge (eds), The Politics of Industrial Closure (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987) 
Findlay, P. and A. McKinlay, ‘‘Restless Factories’: Shop Steward Organisation on Clydeside, 
c.1945-70’, Scottish Labour History, 39, 2004. pp.50-69 
Finlay, R., Modern Scotland, 1914-2000 (London: Profile, 2004) 
Foreman-Peck, J., S. Bowden, and A. McKinlay, The British Motor Industry (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1995) 
Foster, J., ‘The Twentieth Century’, in R.A. Houston and W. Knox, The New Penguin History of 
Scotland (London: Penguin, 1991) 
Foster, J., ‘A Proletarian Nation? Occupation and Class since 1914’, in A. Dickson and J. Treble, 
People and Society in Scotland, Volume III: 1914-1990 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2004) 
Fox, A., and A. Flanders, ‘The Reform of Collective Bargaining: From Donovan to Durkheim’, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 7:2, pp.151-180 
Gall, G., The Political Economy of Scotland: Red Scotland? Radical Scotland? (Cardiff, 
University of Wales Press, 2005) 
Gillette Jr., H., ‘The Wages of Disinvestment: How Money and Politics Aided the Decline of 
Camden, New Jersey’, in Cowie and Heathcott, Beyond the Ruins 
Gilmour, A., ‘Consultation, Co-operation and Collaboration at Chrysler: a ‘new style’ of 
management of the Linwood car plant, 1967-1978’, Scottish Labour History, 44, 2009, 
pp.74-90 
Gilmour, A., ‘The Trouble with Linwood: Compliance and Coercion in the Car Plant, 1963-
1981’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies, 27, 2007, pp.75-93 
260 
 
Goldthorpe, J., D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt, The Affluent Worker: Industrial 
Attitudes and Behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) 
Goldthorpe, J., D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer, and J. Platt, The Affluent Worker in the Class 
Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) 
Gospel, H., and G. Palmer, British Industrial Relations (London: Routledge, 1993) 
Green, A., ‘Can Memory be Collective?’, in D. Ritchie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Oral 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
Grieco, Margaret, ‘The Shaping of a Workforce: A Critique of the Affluent Worker Study’, 
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 1:1, 1981, pp.62-88 
Hamish Fraser, W., A History of British Trade Unionism, 1700-1998 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1999) 
Harvie, C., No Gods and Precious Few Heroes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) 
Hood, N., and S. Young, Multinationals in Retreat: The Scottish Experience (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1982)  
Hood, N., J. Peat, E. Peters, and S. Young, (eds), Scotland in a Global Economy: The 2020 
Vision (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 
James, S., An Essay for Today: The Scottish New Towns, 1947 to 1997 (Edinburgh: Rutland 
Press, 1997) 
Jefferys, S., ‘The Changing Face of Conflict: Shopfloor Organization at Longbridge, 1939-
1980’, in M. Terry and P. K. Edwards (eds), Shopfloor Politics and Job Controls (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1988) 
Johnston, R., and A. McIvor, ‘Marginalising the Body at Work? Employers’ Occupational 
Health Strategies and Occupational Medicine in Scotland, c.1930-1974’, Social History of 
Medicine, 21:1, 2008, pp.127-144 
261 
 
Judge, D., and T. Dickson, ‘The Politics of Closure’, in Dickson and Judge, The Politics of 
Industrial Closure  
Keeble, D., Industrial Location and Planning in the United Kingdom (London: Methuen, 1976) 
Kessler, S., and F. Bayliss, Contemporary British Industrial Relations (London: Macmillan, 
1992) 
Kitson, M., ‘Failure followed by success or success followed by failure? A re-examination of 
British economic growth since 1949’, in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds), The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume III: Structural Change and Growth, 1939-
2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
Knox, W., Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland, 1800-Present (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999) 
Knox, W., ‘Class, Work and Trade Unionism in Scotland’, in Dickson and Treble, People and 
Society in Scotland, Volume III  
Law, C., ‘The Geography of Industrial Rationalisation: The British Motor Car Assembly 
Industry, 1972-1982’, Geography, 1985, pp.1-12 
Lee, C. H., ‘Unbalanced Growth: Prosperity and Deprivation’, in T. M. Devine, C. H. Lee and G. 
C. Peden, (eds.), The Transformation of Scotland: the Economy since 1700 (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2005) 
Levie, H., D. Gregory, and N. Lorentzen, Fighting Closures: De-industrialization and the Trade 
Unions, 1979-1983 (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984) 
Lyddon, D., ‘Workplace Organization in the British Car Industry. A Critique of Jonathan 
Zeitlin’, History Workshop Journal, 15:1, 1983, pp.131-140 
Lyddon, D., ‘The Car Industry, 1945-1979: Shop Stewards and Workplace Unionism’, in C. 
Wrigley (ed.), A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939-1979: Industrial Relations in 
a Declining Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996)  
262 
 
Lyddon, D., ‘“Glorious Summer”, 1972: the High Tide of Rank and File Militancy’, in J. 
McIlroy, N. Fishman and A. Campbell, (eds), British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: 
The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 
Macdonald, C. M. M., Whaur Extremes Meet: Scotland’s Twentieth Century (Edinburgh: John 
Donald, 2009) 
MacKenzie, N., ‘Chucking Buns Across the Fence? Government Planning and Regeneration 
Projects in the Scottish Highland Economy, 1945-82’, PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 
2007 
Marsden, D., T. Morris, P. Willman, and S. Wood, The Car Industry: Labour Relations and 
Industrial Adjustment (London: Tavistock, 1985) 
Maver, I., Glasgow (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 
McCrone, G., Regional Policy in Britain (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969) 
McDonald, G., ‘Social and Geographical Mobility in the Scottish New Towns’, Scottish 
Geographical Journal, 91:1, 1975, pp.38-51 
McIlroy, J., ‘“Every factory our fortress”: Communist Party Workplace Branches in a Time of 
Militancy, 1956-79, Part 2: Testimonies and Judgements’, Historical Studies in Industrial 
Relations, 12, 2001, pp.57-107 
McIvor, A., and R. Johnston, Lethal Work: A History of the Asbestos Tragedy in Scotland (East 
Linton: Tuckwell, 2000) 
McIvor, A., and R. Johnston, Miners’ Lung: A History of Dust Disease in British Coal Mining 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) 
McIvor, A., ‘Were Clydeside Employers More Autocratic?’, in W. Kenefick and A. McIvor 
(eds), Roots of Red Clydeside 1910-1914? Labour Unrest and Industrial Relations in West 
Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1996)  
Melling, J., and A. Booth (eds), Managing the Modern Workplace: Productivity, Politics, and 
Workplace Culture in Post-war Britain (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 
263 
 
Meyer, S., ‘Masculine Culture on the Automotive Shop Floor, 1930-1960’, in R. Horowitz (ed.), 
Boys and their Toys? Masculinity, Class, and Technology in America (London: Routledge, 
2001) 
Milkman, R., Farewell to the Factory: Auto Workers in the Late Twentieth Century (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997) 
Moore, B., and J. Rhodes, ‘Regional Policy and the Scottish Economy’, Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, 22:3, 1974, pp.215-235 
Murden, J., ‘Demands for Fair Wages and Pay Parity in the British Motor Industry in the 1960s 
and 1970s’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 20, 2005, pp.1-27 
Newlands, D., ‘The Regional Economies of Scotland’, in Devine et al., The Transformation of 
Scotland 
Nichols, T., The British Worker Question: A New Look at Workers and Productivity in 
Manufacturing (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986) 
Offer, A., The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and 
Britain since 1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
Oglethorpe, M., Scottish Collieries: An Inventory of the Scottish Coal Industry in the 
Nationalised Era (Edinburgh: RCAHMS, 2006) 
O’Hara, ‘A Journey Without Maps: The Regional Policies of the 1964-70 British Labour 
Government’, Regional Studies, 39:9, 2005, pp.1183-1195 
Payne, P., Growth and Contraction: Scottish industry, c.1860 – 1990 (Glasgow: Economic and 
Social History Society of Scotland, 1992) 
Peden, G. C., ‘The Managed Economy: Scotland, 191-2000’, in Devine et al., The 
Transformation of Scotland 
H. Pemberton, ‘Affluence, Relative Decline, and the Treasury’, in Black and Pemberton, An 
Affluent Society? 
264 
 
Phillips, J., The Industrial Politics of Devolution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2008) 
Phillips, J., Collieries, Communities and the Miners’ Strike in Scotland, 1984-1985 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2012) 
Phillips, J., ‘Workplace Conflict and the Origins of the 1984-85 Miners’ Strike in Scotland’, 
Twentieth Century British History, 20:2, 2009, pp.152-172 
Portelli, A., They Say in Harlan County: An Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011)  
Portelli, A., ‘What Makes Oral History Different’, in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds), 
The Oral History Reader (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998) 
Randall, J. N., ‘New Towns and New Industries’, in R. Saville (ed.), The Economic Development 
of Modern Scotland, 1950-1980 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1985) 
Reid, A., United We Stand: A History of Britain’s Trade Unions (London: Allen Page, 2004) 
Rosevear, S., ‘Regional policy and the British motor vehicle industry 1945-64: a study in 
selective intervention and the economics of industrial location’, unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Bristol, 1998 
Sandbrook, D., Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979 (London: Allen Lane, 
2012) 
Savage, K., ‘Monuments of a Lost Cause: the Postindustrial Campaign to Commemorate Steel’, 
in Cowie and Heathcott, Beyond the Ruins 
Savage, M., ‘Working-Class Identities in the 1960s: Revisiting the Affluent Worker Study’, 
Sociology, 39:5, 2005, pp.929-946 
Savage, M., G. Bagnall, and B. Longurst, ‘Local Habitus and Working-Class Culture’, in M. 
Savage, J. Scott, and R. Crompton (eds) Rethinking Class: Culture, Identities, and Lifestyle 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 
265 
 
Scott, P., ‘Regional Development and Policy’, in Floud and Johnson, The Cambridge Economic 
History  
Scott, P., ‘From a Solution to a Problem? Overseas Multinationals in Britain during Economic 
Decline and Renaissance’, in R. Coopey and P. Lyth (eds), Business in Britain in the 
Twentieth Century: Decline and Renaissance? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
Scott, P., ‘The Worst of Both Worlds: British Regional Policy, 1951-64’, Business History, 38: 
4, 1996, pp.41-64 
Scott, P., ‘Dispersion versus Decentralization: British Location of Industry Policies and Regional 
Development, 1945-60’, Economy and Society, 26:4, 1997, pp.579-598 
Scott, P., ‘The State, Internal Migration, and the Growth of New Industrial Communities in 
Inter-War Britain’, The English Historical Review, 115:461, 2000, pp.329-353  
Scott, P., ‘Marketing Mass Home-Ownership and the Creation of the Modern Working-Class 
Consumer in Inter-War Britain’, Business History Review, 50:1, 2008, pp.4-25 
Scott, P., ‘Mr Drage, Mr Everyman, and the Creation of a Mass Market for Furniture in Inter-
War Britain’, Economic History Review, 62:4, 2009, pp.802-827 
Spencer, K., A. Taylor, B. Smith, J. Mawson, N. Flynn and R. Batley, Crisis in the Industrial 
Heartland: A Study of the West Midlands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 
Stewart, D., ‘Fighting for Survival: The 1980s Campaign to Save Ravenscraig Steelworks’, 
Journal of Scottish Historical Studies, 25.1, 2005, pp.40-57 
Summerfield, P., ‘Culture and Composure: Creating Narratives of the Gendered Self in Oral 
History Interviews’, Cultural and Social History, 1:1, 2004, pp.65-93 
Thoms, D., and T. Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry in Coventry since the 1890s (London: 
Croom Helm, 1985) 
Thompson, P., ‘The Voice of the Past: Oral History’, in Perks and Thomson, The Oral History 
Reader 
266 
 
Tiratsoo, N., Reconstruction, Affluence and Labour Politics: Coventry, 1945-1960 (London: 
Routledge, 1990) 
Tolliday, S., Between Fordism and Flexibility: The Automobile Industry and its Workers 
(Oxford: Berg, 1992) 
Tomlinson, J., Government and the Enterprise since 1900: The Changing Problem of Efficiency 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 
Tomlinson, J., The Politics of Decline (Harlow: Longman, 2001) 
Tomlinson, J., ‘Economic policy’, in Floud and Johnson, The Cambridge Economic History 
Tomlinson, Jim, ‘Managing the economy, managing the people: Britain c.1931-70’, Economic 
History Review, 58:3, 2005 
Tomlinson, J., ‘A ‘Failed Experiment’? Public Ownership and the Narratives of Post-War 
Britain’, Labour History Review, 73:2, 2008 
Tomlinson, J., ‘Not “Decline and Revival”: An Alternative Narrative on British Post-War 
Productivity’, in Coopey and Lyth, Business in Britain  
Tomlinson, J., ‘Thrice Denied: ‘Declinism as a Recurrent Theme in British History in the Long 
Twentieth Century’, Twentieth Century British History, 20:2, 2009 
Turner, A., Crisis? What Crisis? Britain in the 1970s (London: Aurum, 2008) 
Turner, H. A., G. Clack, and G. Roberts, Labour Relations in the Motor Industry: A Study of 
Industrial Unrest and an International Comparison (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1967) 
Whisler, T., The British Motor Industry, 1945-1994: A Case Study in Industrial Decline (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) 
Wigham, E., The Power to Manage: A History of the Engineering Employers’ Federation 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973) 
267 
 
Wight, D., Workers Not Wasters: Masculine Respectability, Consumption & Employment in 
Central Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993) 
Wilks, S., Industrial Policy and the Motor Industry (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984) 
Willman, P., and G. Winch, Innovation and Management Control: Labour Relations at BL Cars 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
Wood, J., Wheels of Misfortune: The Rise and Fall of the British Motor Industry (London: 
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988) 
Wrigley, C., ‘Trade Unions, the Government and the Economy’, in T. Gourvish and A. O’Day, 
Britain Since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1991) 
Wrigley, C., ‘Trade Union Development, 1945-1979’, in C. Wrigley (ed.), A History of British 
Industrial Relations, 1939-1979: Industrial Relations in a Declining Economy 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996)  
Wrigley, C., ‘Strikes in the Motor Car Manufacturing Industry’, in A. Charlesworth et al., An 
Atlas of Industrial Protest: 1750–1990 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) 
Young, S., and N. Hood, ‘The Linwood Experience: Chrysler and Peugeot-Citroen in Scotland’, 
in S. Maxwell (ed.), Scotland, Multinationals, and the Third World (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream, 1982) 
Young, S., and A. Reeves, ‘The Engineering and Metals Sector’, in N. Hood and S. Young, 
(eds), Industry, Policy and the Scottish Economy (Edinburgh University Press, 1984) 
Zeitlin, J., ‘The Emergence of Shop Steward Organization and Job Control in the British Car 
Industry: A Review Essay’, History Workshop Journal, 10:1, 1980, pp.119-137 
Zweig, Ferdinand, The Worker in an Affluent Society: Family Life and Industry (London: 
Heinemann, 1961) 
 
